diff --git a/.github/workflows/crypto_test.yml b/.github/workflows/crypto_test.yml index 1740280..50fdf88 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/crypto_test.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/crypto_test.yml @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ jobs: - name: Set up OpenSK run: ./setup.sh - - run: echo "::set-env name=RUSTFLAGS::-C target-feature=+aes" + - run: echo "RUSTFLAGS=-C target-feature=+aes" >> $GITHUB_ENV - name: Unit testing of crypto library (release mode) uses: actions-rs/cargo@v1 diff --git a/fuzz/fuzz_helper/src/lib.rs b/fuzz/fuzz_helper/src/lib.rs index a6dc1a7..1553f65 100644 --- a/fuzz/fuzz_helper/src/lib.rs +++ b/fuzz/fuzz_helper/src/lib.rs @@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ fn process_message( pub fn process_ctap_any_type(data: &[u8]) { // Initialize ctap state and hid and get the allocated cid. let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {}; - let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present); + let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE); let mut ctap_hid = CtapHid::new(); let cid = initialize(&mut ctap_state, &mut ctap_hid); // Wrap input as message with the allocated cid. @@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ pub fn process_ctap_specific_type(data: &[u8], input_type: InputType) { } // Initialize ctap state and hid and get the allocated cid. let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {}; - let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present); + let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE); let mut ctap_hid = CtapHid::new(); let cid = initialize(&mut ctap_state, &mut ctap_hid); // Wrap input as message with allocated cid and command type. diff --git a/libraries/persistent_store/src/driver.rs b/libraries/persistent_store/src/driver.rs index 15001cb..e529274 100644 --- a/libraries/persistent_store/src/driver.rs +++ b/libraries/persistent_store/src/driver.rs @@ -181,6 +181,12 @@ pub enum StoreInvariant { }, } +impl From for StoreInvariant { + fn from(error: StoreError) -> StoreInvariant { + StoreInvariant::StoreError(error) + } +} + impl StoreDriver { /// Provides read-only access to the storage. pub fn storage(&self) -> &BufferStorage { @@ -249,6 +255,10 @@ impl StoreDriverOff { } /// Powers on the store without interruption. + /// + /// # Panics + /// + /// Panics if the store cannot be powered on. pub fn power_on(self) -> Result { Ok(self .partial_power_on(StoreInterruption::none()) @@ -506,8 +516,8 @@ impl StoreDriverOn { /// Checks that the store and model are in sync. fn check_model(&self) -> Result<(), StoreInvariant> { let mut model_content = self.model.content().clone(); - for handle in self.store.iter().unwrap() { - let handle = handle.unwrap(); + for handle in self.store.iter()? { + let handle = handle?; let model_value = match model_content.remove(&handle.get_key()) { None => { return Err(StoreInvariant::OnlyInStore { @@ -516,7 +526,7 @@ impl StoreDriverOn { } Some(x) => x, }; - let store_value = handle.get_value(&self.store).unwrap().into_boxed_slice(); + let store_value = handle.get_value(&self.store)?.into_boxed_slice(); if store_value != model_value { return Err(StoreInvariant::DifferentValue { key: handle.get_key(), @@ -528,7 +538,7 @@ impl StoreDriverOn { if let Some(&key) = model_content.keys().next() { return Err(StoreInvariant::OnlyInModel { key }); } - let store_capacity = self.store.capacity().unwrap().remaining(); + let store_capacity = self.store.capacity()?.remaining(); let model_capacity = self.model.capacity().remaining(); if store_capacity != model_capacity { return Err(StoreInvariant::DifferentCapacity { @@ -544,8 +554,8 @@ impl StoreDriverOn { let format = self.model.format(); let storage = self.store.storage(); let num_words = format.page_size() / format.word_size(); - let head = self.store.head().unwrap(); - let tail = self.store.tail().unwrap(); + let head = self.store.head()?; + let tail = self.store.tail()?; for page in 0..format.num_pages() { // Check the erase cycle of the page. let store_erase = head.cycle(format) + (page < head.page(format)) as Nat; diff --git a/metadata/metadata.json b/metadata/metadata.