Merge branch 'master' into v2_fuzz

.github/workflows/crypto_test.yml

@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ jobs:
       - name: Set up OpenSK
         run: ./setup.sh
 
-      - run: echo "::set-env name=RUSTFLAGS::-C target-feature=+aes"
+      - run: echo "RUSTFLAGS=-C target-feature=+aes" >> $GITHUB_ENV
 
       - name: Unit testing of crypto library (release mode)
         uses: actions-rs/cargo@v1

fuzz/fuzz_helper/src/lib.rs

@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ fn process_message<CheckUserPresence>(
 pub fn process_ctap_any_type(data: &[u8]) {
     // Initialize ctap state and hid and get the allocated cid.
     let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {};
-    let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present);
+    let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE);
     let mut ctap_hid = CtapHid::new();
     let cid = initialize(&mut ctap_state, &mut ctap_hid);
     // Wrap input as message with the allocated cid.
@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ pub fn process_ctap_specific_type(data: &[u8], input_type: InputType) {
     }
     // Initialize ctap state and hid and get the allocated cid.
     let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {};
-    let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present);
+    let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE);
     let mut ctap_hid = CtapHid::new();
     let cid = initialize(&mut ctap_state, &mut ctap_hid);
     // Wrap input as message with allocated cid and command type.

libraries/persistent_store/src/driver.rs

@@ -181,6 +181,12 @@ pub enum StoreInvariant {
     },
 }
 
+impl From<StoreError> for StoreInvariant {
+    fn from(error: StoreError) -> StoreInvariant {
+        StoreInvariant::StoreError(error)
+    }
+}
+
 impl StoreDriver {
     /// Provides read-only access to the storage.
     pub fn storage(&self) -> &BufferStorage {
@@ -249,6 +255,10 @@ impl StoreDriverOff {
     }
 
     /// Powers on the store without interruption.
+    ///
+    /// # Panics
+    ///
+    /// Panics if the store cannot be powered on.
     pub fn power_on(self) -> Result<StoreDriverOn, StoreInvariant> {
         Ok(self
             .partial_power_on(StoreInterruption::none())
@@ -506,8 +516,8 @@ impl StoreDriverOn {
     /// Checks that the store and model are in sync.
     fn check_model(&self) -> Result<(), StoreInvariant> {
         let mut model_content = self.model.content().clone();
-        for handle in self.store.iter().unwrap() {
+        for handle in self.store.iter()? {
-            let handle = handle.unwrap();
+            let handle = handle?;
             let model_value = match model_content.remove(&handle.get_key()) {
                 None => {
                     return Err(StoreInvariant::OnlyInStore {
@@ -516,7 +526,7 @@ impl StoreDriverOn {
                 }
                 Some(x) => x,
             };
-            let store_value = handle.get_value(&self.store).unwrap().into_boxed_slice();
+            let store_value = handle.get_value(&self.store)?.into_boxed_slice();
             if store_value != model_value {
                 return Err(StoreInvariant::DifferentValue {
                     key: handle.get_key(),
@@ -528,7 +538,7 @@ impl StoreDriverOn {
         if let Some(&key) = model_content.keys().next() {
             return Err(StoreInvariant::OnlyInModel { key });
         }
-        let store_capacity = self.store.capacity().unwrap().remaining();
+        let store_capacity = self.store.capacity()?.remaining();
         let model_capacity = self.model.capacity().remaining();
         if store_capacity != model_capacity {
             return Err(StoreInvariant::DifferentCapacity {
@@ -544,8 +554,8 @@ impl StoreDriverOn {
         let format = self.model.format();
         let storage = self.store.storage();
         let num_words = format.page_size() / format.word_size();
-        let head = self.store.head().unwrap();
+        let head = self.store.head()?;
-        let tail = self.store.tail().unwrap();
+        let tail = self.store.tail()?;
         for page in 0..format.num_pages() {
             // Check the erase cycle of the page.
             let store_erase = head.cycle(format) + (page < head.page(format)) as Nat;

metadata/metadata.json

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+{
+   "assertionScheme": "FIDOV2",
+   "keyProtection": 1,
+   "attestationRootCertificates": [],
+   "aaguid": "664d9f67-84a2-412a-9ff7-b4f7d8ee6d05",
+   "publicKeyAlgAndEncoding": 260,
+   "protocolFamily": "fido2",
+   "upv": [
+      {
+         "major": 1,
+         "minor": 0
+      }
+   ],
+   "icon": "",
+   "matcherProtection": 1,
+   "supportedExtensions": [
+      {
+         "id": "hmac-secret",
+         "fail_if_unknown": false
+      },
+      {
+         "id": "credProtect",
+         "fail_if_unknown": false
+      }
+   ],
+   "cryptoStrength": 128,
+   "description": "OpenSK authenticator",
+   "authenticatorVersion": 1,
+   "isSecondFactorOnly": false,
+   "userVerificationDetails": [
+      [
+         {
+            "userVerification": 1
+         },
+         {
+            "userVerification": 4
+         }
+      ]
+   ],
+   "attachmentHint": 6,
+   "attestationTypes": [
+      15880
+   ],
+   "authenticationAlgorithm": 1,
+   "tcDisplay": 0
+}

src/ctap/command.rs

@@ -57,8 +57,8 @@ impl Command {
     const AUTHENTICATOR_GET_INFO: u8 = 0x04;
     const AUTHENTICATOR_CLIENT_PIN: u8 = 0x06;
     const AUTHENTICATOR_RESET: u8 = 0x07;
-    // TODO(kaczmarczyck) use or remove those constants
     const AUTHENTICATOR_GET_NEXT_ASSERTION: u8 = 0x08;
+    // TODO(kaczmarczyck) use or remove those constants
     const AUTHENTICATOR_BIO_ENROLLMENT: u8 = 0x09;
     const AUTHENTICATOR_CREDENTIAL_MANAGEMENT: u8 = 0xA0;
     const AUTHENTICATOR_SELECTION: u8 = 0xB0;

src/ctap/ctap1.rs

@@ -13,7 +13,6 @@
 // limitations under the License.
 
 use super::hid::ChannelID;
-use super::key_material::{ATTESTATION_CERTIFICATE, ATTESTATION_PRIVATE_KEY};
 use super::status_code::Ctap2StatusCode;
 use super::CtapState;
 use alloc::vec::Vec;
@@ -36,6 +35,8 @@ pub enum Ctap1StatusCode {
     SW_WRONG_LENGTH = 0x6700,
     SW_CLA_NOT_SUPPORTED = 0x6E00,
     SW_INS_NOT_SUPPORTED = 0x6D00,
+    SW_MEMERR = 0x6501,
+    SW_COMMAND_ABORTED = 0x6F00,
     SW_VENDOR_KEY_HANDLE_TOO_LONG = 0xF000,
 }
 