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000..eedeed9 --- /dev/null +++ b/metadata/metadata.json @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +{ + "assertionScheme": "FIDOV2", + "keyProtection": 1, + "attestationRootCertificates": [], + "aaguid": "664d9f67-84a2-412a-9ff7-b4f7d8ee6d05", + "publicKeyAlgAndEncoding": 260, + "protocolFamily": "fido2", + "upv": [ + { + "major": 1, + "minor": 0 + } + ], + "icon": "", + "matcherProtection": 1, + "supportedExtensions": [ + { + "id": "hmac-secret", + "fail_if_unknown": false + }, + { + "id": "credProtect", + "fail_if_unknown": false + } + ], + "cryptoStrength": 128, + "description": "OpenSK authenticator", + "authenticatorVersion": 1, + "isSecondFactorOnly": false, + "userVerificationDetails": [ + [ + { + "userVerification": 1 + }, + { + "userVerification": 4 + } + ] + ], + "attachmentHint": 6, + "attestationTypes": [ + 15880 + ], + "authenticationAlgorithm": 1, + "tcDisplay": 0 +} diff --git a/src/ctap/command.rs b/src/ctap/command.rs index 5c58234..1b4b96a 100644 --- a/src/ctap/command.rs +++ b/src/ctap/command.rs @@ -57,8 +57,8 @@ impl Command { const AUTHENTICATOR_GET_INFO: u8 = 0x04; const AUTHENTICATOR_CLIENT_PIN: u8 = 0x06; const AUTHENTICATOR_RESET: u8 = 0x07; - // TODO(kaczmarczyck) use or remove those constants const AUTHENTICATOR_GET_NEXT_ASSERTION: u8 = 0x08; + // TODO(kaczmarczyck) use or remove those constants const AUTHENTICATOR_BIO_ENROLLMENT: u8 = 0x09; const AUTHENTICATOR_CREDENTIAL_MANAGEMENT: u8 = 0xA0; const AUTHENTICATOR_SELECTION: u8 = 0xB0; diff --git a/src/ctap/ctap1.rs b/src/ctap/ctap1.rs index 84c6fb0..5bc759c 100644 --- a/src/ctap/ctap1.rs +++ b/src/ctap/ctap1.rs @@ -13,7 +13,6 @@ // limitations under the License. use super::hid::ChannelID; -use super::key_material::{ATTESTATION_CERTIFICATE, ATTESTATION_PRIVATE_KEY}; use super::status_code::Ctap2StatusCode; use super::CtapState; use alloc::vec::Vec; @@ -36,6 +35,8 @@ pub enum Ctap1StatusCode { SW_WRONG_LENGTH = 0x6700, SW_CLA_NOT_SUPPORTED = 0x6E00, SW_INS_NOT_SUPPORTED = 0x6D00, + SW_MEMERR = 0x6501, + SW_COMMAND_ABORTED = 0x6F00, SW_VENDOR_KEY_HANDLE_TOO_LONG = 0xF000, } @@ -50,6 +51,8 @@ impl TryFrom for Ctap1StatusCode { 0x6700 => Ok(Ctap1StatusCode::SW_WRONG_LENGTH), 0x6E00 => Ok(Ctap1StatusCode::SW_CLA_NOT_SUPPORTED), 0x6D00 => Ok(Ctap1StatusCode::SW_INS_NOT_SUPPORTED), + 0x6501 => Ok(Ctap1StatusCode::SW_MEMERR), + 0x6F00 => Ok(Ctap1StatusCode::SW_COMMAND_ABORTED), 0xF000 => Ok(Ctap1StatusCode::SW_VENDOR_KEY_HANDLE_TOO_LONG), _ => Err(()), } @@ -288,21 +291,31 @@ impl Ctap1Command { let sk = crypto::ecdsa::SecKey::gensk(ctap_state.rng); let pk = sk.genpk(); let key_handle = ctap_state - .encrypt_key_handle(sk, &application) - .map_err(|_| Ctap1StatusCode::SW_VENDOR_KEY_HANDLE_TOO_LONG)?; + .encrypt_key_handle(sk, &application, None) + .map_err(|_| Ctap1StatusCode::SW_COMMAND_ABORTED)?; if key_handle.len() > 0xFF { // This is just being defensive with unreachable code. return Err(Ctap1StatusCode::SW_VENDOR_KEY_HANDLE_TOO_LONG); } - let mut response = - Vec::with_capacity(105 + key_handle.len() + ATTESTATION_CERTIFICATE.len()); + let certificate = ctap_state + .persistent_store + .attestation_certificate() + .map_err(|_| Ctap1StatusCode::SW_MEMERR)? + .ok_or(Ctap1StatusCode::SW_COMMAND_ABORTED)?; + let private_key = ctap_state + .persistent_store + .attestation_private_key() + .map_err(|_| Ctap1StatusCode::SW_MEMERR)? + .ok_or(Ctap1StatusCode::SW_COMMAND_ABORTED)?; + + let mut response = Vec::with_capacity(105 + key_handle.len() + certificate.len()); response.push(Ctap1Command::LEGACY_BYTE); let user_pk = pk.to_uncompressed(); response.extend_from_slice(&user_pk); response.push(key_handle.len() as u8); response.extend(key_handle.clone()); - response.extend_from_slice(&ATTESTATION_CERTIFICATE); + response.extend_from_slice(&certificate); // The first byte is reserved. let mut signature_data = Vec::with_capacity(66 + key_handle.len()); @@ -312,7 +325,7 @@ impl Ctap1Command { signature_data.extend(key_handle); signature_data.extend_from_slice(&user_pk); - let attestation_key = crypto::ecdsa::SecKey::from_bytes(ATTESTATION_PRIVATE_KEY).unwrap(); + let attestation_key = crypto::ecdsa::SecKey::from_bytes(private_key).unwrap(); let signature = attestation_key.sign_rfc6979::(&signature_data); response.extend(signature.to_asn1_der()); @@ -373,7 +386,7 @@ impl Ctap1Command { #[cfg(test)] mod test { - use super::super::{ENCRYPTED_CREDENTIAL_ID_SIZE, USE_SIGNATURE_COUNTER}; + use super::super::{key_material, CREDENTIAL_ID_BASE_SIZE, USE_SIGNATURE_COUNTER}; use super::*; use crypto::rng256::ThreadRng256; use crypto::Hash256; @@ -413,12 +426,12 @@ mod test { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 65 + ENCRYPTED_CREDENTIAL_ID_SIZE as u8, + 65 + CREDENTIAL_ID_BASE_SIZE as u8, ]; let challenge = [0x0C; 32]; message.extend(&challenge); message.extend(application); - message.push(ENCRYPTED_CREDENTIAL_ID_SIZE as u8); + message.push(CREDENTIAL_ID_BASE_SIZE as u8); message.extend(key_handle); message } @@ -427,28 +440,49 @@ mod test { fn test_process_register() { let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {}; let dummy_user_presence = |_| panic!("Unexpected user presence check in CTAP1"); - let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, dummy_user_presence); + let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, dummy_user_presence, START_CLOCK_VALUE); let application = [0x0A; 32]; let message = create_register_message(&application); ctap_state.u2f_up_state.consume_up(START_CLOCK_VALUE); ctap_state.u2f_up_state.grant_up(START_CLOCK_VALUE); + let response = Ctap1Command::process_command(&message, &mut ctap_state, START_CLOCK_VALUE); + // Certificate and private key are missing + assert_eq!(response, Err(Ctap1StatusCode::SW_COMMAND_ABORTED)); + + let fake_key = [0x41u8; key_material::ATTESTATION_PRIVATE_KEY_LENGTH]; + assert!(ctap_state + .persistent_store + .set_attestation_private_key(&fake_key) + .is_ok()); + ctap_state.u2f_up_state.consume_up(START_CLOCK_VALUE); + ctap_state.u2f_up_state.grant_up(START_CLOCK_VALUE); + let response = Ctap1Command::process_command(&message, &mut ctap_state, START_CLOCK_VALUE); + // Certificate is still missing + assert_eq!(response, Err(Ctap1StatusCode::SW_COMMAND_ABORTED)); + + let fake_cert = [0x99u8; 100]; // Arbitrary length + assert!(ctap_state + .persistent_store + .set_attestation_certificate(&fake_cert[..]) + .is_ok()); + ctap_state.u2f_up_state.consume_up(START_CLOCK_VALUE); + ctap_state.u2f_up_state.grant_up(START_CLOCK_VALUE); let response = Ctap1Command::process_command(&message, &mut ctap_state, START_CLOCK_VALUE).unwrap(); - assert_eq!(response[0], Ctap1Command::LEGACY_BYTE); - assert_eq!(response[66], ENCRYPTED_CREDENTIAL_ID_SIZE as u8); + assert_eq!(response[66], CREDENTIAL_ID_BASE_SIZE as u8); assert!(ctap_state .decrypt_credential_source( - response[67..67 + ENCRYPTED_CREDENTIAL_ID_SIZE].to_vec(), + response[67..67 + CREDENTIAL_ID_BASE_SIZE].to_vec(), &application ) .unwrap() .is_some()); - const CERT_START: usize = 67 + ENCRYPTED_CREDENTIAL_ID_SIZE; + const CERT_START: usize = 67 + CREDENTIAL_ID_BASE_SIZE; assert_eq!( - &response[CERT_START..CERT_START + ATTESTATION_CERTIFICATE.len()], - &ATTESTATION_CERTIFICATE[..] + &response[CERT_START..CERT_START + fake_cert.len()], + &fake_cert[..] ); } @@ -456,7 +490,7 @@ mod test { fn test_process_register_bad_message() { let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {}; let dummy_user_presence = |_| panic!("Unexpected user presence check in CTAP1"); - let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, dummy_user_presence); + let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, dummy_user_presence, START_CLOCK_VALUE); let application = [0x0A; 32]; let message = create_register_message(&application); @@ -476,7 +510,7 @@ mod test { let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {}; let dummy_user_presence = |_| panic!