@@ -50,6 +51,8 @@ impl TryFrom<u16> for Ctap1StatusCode {
             0x6700 => Ok(Ctap1StatusCode::SW_WRONG_LENGTH),
             0x6E00 => Ok(Ctap1StatusCode::SW_CLA_NOT_SUPPORTED),
             0x6D00 => Ok(Ctap1StatusCode::SW_INS_NOT_SUPPORTED),
+            0x6501 => Ok(Ctap1StatusCode::SW_MEMERR),
+            0x6F00 => Ok(Ctap1StatusCode::SW_COMMAND_ABORTED),
             0xF000 => Ok(Ctap1StatusCode::SW_VENDOR_KEY_HANDLE_TOO_LONG),
             _ => Err(()),
         }
@@ -288,21 +291,31 @@ impl Ctap1Command {
         let sk = crypto::ecdsa::SecKey::gensk(ctap_state.rng);
         let pk = sk.genpk();
         let key_handle = ctap_state
-            .encrypt_key_handle(sk, &application)
+            .encrypt_key_handle(sk, &application, None)
-            .map_err(|_| Ctap1StatusCode::SW_VENDOR_KEY_HANDLE_TOO_LONG)?;
+            .map_err(|_| Ctap1StatusCode::SW_COMMAND_ABORTED)?;
         if key_handle.len() > 0xFF {
             // This is just being defensive with unreachable code.
             return Err(Ctap1StatusCode::SW_VENDOR_KEY_HANDLE_TOO_LONG);
         }
 
-        let mut response =
+        let certificate = ctap_state
-            Vec::with_capacity(105 + key_handle.len() + ATTESTATION_CERTIFICATE.len());
+            .persistent_store
+            .attestation_certificate()
+            .map_err(|_| Ctap1StatusCode::SW_MEMERR)?
+            .ok_or(Ctap1StatusCode::SW_COMMAND_ABORTED)?;
+        let private_key = ctap_state
+            .persistent_store
+            .attestation_private_key()
+            .map_err(|_| Ctap1StatusCode::SW_MEMERR)?
+            .ok_or(Ctap1StatusCode::SW_COMMAND_ABORTED)?;
+
+        let mut response = Vec::with_capacity(105 + key_handle.len() + certificate.len());
         response.push(Ctap1Command::LEGACY_BYTE);
         let user_pk = pk.to_uncompressed();
         response.extend_from_slice(&user_pk);
         response.push(key_handle.len() as u8);
         response.extend(key_handle.clone());
-        response.extend_from_slice(&ATTESTATION_CERTIFICATE);
+        response.extend_from_slice(&certificate);
 
         // The first byte is reserved.
         let mut signature_data = Vec::with_capacity(66 + key_handle.len());
@@ -312,7 +325,7 @@ impl Ctap1Command {
         signature_data.extend(key_handle);
         signature_data.extend_from_slice(&user_pk);
 
-        let attestation_key = crypto::ecdsa::SecKey::from_bytes(ATTESTATION_PRIVATE_KEY).unwrap();
+        let attestation_key = crypto::ecdsa::SecKey::from_bytes(private_key).unwrap();
         let signature = attestation_key.sign_rfc6979::<crypto::sha256::Sha256>(&signature_data);
 
         response.extend(signature.to_asn1_der());
@@ -373,7 +386,7 @@ impl Ctap1Command {
 
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod test {
-    use super::super::{ENCRYPTED_CREDENTIAL_ID_SIZE, USE_SIGNATURE_COUNTER};
+    use super::super::{key_material, CREDENTIAL_ID_BASE_SIZE, USE_SIGNATURE_COUNTER};
     use super::*;
     use crypto::rng256::ThreadRng256;
     use crypto::Hash256;
@@ -413,12 +426,12 @@ mod test {
             0x00,
             0x00,
             0x00,
-            65 + ENCRYPTED_CREDENTIAL_ID_SIZE as u8,
+            65 + CREDENTIAL_ID_BASE_SIZE as u8,
         ];
         let challenge = [0x0C; 32];
         message.extend(&challenge);
         message.extend(application);
-        message.push(ENCRYPTED_CREDENTIAL_ID_SIZE as u8);
+        message.push(CREDENTIAL_ID_BASE_SIZE as u8);
         message.extend(key_handle);
         message
     }
@@ -427,28 +440,49 @@ mod test {
     fn test_process_register() {
         let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {};
         let dummy_user_presence = |_| panic!("Unexpected user presence check in CTAP1");
-        let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, dummy_user_presence);
+        let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, dummy_user_presence, START_CLOCK_VALUE);
 
         let application = [0x0A; 32];
         let message = create_register_message(&application);
         ctap_state.u2f_up_state.consume_up(START_CLOCK_VALUE);
         ctap_state.u2f_up_state.grant_up(START_CLOCK_VALUE);
+        let response = Ctap1Command::process_command(&message, &mut ctap_state, START_CLOCK_VALUE);
+        // Certificate and private key are missing
+        assert_eq!(response, Err(Ctap1StatusCode::SW_COMMAND_ABORTED));
+
+        let fake_key = [0x41u8; key_material::ATTESTATION_PRIVATE_KEY_LENGTH];
+        assert!(ctap_state
+            .persistent_store
+            .set_attestation_private_key(&fake_key)
+            .is_ok());
+        ctap_state.u2f_up_state.consume_up(START_CLOCK_VALUE);
+        ctap_state.u2f_up_state.grant_up(START_CLOCK_VALUE);
+        let response = Ctap1Command::process_command(&message, &mut ctap_state, START_CLOCK_VALUE);
+        // Certificate is still missing
+        assert_eq!(response, Err(Ctap1StatusCode::SW_COMMAND_ABORTED));
+
+        let fake_cert = [0x99u8; 100]; // Arbitrary length
+        assert!(ctap_state
+            .persistent_store
+            .set_attestation_certificate(&fake_cert[..])
+            .is_ok());
+        ctap_state.u2f_up_state.consume_up(START_CLOCK_VALUE);
+        ctap_state.u2f_up_state.grant_up(START_CLOCK_VALUE);
         let response =
             Ctap1Command::process_command(&message, &mut ctap_state, START_CLOCK_VALUE).unwrap();
-
         assert_eq!(response[0], Ctap1Command::LEGACY_BYTE);
-        assert_eq!(response[66], ENCRYPTED_CREDENTIAL_ID_SIZE as u8);
+        assert_eq!(response[66], CREDENTIAL_ID_BASE_SIZE as u8);
         assert!(ctap_state
             .decrypt_credential_source(
-                response[67..67 + ENCRYPTED_CREDENTIAL_ID_SIZE].to_vec(),
+                response[67..67 + CREDENTIAL_ID_BASE_SIZE].to_vec(),
                 &application
             )
             .unwrap()
             .is_some());
-        const CERT_START: usize = 67 + ENCRYPTED_CREDENTIAL_ID_SIZE;
+        const CERT_START: usize = 67 + CREDENTIAL_ID_BASE_SIZE;
         assert_eq!(
-            &response[CERT_START..CERT_START + ATTESTATION_CERTIFICATE.len()],
+            &response[CERT_START..CERT_START + fake_cert.len()],
-            &ATTESTATION_CERTIFICATE[..]
+            &fake_cert[..]
         );
     }
 