("Unexpected user presence check in CTAP1"); - let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, dummy_user_presence); + let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, dummy_user_presence, START_CLOCK_VALUE); ctap_state.u2f_up_state.consume_up(START_CLOCK_VALUE); ctap_state.u2f_up_state.grant_up(START_CLOCK_VALUE); @@ -490,11 +524,13 @@ mod test { let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {}; let dummy_user_presence = |_| panic!("Unexpected user presence check in CTAP1"); let sk = crypto::ecdsa::SecKey::gensk(&mut rng); - let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, dummy_user_presence); + let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, dummy_user_presence, START_CLOCK_VALUE); let rp_id = "example.com"; let application = crypto::sha256::Sha256::hash(rp_id.as_bytes()); - let key_handle = ctap_state.encrypt_key_handle(sk, &application).unwrap(); + let key_handle = ctap_state + .encrypt_key_handle(sk, &application, None) + .unwrap(); let message = create_authenticate_message(&application, Ctap1Flags::CheckOnly, &key_handle); let response = Ctap1Command::process_command(&message, &mut ctap_state, START_CLOCK_VALUE); @@ -506,11 +542,13 @@ mod test { let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {}; let dummy_user_presence = |_| panic!("Unexpected user presence check in CTAP1"); let sk = crypto::ecdsa::SecKey::gensk(&mut rng); - let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, dummy_user_presence); + let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, dummy_user_presence, START_CLOCK_VALUE); let rp_id = "example.com"; let application = crypto::sha256::Sha256::hash(rp_id.as_bytes()); - let key_handle = ctap_state.encrypt_key_handle(sk, &application).unwrap(); + let key_handle = ctap_state + .encrypt_key_handle(sk, &application, None) + .unwrap(); let application = [0x55; 32]; let message = create_authenticate_message(&application, Ctap1Flags::CheckOnly, &key_handle); @@ -523,11 +561,13 @@ mod test { let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {}; let dummy_user_presence = |_| panic!("Unexpected user presence check in CTAP1"); let sk = crypto::ecdsa::SecKey::gensk(&mut rng); - let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, dummy_user_presence); + let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, dummy_user_presence, START_CLOCK_VALUE); let rp_id = "example.com"; let application = crypto::sha256::Sha256::hash(rp_id.as_bytes()); - let key_handle = ctap_state.encrypt_key_handle(sk, &application).unwrap(); + let key_handle = ctap_state + .encrypt_key_handle(sk, &application, None) + .unwrap(); let mut message = create_authenticate_message(&application, Ctap1Flags::CheckOnly, &key_handle); @@ -547,11 +587,13 @@ mod test { let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {}; let dummy_user_presence = |_| panic!("Unexpected user presence check in CTAP1"); let sk = crypto::ecdsa::SecKey::gensk(&mut rng); - let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, dummy_user_presence); + let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, dummy_user_presence, START_CLOCK_VALUE); let rp_id = "example.com"; let application = crypto::sha256::Sha256::hash(rp_id.as_bytes()); - let key_handle = ctap_state.encrypt_key_handle(sk, &application).unwrap(); + let key_handle = ctap_state + .encrypt_key_handle(sk, &application, None) + .unwrap(); let mut message = create_authenticate_message(&application, Ctap1Flags::CheckOnly, &key_handle); message[0] = 0xEE; @@ -565,11 +607,13 @@ mod test { let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {}; let dummy_user_presence = |_| panic!("Unexpected user presence check in CTAP1"); let sk = crypto::ecdsa::SecKey::gensk(&mut rng); - let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, dummy_user_presence); + let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, dummy_user_presence, START_CLOCK_VALUE); let rp_id = "example.com"; let application = crypto::sha256::Sha256::hash(rp_id.as_bytes()); - let key_handle = ctap_state.encrypt_key_handle(sk, &application).unwrap(); + let key_handle = ctap_state + .encrypt_key_handle(sk, &application, None) + .unwrap(); let mut message = create_authenticate_message(&application, Ctap1Flags::CheckOnly, &key_handle); message[1] = 0xEE; @@ -583,11 +627,13 @@ mod test { let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {}; let dummy_user_presence = |_| panic!("Unexpected user presence check in CTAP1"); let sk = crypto::ecdsa::SecKey::gensk(&mut rng); - let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, dummy_user_presence); + let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, dummy_user_presence, START_CLOCK_VALUE); let rp_id = "example.com"; let application = crypto::sha256::Sha256::hash(rp_id.as_bytes()); - let key_handle = ctap_state.encrypt_key_handle(sk, &application).unwrap(); + let key_handle = ctap_state + .encrypt_key_handle(sk, &application, None) + .unwrap(); let mut message = create_authenticate_message(&application, Ctap1Flags::CheckOnly, &key_handle); message[2] = 0xEE; @@ -601,11 +647,13 @@ mod test { let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {}; let dummy_user_presence = |_| panic!("Unexpected user presence check in CTAP1"); let sk = crypto::ecdsa::SecKey::gensk(&mut rng); - let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, dummy_user_presence); + let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, dummy_user_presence, START_CLOCK_VALUE); let rp_id = "example.com"; let application = crypto::sha256::Sha256::hash(rp_id.as_bytes()); - let key_handle = ctap_state.encrypt_key_handle(sk, &application).unwrap(); + let key_handle = ctap_state + .encrypt_key_handle(sk, &application, None) + .unwrap(); let message = create_authenticate_message(&application, Ctap1Flags::EnforceUpAndSign, &key_handle); @@ -626,11 +674,13 @@ mod test { let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {}; let dummy_user_presence = |_| panic!("Unexpected user presence check in CTAP1"); let sk = crypto::ecdsa::SecKey::gensk(&mut rng); - let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, dummy_user_presence); + let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, dummy_user_presence, START_CLOCK_VALUE); let rp_id = "example.com"; let application = crypto::sha256::Sha256::hash(rp_id.as_bytes()); - let key_handle = ctap_state.encrypt_key_handle(sk, &application).unwrap(); + let key_handle = ctap_state + .encrypt_key_handle(sk, &application, None) + .unwrap(); let message = create_authenticate_message( &application, Ctap1Flags::DontEnforceUpAndSign, @@ -650,13 +700,13 @@ mod test { #[test] fn test_process_authenticate_bad_key_handle() { let application = [0x0A; 32]; - let key_handle = vec![0x00; ENCRYPTED_CREDENTIAL_ID_SIZE]; + let key_handle = vec![0x00; CREDENTIAL_ID_BASE_SIZE]; let message = create_authenticate_message(&application, Ctap1Flags::EnforceUpAndSign, &key_handle); let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {}; let dummy_user_presence = |_| panic!("Unexpected user presence check in CTAP1"); - let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, dummy_user_presence); + let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, dummy_user_presence, START_CLOCK_VALUE); ctap_state.u2f_up_state.consume_up(START_CLOCK_VALUE); ctap_state.u2f_up_state.grant_up(START_CLOCK_VALUE); @@ -667,13 +717,13 @@ mod test { #[test] fn test_process_authenticate_without_up() { let application = [0x0A; 32]; - let key_handle = vec![0x00; ENCRYPTED_CREDENTIAL_ID_SIZE]; + let key_handle = vec![0x00; CREDENTIAL_ID_BASE_SIZE]; let message = create_authenticate_message(&application, Ctap1Flags::EnforceUpAndSign, &key_handle); let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {}; let dummy_user_presence = |_| panic!