@@ -456,7 +490,7 @@ mod test {
     fn test_process_register_bad_message() {
         let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {};
         let dummy_user_presence = |_| panic!("Unexpected user presence check in CTAP1");
-        let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, dummy_user_presence);
+        let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, dummy_user_presence, START_CLOCK_VALUE);
 
         let application = [0x0A; 32];
         let message = create_register_message(&application);
@@ -476,7 +510,7 @@ mod test {
 
         let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {};
         let dummy_user_presence = |_| panic!("Unexpected user presence check in CTAP1");
-        let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, dummy_user_presence);
+        let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, dummy_user_presence, START_CLOCK_VALUE);
 
         ctap_state.u2f_up_state.consume_up(START_CLOCK_VALUE);
         ctap_state.u2f_up_state.grant_up(START_CLOCK_VALUE);
@@ -490,11 +524,13 @@ mod test {
         let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {};
         let dummy_user_presence = |_| panic!("Unexpected user presence check in CTAP1");
         let sk = crypto::ecdsa::SecKey::gensk(&mut rng);
-        let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, dummy_user_presence);
+        let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, dummy_user_presence, START_CLOCK_VALUE);
 
         let rp_id = "example.com";
         let application = crypto::sha256::Sha256::hash(rp_id.as_bytes());
-        let key_handle = ctap_state.encrypt_key_handle(sk, &application).unwrap();
+        let key_handle = ctap_state
+            .encrypt_key_handle(sk, &application, None)
+            .unwrap();
         let message = create_authenticate_message(&application, Ctap1Flags::CheckOnly, &key_handle);
 
         let response = Ctap1Command::process_command(&message, &mut ctap_state, START_CLOCK_VALUE);
@@ -506,11 +542,13 @@ mod test {
         let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {};
         let dummy_user_presence = |_| panic!("Unexpected user presence check in CTAP1");
         let sk = crypto::ecdsa::SecKey::gensk(&mut rng);
-        let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, dummy_user_presence);
+        let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, dummy_user_presence, START_CLOCK_VALUE);
 
         let rp_id = "example.com";
         let application = crypto::sha256::Sha256::hash(rp_id.as_bytes());
-        let key_handle = ctap_state.encrypt_key_handle(sk, &application).unwrap();
+        let key_handle = ctap_state
+            .encrypt_key_handle(sk, &application, None)
+            .unwrap();
         let application = [0x55; 32];
         let message = create_authenticate_message(&application, Ctap1Flags::CheckOnly, &key_handle);
 
@@ -523,11 +561,13 @@ mod test {
         let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {};
         let dummy_user_presence = |_| panic!("Unexpected user presence check in CTAP1");
         let sk = crypto::ecdsa::SecKey::gensk(&mut rng);
-        let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, dummy_user_presence);
+        let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, dummy_user_presence, START_CLOCK_VALUE);
 
         let rp_id = "example.com";
         let application = crypto::sha256::Sha256::hash(rp_id.as_bytes());
-        let key_handle = ctap_state.encrypt_key_handle(sk, &application).unwrap();
+        let key_handle = ctap_state
+            .encrypt_key_handle(sk, &application, None)
+            .unwrap();
         let mut message =
             create_authenticate_message(&application, Ctap1Flags::CheckOnly, &key_handle);
 
@@ -547,11 +587,13 @@ mod test {
         let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {};
         let dummy_user_presence = |_| panic!("Unexpected user presence check in CTAP1");
         let sk = crypto::ecdsa::SecKey::gensk(&mut rng);
-        let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, dummy_user_presence);
+        let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, dummy_user_presence, START_CLOCK_VALUE);
 
         let rp_id = "example.com";
         let application = crypto::sha256::Sha256::hash(rp_id.as_bytes());
-        let key_handle = ctap_state.encrypt_key_handle(sk, &application).unwrap();
+        let key_handle = ctap_state
+            .encrypt_key_handle(sk, &application, None)
+            .unwrap();
         let mut message =
             create_authenticate_message(&application, Ctap1Flags::CheckOnly, &key_handle);
         message[0] = 0xEE;
@@ -565,11 +607,13 @@ mod test {
         let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {};
         let dummy_user_presence = |_| panic!("Unexpected user presence check in CTAP1");
         let sk = crypto::ecdsa::SecKey::gensk(&mut rng);
-        let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, dummy_user_presence);
+        let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, dummy_user_presence, START_CLOCK_VALUE);
 
         let rp_id = "example.com";
         let application = crypto::sha256::Sha256::hash(rp_id.as_bytes());
-        let key_handle = ctap_state.encrypt_key_handle(sk, &application).unwrap();
+        let key_handle = ctap_state
+            .encrypt_key_handle(sk, &application, None)
+            .unwrap();
         let mut message =
             create_authenticate_message(&application, Ctap1Flags::CheckOnly, &key_handle);
         message[1] = 0xEE;
@@ -583,11 +627,13 @@ mod test {
         let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {};
         let dummy_user_presence = |_| panic!("Unexpected user presence check in CTAP1");
         let sk = crypto::ecdsa::SecKey::gensk(&mut rng);
-        let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, dummy_user_presence);
+        let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, dummy_user_presence, START_CLOCK_VALUE);
 
         let rp_id = "example.com";
         let application = crypto::sha256::Sha256::hash(rp_id.as_bytes());
-        let key_handle = ctap_state.encrypt_key_handle(sk, &application).unwrap();
+        let key_handle = ctap_state
+            .encrypt_key_handle(sk, &application, None)
+            .unwrap();
         let mut message =
             create_authenticate_message(&application, Ctap1Flags::CheckOnly, &key_handle);
         message[2] = 0xEE;
@@ -601,11 +647,13 @@ mod test {
         let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {};
         let dummy_user_presence = |_| panic!("Unexpected user presence check in CTAP1");
         let sk = crypto::ecdsa::SecKey::gensk(&mut rng);
-        let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, dummy_user_presence);
+        let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, dummy_user_presence, START_CLOCK_VALUE);
 
         let rp_id = "example.com";
         let application = crypto::sha256::Sha256::hash(rp_id.as_bytes());
-        let key_handle = ctap_state.encrypt_key_handle(sk, &application).unwrap();
+        let key_handle = ctap_state
+            .encrypt_key_handle(sk, &application, None)
+            .unwrap();
         let message =
             create_authenticate_message(&application, Ctap1Flags::EnforceUpAndSign, &key_handle);
 
@@ -626,11 +674,13 @@ mod test {
         let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {};
         let dummy_user_presence = |_| panic!("Unexpected user presence check in CTAP1");
         let sk = crypto::ecdsa::SecKey::gensk(&mut rng);
-        let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, dummy_user_presence);
+        let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, dummy_user_presence, START_CLOCK_VALUE);
 
         let rp_id = "example.com";
         let application = crypto::sha256::Sha256::hash(rp_id.as_bytes());
-        let key_handle = ctap_state.encrypt_key_handle(sk, &application).unwrap();
+        let key_handle = ctap_state
+            .encrypt_key_handle(sk, &application, None)
+            .unwrap();
         let message = create_authenticate_message(
             &application,
             Ctap1Flags::DontEnforceUpAndSign,
@@ -650,13 +700,13 @@ mod test {
     #[test]
     fn test_process_authenticate_bad_key_handle() {
         let application = [0x0A; 32];
-        let key_handle = vec![0x00; ENCRYPTED_CREDENTIAL_ID_SIZE];
+        let key_handle = vec![0x00; CREDENTIAL_ID_BASE_SIZE];
         let message =
             create_authenticate_message(&application, Ctap1Flags::EnforceUpAndSign, &key_handle);
 
         let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {};
         let dummy_user_presence = |_| panic!("Unexpected user presence check in CTAP1");
-        let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, dummy_user_presence);
+        let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, dummy_user_presence, START_CLOCK_VALUE);
 
         ctap_state.u2f_up_state.consume_up(START_CLOCK_VALUE);
         ctap_state.u2f_up_state.grant_up(START_CLOCK_VALUE);
@@ -667,13 +717,13 @@ mod test {
     #[test]
     fn test_process_authenticate_without_up() {
         let application = [0x0A; 32];
-        let key_handle = vec![0x00; ENCRYPTED_CREDENTIAL_ID_SIZE];
+        let key_handle = vec![0x00; CREDENTIAL_ID_BASE_SIZE];
         let message =
             create_authenticate_message(&application, Ctap1Flags::EnforceUpAndSign, &key_handle);
 
         let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {};
         let dummy_user_presence = |_| panic!("Unexpected user presence check in CTAP1");
-        let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, dummy_user_presence);
+        let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, dummy_user_presence, START_CLOCK_VALUE);
 
         ctap_state.u2f_up_state.consume_up(START_CLOCK_VALUE);
         ctap_state.u2f_up_state.grant_up(START_CLOCK_VALUE);

src/ctap/data_formats.rs

@@ -308,7 +308,8 @@ impl TryFrom<cbor::Value> for GetAssertionExtensions {
     }
 }
 
-#[cfg_attr(any(test, feature = "debug_ctap"), derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
+#[derive(Clone)]
+#[cfg_attr(any(test, feature = "debug_ctap"), derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
 pub struct GetAssertionHmacSecretInput {
     pub key_agreement: CoseKey,
     pub salt_enc: Vec<u8>,
@@ -361,10 +362,8 @@ impl TryFrom<cbor::Value> for MakeCredentialOptions {
             Some(options_entry) => extract_bool(options_entry)?,
             None => false,
         };
-        if let Some(options_entry) = up {
+        if up.is_some() {
-            if !extract_bool(options_entry)? {
+            return Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_INVALID_OPTION);
-                return Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_INVALID_OPTION);
-            }
         }
         let uv = match uv {
             Some(options_entry) => extract_bool(options_entry)?,
@@ -501,6 +500,7 @@ pub struct PublicKeyCredentialSource {
     pub other_ui: Option<String>,
     pub cred_random: Option<Vec<u8>>,
     pub cred_protect_policy: Option<CredentialProtectionPolicy>,
+    pub creation_order: u64,
 }
 
 // We serialize credentials for the persistent storage using CBOR maps. Each field of a credential
@@ -513,6 +513,7 @@ enum PublicKeyCredentialSourceField {
     OtherUi = 4,
     CredRandom = 5,
     CredProtectPolicy = 6,
+    CreationOrder = 7,
     // When a field is removed, its tag should be reserved and not used for new fields. We document
     // those reserved tags below.
     // Reserved tags: none.
@@ -536,6 +537,7 @@ impl From<PublicKeyCredentialSource> for cbor::Value {
             PublicKeyCredentialSourceField::OtherUi => credential.other_ui,
             PublicKeyCredentialSourceField::CredRandom => credential.cred_random,
             PublicKeyCredentialSourceField::CredProtectPolicy => credential.cred_protect_policy,
+            PublicKeyCredentialSourceField::CreationOrder => credential.creation_order,
         }
     }
 }
@@ -553,6 +555,7 @@ impl TryFrom<cbor::Value> for PublicKeyCredentialSource {
                 PublicKeyCredentialSourceField::OtherUi => other_ui,
                 PublicKeyCredentialSourceField::CredRandom => cred_random,
                 PublicKeyCredentialSourceField::CredProtectPolicy => cred_protect_policy,
+                PublicKeyCredentialSourceField::CreationOrder => creation_order,
             } = extract_map(cbor_value)?;
         }
 
@@ -570,6 +573,7 @@ impl TryFrom<cbor::Value> for PublicKeyCredentialSource {
         let cred_protect_policy = cred_protect_policy
             .map(CredentialProtectionPolicy::try_from)
             .transpose()?;
+        let creation_order = creation_order.map(extract_unsigned).unwrap_or(Ok(0))?;
         // We don't return whether there were unknown fields in the CBOR value. This means that
         // deserialization is not injective. In particular deserialization is only an inverse of
         // serialization at a given version of OpenSK. This is not a problem because:
@@ -589,6 +593,7 @@ impl TryFrom<cbor::Value> for PublicKeyCredentialSource {
             other_ui,
             cred_random,
             cred_protect_policy,
+            creation_order,
         })
     }
 }
@@ -605,7 +610,8 @@ impl PublicKeyCredentialSource {
 // TODO(kaczmarczyck) we could decide to split this data type up
 // It depends on the algorithm though, I think.
 // So before creating a mess, this is my workaround.
-#[cfg_attr(any(test, feature = "debug_ctap"), derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
+#[derive(Clone)]
+#[cfg_attr(any(test, feature = "debug_ctap"), derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
 pub struct CoseKey(pub BTreeMap<cbor::KeyType, cbor::Value>);
 
 // This is the algorithm specifier that is supposed to be used in a COSE key
@@ -1357,6 +1363,7 @@ mod test {
             other_ui: None,
             cred_random: None,
             cred_protect_policy: None,
+            creation_order: 0,
         };
 
         assert_eq!(

src/ctap/hid/mod.rs

@@ -200,7 +200,8 @@ impl CtapHid {
                         // Each transaction is atomic, so we process the command directly here and
                         // don't handle any other packet in the meantime.
                         // TODO: Send keep-alive packets in the meantime.
-                        let response = ctap_state.process_command(&message.payload, cid);
+                        let response =
+                            ctap_state.process_command(&message.payload, cid, clock_value);
                         if let Some(iterator) = CtapHid::split_message(Message {
                             cid,
                             cmd: CtapHid::COMMAND_CBOR,
@@ -227,44 +228,35 @@ impl CtapHid {
                     }
                     // CTAP specification (version 20190130) section 8.1.9.1.3
                     CtapHid::COMMAND_INIT => {
-                        if cid == CtapHid::CHANNEL_BROADCAST {
+                        if message.payload.len() != 8 {
-                            if message.payload.len() != 8 {
+                            return CtapHid::error_message(cid, CtapHid::ERR_INVALID_LEN);
-                                return CtapHid::error_message(cid, CtapHid::ERR_INVALID_LEN);
+                        }
-                            }
 
+                        let new_cid = if cid == CtapHid::CHANNEL_BROADCAST {
                             // TODO: Prevent allocating 2^32 channels.
                             self.allocated_cids += 1;
-                            let allocated_cid = (self.allocated_cids as u32).to_ne_bytes();
+                            (self.allocated_cids as u32).to_ne_bytes()
-
-                            let mut payload = vec![0; 17];
-                            payload[..8].copy_from_slice(&message.payload);
-                            payload[8..12].copy_from_slice(&allocated_cid);
-                            payload[12] = CtapHid::PROTOCOL_VERSION;
-                            payload[13] = CtapHid::DEVICE_VERSION_MAJOR;
-                            payload[14] = CtapHid::DEVICE_VERSION_MINOR;
-                            payload[15] = CtapHid::DEVICE_VERSION_BUILD;
-                            payload[16] = CtapHid::CAPABILITIES;
-
-                            // This unwrap is safe because the payload length is 17 <= 7609 bytes.
-                            CtapHid::split_message(Message {
-                                cid,
-                                cmd: CtapHid::COMMAND_INIT,
-                                payload,
-                            })
-                            .unwrap()
                         } else {
                             // Sync the channel and discard the current transaction.
-                            // TODO: The specification (version 20190130) wording isn't clear about
+                            cid
-                            // the payload format in this case.
+                        };
-                            //
+
-                            // This unwrap is safe because the payload length is 0 <= 7609 bytes.
+                        let mut payload = vec![0; 17];
-                            CtapHid::split_message(Message {
+                        payload[..8].copy_from_slice(&message.payload);
-                                cid,
+                        payload[8..12].copy_from_slice(&new_cid);
-                                cmd: CtapHid::COMMAND_INIT,
+                        payload[12] = CtapHid::PROTOCOL_VERSION;
-                                payload: vec![],
+                        payload[13] = CtapHid::DEVICE_VERSION_MAJOR;
-                            })
+                        payload[14] = CtapHid::DEVICE_VERSION_MINOR;
-                            .unwrap()
+                        payload[15] = CtapHid::DEVICE_VERSION_BUILD;
-                        }
+                        payload[16] = CtapHid::CAPABILITIES;
+
+                        // This unwrap is safe because the payload length is 17 <= 7609 bytes.
+                        CtapHid::split_message(Message {
+                            cid,
+                            cmd: CtapHid::COMMAND_INIT,
+                            payload,
+                        })
+                        .unwrap()
                     }
                     // CTAP specification (version 20190130) section 8.1.9.1.4
                     CtapHid::COMMAND_PING => {
@@ -307,7 +299,9 @@ impl CtapHid {
                 HidPacketIterator::none()
             }
             Err((cid, error)) => {
-                if !self.is_allocated_channel(cid) {
+                if !self.is_allocated_channel(cid)
+                    && error != receive::Error::UnexpectedContinuation
+                {
                     CtapHid::error_message(cid, CtapHid::ERR_INVALID_CHANNEL)
                 } else {
                     match error {
@@ -523,11 +517,32 @@ mod test {
         }
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn test_spurious_continuation_packet() {
+        let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {};
+        let user_immediately_present = |_| Ok(());
+        let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE);
+        let mut ctap_hid = CtapHid::new();
+
+        let mut packet = [0x00; 64];
+        packet[0..7].copy_from_slice(&[0xC1, 0xC1, 0xC1, 0xC1, 0x00, 0x51, 0x51]);
+        let mut assembler_reply = MessageAssembler::new();
+        for pkt_reply in ctap_hid.process_hid_packet(&packet, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE, &mut ctap_state) {
+            // Continuation packets are silently ignored.
+            assert_eq!(
+                assembler_reply
+                    .parse_packet(&pkt_reply, DUMMY_TIMESTAMP)
+                    .unwrap(),
+                None
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn test_command_init() {
         let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {};
         let user_immediately_present = |_| Ok(());
-        let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present);
+        let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE);
         let mut ctap_hid = CtapHid::new();
 
         let reply = process_messages(
@@ -568,11 +583,71 @@ mod test {
         );
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn test_command_init_for_sync() {
+        let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {};
+        let user_immediately_present = |_| Ok(());
+        let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE);
+        let mut ctap_hid = CtapHid::new();
+        let cid = cid_from_init(&mut ctap_hid, &mut ctap_state);
+
+        // Ping packet with a length longer than one packet.
+        let mut packet1 = [0x51; 64];
+        packet1[..4].copy_from_slice(&cid);
+        packet1[4..7].copy_from_slice(&[0x81, 0x02, 0x00]);
+        // Init packet on the same channel.
+        let mut packet2 = [0x00; 64];
+        packet2[..4].copy_from_slice(&cid);
+        packet2[4..15].copy_from_slice(&[
+            0x86, 0x00, 0x08, 0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78, 0x9A, 0xBC, 0xDE, 0xF0,
+        ]);
+        let mut result = Vec::new();
+        let mut assembler_reply = MessageAssembler::new();
+        for pkt_request in &[packet1, packet2] {
+            for pkt_reply in
+                ctap_hid.process_hid_packet(&pkt_request, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE, &mut ctap_state)
+            {
+                if let Some(message) = assembler_reply
+                    .parse_packet(&pkt_reply, DUMMY_TIMESTAMP)
+                    .unwrap()
+                {
+                    result.push(message);
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        assert_eq!(
+            result,
+            vec![Message {
+                cid,
+                cmd: CtapHid::COMMAND_INIT,
+                payload: vec![
+                    0x12, // Nonce
+                    0x34,
+                    0x56,
+                    0x78,
+                    0x9A,
+                    0xBC,
+                    0xDE,
+                    0xF0,
+                    cid[0], // Allocated CID
+                    cid[1],
+                    cid[2],
+                    cid[3],
+                    0x02, // Protocol version
+                    0x00, // Device version
+                    0x00,
+                    0x00,
+                    CtapHid::CAPABILITIES
+                ]
+            }]
+        );
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn test_command_ping() {
         let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {};
         let user_immediately_present = |_| Ok(());
-        let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present);
+        let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE);
         let mut ctap_hid = CtapHid::new();
         let cid = cid_from_init(&mut ctap_hid, &mut ctap_state);
 

src/ctap/hid/receive.rs

@@ -586,5 +586,33 @@ mod test {
         );
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn test_init_sync() {
+        let mut assembler = MessageAssembler::new();
+        // Ping packet with a length longer than one packet.
+        assert_eq!(
+            assembler.parse_packet(
+                &byte_extend(&[0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78, 0x81, 0x02, 0x00], 0x51),
+                DUMMY_TIMESTAMP
+            ),
+            Ok(None)
+        );
+        // Init packet on the same channel.
+        assert_eq!(
+            assembler.parse_packet(
+                &zero_extend(&[
+                    0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78, 0x86, 0x00, 0x08, 0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78, 0x9A, 0xBC,
+                    0xDE, 0xF0
+                ]),
+                DUMMY_TIMESTAMP
+            ),
+            Ok(Some(Message {
+                cid: [0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78],
+                cmd: 0x06,
+                payload: vec![0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78, 0x9A, 0xBC, 0xDE, 0xF0]
+            }))
+        );
+    }
+
     // TODO: more tests
 }

src/ctap/key_material.rs

@@ -12,10 +12,14 @@
 // See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
 // limitations under the License.
 
-pub const AAGUID: &[u8; 16] = include_bytes!(concat!(env!("OUT_DIR"), "/opensk_aaguid.bin"));
+pub const ATTESTATION_PRIVATE_KEY_LENGTH: usize = 32;
+pub const AAGUID_LENGTH: usize = 16;
+
+pub const AAGUID: &[u8; AAGUID_LENGTH] =
+    include_bytes!(concat!(env!("OUT_DIR"), "/opensk_aaguid.bin"));
 
 pub const ATTESTATION_CERTIFICATE: &[u8] =
     include_bytes!(concat!(env!("OUT_DIR"), "/opensk_cert.bin"));
 
-pub const ATTESTATION_PRIVATE_KEY: &[u8; 32] =
+pub const ATTESTATION_PRIVATE_KEY: &[u8; ATTESTATION_PRIVATE_KEY_LENGTH] =
     include_bytes!(concat!(env!("OUT_DIR"), "/opensk_pkey.bin"));

src/ctap/pin_protocol_v1.rs

@@ -19,7 +19,6 @@ use super::status_code::Ctap2StatusCode;
 use super::storage::PersistentStore;
 #[cfg(feature = "with_ctap2_1")]
 use alloc::string::String;
-#[cfg(feature = "with_ctap2_1")]
 use alloc::vec;
 use alloc::vec::Vec;
 use arrayref::array_ref;
@@ -74,10 +73,9 @@ fn encrypt_hmac_secret_output(
     let mut cred_random_secret = [0u8; 32];
     cred_random_secret.copy_from_slice(cred_random);
 
-    // Initialization of 4 blocks in any case makes this function more readable.
-    let mut blocks = [[0u8; 16]; 4];
     // With the if clause restriction above, block_len can only be 2 or 4.
     let block_len = salt_enc.len() / 16;
+    let mut blocks = vec![[0u8; 16]; block_len];
     for i in 0..block_len {
         blocks[i].copy_from_slice(&salt_enc[16 * i..16 * (i + 1)]);
     }
@@ -85,8 +83,8 @@ fn encrypt_hmac_secret_output(
 
     let mut decrypted_salt1 = [0u8; 32];
     decrypted_salt1[..16].copy_from_slice(&blocks[0]);
-    let output1 = hmac_256::<Sha256>(&cred_random_secret, &decrypted_salt1[..]);
     decrypted_salt1[16..].copy_from_slice(&blocks[1]);
+    let output1 = hmac_256::<Sha256>(&cred_random_secret, &decrypted_salt1[..]);
     for i in 0..2 {
         blocks[i].copy_from_slice(&output1[16 * i..16 * (i + 1)]);
     }
@@ -638,36 +636,52 @@ impl PinProtocolV1 {
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod test {
     use super::*;
-    use arrayref::array_refs;
     use crypto::rng256::ThreadRng256;
 
     // Stores a PIN hash corresponding to the dummy PIN "1234".
     fn set_standard_pin(persistent_store: &mut PersistentStore) {
         let mut pin = [0u8; 64];
-        pin[0] = 0x31;
+        pin[..4].copy_from_slice(b"1234");
-        pin[1] = 0x32;
-        pin[2] = 0x33;
-        pin[3] = 0x34;
         let mut pin_hash = [0u8; 16];
         pin_hash.copy_from_slice(&Sha256::hash(&pin[..])[..16]);
         persistent_store.set_pin_hash(&pin_hash).unwrap();
     }
 
+    // Encrypts the message with a zero IV and key derived from shared_secret.
+    fn encrypt_message(shared_secret: &[u8; 32], message: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
+        assert!(message.len() % 16 == 0);
+        let block_len = message.len() / 16;
+        let mut blocks = vec![[0u8; 16]; block_len];
+        for i in 0..block_len {
+            blocks[i][..].copy_from_slice(&message[i * 16..(i + 1) * 16]);
+        }
+        let aes_enc_key = crypto::aes256::EncryptionKey::new(shared_secret);
+        let iv = [0u8; 16];
+        cbc_encrypt(&aes_enc_key, iv, &mut blocks);
+        blocks.iter().flatten().cloned().collect::<Vec<u8>>()
+    }
+
+    // Decrypts the message with a zero IV and key derived from shared_secret.
+    fn decrypt_message(shared_secret: &[u8; 32], message: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
+        assert!(message.len() % 16 == 0);
+        let block_len = message.len() / 16;
+        let mut blocks = vec![[0u8; 16]; block_len];
+        for i in 0..block_len {
+            blocks[i][..].copy_from_slice(&message[i * 16..(i + 1) * 16]);
+        }
+        let aes_enc_key = crypto::aes256::EncryptionKey::new(shared_secret);
+        let aes_dec_key = crypto::aes256::DecryptionKey::new(&aes_enc_key);
+        let iv = [0u8; 16];
+        cbc_decrypt(&aes_dec_key, iv, &mut blocks);
+        blocks.iter().flatten().cloned().collect::<Vec<u8>>()
+    }
+
     // Fails on PINs bigger than 64 bytes.
     fn encrypt_pin(shared_secret: &[u8; 32], pin: Vec<u8>) -> Vec<u8> {
         assert!(pin.len() <= 64);
         let mut padded_pin = [0u8; 64];
         padded_pin[..pin.len()].copy_from_slice(&pin[..]);
-        let aes_enc_key = crypto::aes256::EncryptionKey::new(shared_secret);
+        encrypt_message(shared_secret, &padded_pin)
-        let mut blocks = [[0u8; 16]; 4];
-        let (b0, b1, b2, b3) = array_refs!(&padded_pin, 16, 16, 16, 16);
-        blocks[0][..].copy_from_slice(b0);
-        blocks[1][..].copy_from_slice(b1);
-        blocks[2][..].copy_from_slice(b2);
-        blocks[3][..].copy_from_slice(b3);
-        let iv = [0u8; 16];
-        cbc_encrypt(&aes_enc_key, iv, &mut blocks);
-        blocks.iter().flatten().cloned().collect::<Vec<u8>>()
     }
 
     // Encrypts the dummy PIN "1234".
@@ -677,22 +691,10 @@ mod test {
 
     // Encrypts the PIN hash corresponding to the dummy PIN "1234".
     fn encrypt_standard_pin_hash(shared_secret: &[u8; 32]) -> Vec<u8> {
-        let aes_enc_key = crypto::aes256::EncryptionKey::new(shared_secret);
         let mut pin = [0u8; 64];
-        pin[0] = 0x31;
+        pin[..4].copy_from_slice(b"1234");
-        pin[1] = 0x32;
-        pin[2] = 0x33;
-        pin[3] = 0x34;
         let pin_hash = Sha256::hash(&pin);
-
+        encrypt_message(shared_secret, &pin_hash[..16])
-        let mut blocks = [[0u8; 16]; 1];
-        blocks[0].copy_from_slice(&pin_hash[..16]);
-        let iv = [0u8; 16];
-        cbc_encrypt(&aes_enc_key, iv, &mut blocks);
-
-        let mut encrypted_pin_hash = Vec::with_capacity(16);
-        encrypted_pin_hash.extend(&blocks[0]);
-        encrypted_pin_hash
     }
 
     #[test]
@@ -1184,6 +1186,56 @@ mod test {
             output,
             Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION)
         );
+
+        let mut salt_enc = [0x00; 32];
+        let cred_random = [0xC9; 32];
+
+        // Test values to check for reproducibility.
+        let salt1 = [0x01; 32];
+        let salt2 = [0x02; 32];
+        let expected_output1 = hmac_256::<Sha256>(&cred_random, &salt1);
+        let expected_output2 = hmac_256::<Sha256>(&cred_random, &salt2);
+
+        let salt_enc1 = encrypt_message(&shared_secret, &salt1);
+        salt_enc.copy_from_slice(salt_enc1.as_slice());
+        let output = encrypt_hmac_secret_output(&shared_secret, &salt_enc, &cred_random).unwrap();
+        let output_dec = decrypt_message(&shared_secret, &output);
+        assert_eq!(&output_dec, &expected_output1);
+
+        let salt_enc2 = &encrypt_message(&shared_secret, &salt2);
+        salt_enc.copy_from_slice(salt_enc2.as_slice());
+        let output = encrypt_hmac_secret_output(&shared_secret, &salt_enc, &cred_random).unwrap();
+        let output_dec = decrypt_message(&shared_secret, &output);
+        assert_eq!(&output_dec, &expected_output2);
+
+        let mut salt_enc = [0x00; 64];
+        let mut salt12 = [0x00; 64];
+        salt12[..32].copy_from_slice(&salt1);
+        salt12[32..].copy_from_slice(&salt2);
+        let salt_enc12 = encrypt_message(&shared_secret, &salt12);
+        salt_enc.copy_from_slice(salt_enc12.as_slice());
+        let output = encrypt_hmac_secret_output(&shared_secret, &salt_enc, &cred_random).unwrap();
+        let output_dec = decrypt_message(&shared_secret, &output);
+        assert_eq!(&output_dec[..32], &expected_output1);
+        assert_eq!(&output_dec[32..], &expected_output2);
+
+        let mut salt_enc = [0x00; 64];
+        let mut salt02 = [0x00; 64];
+        salt02[32..].copy_from_slice(&salt2);
+        let salt_enc02 = encrypt_message(&shared_secret, &salt02);
+        salt_enc.copy_from_slice(salt_enc02.as_slice());
+        let output = encrypt_hmac_secret_output(&shared_secret, &salt_enc, &cred_random).unwrap();
+        let output_dec = decrypt_message(&shared_secret, &output);
+        assert_eq!(&output_dec[32..], &expected_output2);
+
+        let mut salt_enc = [0x00; 64];
+        let mut salt10 = [0x00; 64];
+        salt10[..32].copy_from_slice(&salt1);
+        let salt_enc10 = encrypt_message(&shared_secret, &salt10);
+        salt_enc.copy_from_slice(salt_enc10.as_slice());
+        let output = encrypt_hmac_secret_output(&shared_secret, &salt_enc, &cred_random).unwrap();
+        let output_dec = decrypt_message(&shared_secret, &output);
+        assert_eq!(&output_dec[..32], &expected_output1);
     }
 
     #[cfg(feature = "with_ctap2_1")]

src/ctap/storage.rs

@@ -15,9 +15,9 @@
 #[cfg(feature = "with_ctap2_1")]
 use crate::ctap::data_formats::{extract_array, extract_text_string};
 use crate::ctap::data_formats::{CredentialProtectionPolicy, PublicKeyCredentialSource};
+use crate::ctap::key_material;
 use crate::ctap::pin_protocol_v1::PIN_AUTH_LENGTH;
 use crate::ctap::status_code::Ctap2StatusCode;
-use crate::ctap::{key_material, USE_BATCH_ATTESTATION};
 use crate::embedded_flash::{self, StoreConfig, StoreEntry, StoreError};
 use alloc::string::String;
 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "ram_storage", feature = "with_ctap2_1"))]
@@ -76,8 +76,6 @@ const MIN_PIN_LENGTH_RP_IDS: usize = 9;
 const NUM_TAGS: usize = 10;
 
 const MAX_PIN_RETRIES: u8 = 8;
-const ATTESTATION_PRIVATE_KEY_LENGTH: usize = 32;
-const AAGUID_LENGTH: usize = 16;
 #[cfg(feature = "with_ctap2_1")]
 const DEFAULT_MIN_PIN_LENGTH: u8 = 4;
 // TODO(kaczmarczyck) use this for the minPinLength extension
@@ -231,22 +229,29 @@ impl PersistentStore {
                 })
                 .unwrap();
         }
-        // The following 3 entries are meant to be written by vendor-specific commands.
+        // TODO(jmichel): remove this when vendor command is in place
-        if USE_BATCH_ATTESTATION {
+        #[cfg(not(test))]
-            if self.store.find_one(&Key::AttestationPrivateKey).is_none() {
+        self.load_attestation_data_from_firmware();
-                self.set_attestation_private_key(key_material::ATTESTATION_PRIVATE_KEY)
+
-                    .unwrap();
-            }
-            if self.store.find_one(&Key::AttestationCertificate).is_none() {
-                self.set_attestation_certificate(key_material::ATTESTATION_CERTIFICATE)
-                    .unwrap();
-            }
-        }
         if self.store.find_one(&Key::Aaguid).is_none() {
             self.set_aaguid(key_material::AAGUID).unwrap();
         }
     }
 
+    // TODO(jmichel): remove this function when vendor command is in place.
+    #[cfg(not(test))]
+    fn load_attestation_data_from_firmware(&mut self) {
+        // The following 2 entries are meant to be written by vendor-specific commands.
+        if self.store.find_one(&Key::AttestationPrivateKey).is_none() {
+            self.set_attestation_private_key(key_material::ATTESTATION_PRIVATE_KEY)
+                .unwrap();
+        }
+        if self.store.find_one(&Key::AttestationCertificate).is_none() {
+            self.set_attestation_certificate(key_material::ATTESTATION_CERTIFICATE)
+                .unwrap();
+        }
+    }
+
     pub fn find_credential(
         &self,
         rp_id: &str,
@@ -337,6 +342,26 @@ impl PersistentStore {
             .count())
     }
 
+    pub fn new_creation_order(&self) -> Result<u64, Ctap2StatusCode> {
+        Ok(self
+            .store
+            .find_all(&Key::Credential {
+                rp_id: None,
+                credential_id: None,
+                user_handle: None,
+            })
+            .filter_map(|(_, entry)| {
+                debug_assert_eq!(entry.tag, TAG_CREDENTIAL);
+                let credential = deserialize_credential(entry.data);
+                debug_assert!(credential.is_some());
+                credential
+            })
+            .map(|c| c.creation_order)
+            .max()
+            .unwrap_or(0)
+            .wrapping_add(1))
+    }
+
     pub fn global_signature_counter(&self) -> Result<u32, Ctap2StatusCode> {
         Ok(self
             .store
@@ -525,29 +550,33 @@ impl PersistentStore {
 
     pub fn attestation_private_key(
         &self,
-    ) -> Result<Option<&[u8; ATTESTATION_PRIVATE_KEY_LENGTH]>, Ctap2StatusCode> {
+    ) -> Result<Option<&[u8; key_material::ATTESTATION_PRIVATE_KEY_LENGTH]>, Ctap2StatusCode> {
         let data = match self.store.find_one(&Key::AttestationPrivateKey) {
             None => return Ok(None),
             Some((_, entry)) => entry.data,
         };
-        if data.len() != ATTESTATION_PRIVATE_KEY_LENGTH {
+        if data.len() != key_material::ATTESTATION_PRIVATE_KEY_LENGTH {
             return Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_VENDOR_INTERNAL_ERROR);
         }
-        Ok(Some(array_ref!(data, 0, ATTESTATION_PRIVATE_KEY_LENGTH)))
+        Ok(Some(array_ref!(
+            data,
+            0,
+            key_material::ATTESTATION_PRIVATE_KEY_LENGTH
+        )))
     }
 
     pub fn set_attestation_private_key(
         &mut self,
-        attestation_private_key: &[u8; ATTESTATION_PRIVATE_KEY_LENGTH],
+        attestation_private_key: &[u8; key_material::ATTESTATION_PRIVATE_KEY_LENGTH],
     ) -> Result<(), Ctap2StatusCode> {
         let entry = StoreEntry {
             tag: ATTESTATION_PRIVATE_KEY,
             data: attestation_private_key,
-            sensitive: false,
+            sensitive: true,
         };
         match self.store.find_one(&Key::AttestationPrivateKey) {
             None => self.store.insert(entry)?,
-            Some((index, _)) => self.store.replace(index, entry)?,
+            _ => return Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_VENDOR_INTERNAL_ERROR),
         }
         Ok(())
     }
@@ -571,24 +600,27 @@ impl PersistentStore {
         };
         match self.store.find_one(&Key::AttestationCertificate) {
             None => self.store.insert(entry)?,
-            Some((index, _)) => self.store.replace(index, entry)?,
+            _ => return Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_VENDOR_INTERNAL_ERROR),
         }
         Ok(())
     }
 
-    pub fn aaguid(&self) -> Result<[u8; AAGUID_LENGTH], Ctap2StatusCode> {
+    pub fn aaguid(&self) -> Result<[u8; key_material::AAGUID_LENGTH], Ctap2StatusCode> {
         let (_, entry) = self
             .store
             .find_one(&Key::Aaguid)
             .ok_or(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_VENDOR_INTERNAL_ERROR)?;
         let data = entry.data;
-        if data.len() != AAGUID_LENGTH {
+        if data.len() != key_material::AAGUID_LENGTH {
             return Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_VENDOR_INTERNAL_ERROR);
         }
-        Ok(*array_ref![data, 0, AAGUID_LENGTH])
+        Ok(*array_ref![data, 0, key_material::AAGUID_LENGTH])
     }
 
-    pub fn set_aaguid(&mut self, aaguid: &[u8; AAGUID_LENGTH]) -> Result<(), Ctap2StatusCode> {
+    pub fn set_aaguid(
+        &mut self,
+        aaguid: &[u8; key_material::AAGUID_LENGTH],
+    ) -> Result<(), Ctap2StatusCode> {
         let entry = StoreEntry {
             tag: AAGUID,
             data: aaguid,
@@ -690,6 +722,7 @@ mod test {
             other_ui: None,
             cred_random: None,
             cred_protect_policy: None,
+            creation_order: 0,
         }
     }
 
@@ -725,6 +758,21 @@ mod test {
         assert!(persistent_store.count_credentials().unwrap() > 0);
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn test_credential_order() {
+        let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {};
+        let mut persistent_store = PersistentStore::new(&mut rng);
+        let credential_source = create_credential_source(&mut rng, "example.com", vec![]);
+        let current_latest_creation = credential_source.creation_order;
+        assert!(persistent_store.store_credential(credential_source).is_ok());
+        let mut credential_source = create_credential_source(&mut rng, "example.com", vec![]);
+        credential_source.creation_order = persistent_store.new_creation_order().unwrap();
+        assert!(credential_source.creation_order > current_latest_creation);
+        let current_latest_creation = credential_source.creation_order;
+        assert!(persistent_store.store_credential(credential_source).is_ok());
+        assert!(persistent_store.new_creation_order().unwrap() > current_latest_creation);
+    }
+
     #[test]
     #[allow(clippy::assertions_on_constants)]
     fn test_fill_store() {
@@ -853,6 +901,7 @@ mod test {
             cred_protect_policy: Some(
                 CredentialProtectionPolicy::UserVerificationOptionalWithCredentialIdList,
             ),
+            creation_order: 0,
         };
         assert!(persistent_store.store_credential(credential).is_ok());
 
@@ -894,6 +943,7 @@ mod test {
             other_ui: None,
             cred_random: None,
             cred_protect_policy: None,
+            creation_order: 0,
         };
         assert_eq!(found_credential, Some(expected_credential));
     }
@@ -913,6 +963,7 @@ mod test {
             other_ui: None,
             cred_random: None,
             cred_protect_policy: Some(CredentialProtectionPolicy::UserVerificationRequired),
+            creation_order: 0,
         };
         assert!(persistent_store.store_credential(credential).is_ok());
 
@@ -1090,6 +1141,7 @@ mod test {
             other_ui: None,
             cred_random: None,
             cred_protect_policy: None,
+            creation_order: 0,
         };
         let serialized = serialize_credential(credential.clone()).unwrap();
         let reconstructed = deserialize_credential(&serialized).unwrap();

src/main.rs

@@ -37,9 +37,11 @@ use libtock_drivers::console::Console;
 use libtock_drivers::led;
 use libtock_drivers::result::{FlexUnwrap, TockError};
 use libtock_drivers::timer;
+use libtock_drivers::timer::Duration;
 #[cfg(feature = "debug_ctap")]
 use libtock_drivers::timer::Timer;
-use libtock_drivers::timer::{Duration, Timestamp};
+#[cfg(feature = "debug_ctap")]
+use libtock_drivers::timer::Timestamp;
 use libtock_drivers::usb_ctap_hid;
 
 const KEEPALIVE_DELAY_MS: isize = 100;
@@ -57,12 +59,13 @@ fn main() {
         panic!("Cannot setup USB driver");
     }
 
+    let boot_time = timer.get_current_clock().flex_unwrap();
     let mut rng = TockRng256 {};
-    let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, check_user_presence);
+    let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, check_user_presence, boot_time);
     let mut ctap_hid = CtapHid::new();
 
     let mut led_counter = 0;
-    let mut last_led_increment = timer.get_current_clock().flex_unwrap();
+    let mut last_led_increment = boot_time;
 
     // Main loop. If CTAP1 is used, we register button presses for U2F while receiving and waiting.
     // The way TockOS and apps currently interact, callbacks need a yield syscall to execute,
@@ -115,7 +118,7 @@ fn main() {
 
         // These calls are making sure that even for long inactivity, wrapping clock values
         // never randomly wink or grant user presence for U2F.
-        ctap_state.check_disable_reset(Timestamp::<isize>::from_clock_value(now));
+        ctap_state.update_command_permission(now);
         ctap_hid.wink_permission = ctap_hid.wink_permission.check_expiration(now);
 
         if has_packet {