("Unexpected user presence check in CTAP1"); - let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, dummy_user_presence); + let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, dummy_user_presence, START_CLOCK_VALUE); ctap_state.u2f_up_state.consume_up(START_CLOCK_VALUE); ctap_state.u2f_up_state.grant_up(START_CLOCK_VALUE); diff --git a/src/ctap/data_formats.rs b/src/ctap/data_formats.rs index dacafe5..fa747bc 100644 --- a/src/ctap/data_formats.rs +++ b/src/ctap/data_formats.rs @@ -308,7 +308,8 @@ impl TryFrom for GetAssertionExtensions { } } -#[cfg_attr(any(test, feature = "debug_ctap"), derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))] +#[derive(Clone)] +#[cfg_attr(any(test, feature = "debug_ctap"), derive(Debug, PartialEq))] pub struct GetAssertionHmacSecretInput { pub key_agreement: CoseKey, pub salt_enc: Vec, @@ -361,10 +362,8 @@ impl TryFrom for MakeCredentialOptions { Some(options_entry) => extract_bool(options_entry)?, None => false, }; - if let Some(options_entry) = up { - if !extract_bool(options_entry)? { - return Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_INVALID_OPTION); - } + if up.is_some() { + return Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_INVALID_OPTION); } let uv = match uv { Some(options_entry) => extract_bool(options_entry)?, @@ -501,6 +500,7 @@ pub struct PublicKeyCredentialSource { pub other_ui: Option, pub cred_random: Option>, pub cred_protect_policy: Option, + pub creation_order: u64, } // We serialize credentials for the persistent storage using CBOR maps. Each field of a credential @@ -513,6 +513,7 @@ enum PublicKeyCredentialSourceField { OtherUi = 4, CredRandom = 5, CredProtectPolicy = 6, + CreationOrder = 7, // When a field is removed, its tag should be reserved and not used for new fields. We document // those reserved tags below. // Reserved tags: none. @@ -536,6 +537,7 @@ impl From for cbor::Value { PublicKeyCredentialSourceField::OtherUi => credential.other_ui, PublicKeyCredentialSourceField::CredRandom => credential.cred_random, PublicKeyCredentialSourceField::CredProtectPolicy => credential.cred_protect_policy, + PublicKeyCredentialSourceField::CreationOrder => credential.creation_order, } } } @@ -553,6 +555,7 @@ impl TryFrom for PublicKeyCredentialSource { PublicKeyCredentialSourceField::OtherUi => other_ui, PublicKeyCredentialSourceField::CredRandom => cred_random, PublicKeyCredentialSourceField::CredProtectPolicy => cred_protect_policy, + PublicKeyCredentialSourceField::CreationOrder => creation_order, } = extract_map(cbor_value)?; } @@ -570,6 +573,7 @@ impl TryFrom for PublicKeyCredentialSource { let cred_protect_policy = cred_protect_policy .map(CredentialProtectionPolicy::try_from) .transpose()?; + let creation_order = creation_order.map(extract_unsigned).unwrap_or(Ok(0))?; // We don't return whether there were unknown fields in the CBOR value. This means that // deserialization is not injective. In particular deserialization is only an inverse of // serialization at a given version of OpenSK. This is not a problem because: @@ -589,6 +593,7 @@ impl TryFrom for PublicKeyCredentialSource { other_ui, cred_random, cred_protect_policy, + creation_order, }) } } @@ -605,7 +610,8 @@ impl PublicKeyCredentialSource { // TODO(kaczmarczyck) we could decide to split this data type up // It depends on the algorithm though, I think. // So before creating a mess, this is my workaround. -#[cfg_attr(any(test, feature = "debug_ctap"), derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))] +#[derive(Clone)] +#[cfg_attr(any(test, feature = "debug_ctap"), derive(Debug, PartialEq))] pub struct CoseKey(pub BTreeMap); // This is the algorithm specifier that is supposed to be used in a COSE key @@ -1357,6 +1363,7 @@ mod test { other_ui: None, cred_random: None, cred_protect_policy: None, + creation_order: 0, }; assert_eq!( diff --git a/src/ctap/hid/mod.rs b/src/ctap/hid/mod.rs index 7489f6e..3874792 100644 --- a/src/ctap/hid/mod.rs +++ b/src/ctap/hid/mod.rs @@ -200,7 +200,8 @@ impl CtapHid { // Each transaction is atomic, so we process the command directly here and // don't handle any other packet in the meantime. // TODO: Send keep-alive packets in the meantime. - let response = ctap_state.process_command(&message.payload, cid); + let response = + ctap_state.process_command(&message.payload, cid, clock_value); if let Some(iterator) = CtapHid::split_message(Message { cid, cmd: CtapHid::COMMAND_CBOR, @@ -227,44 +228,35 @@ impl CtapHid { } // CTAP specification (version 20190130) section 8.1.9.1.3 CtapHid::COMMAND_INIT => { - if cid == CtapHid::CHANNEL_BROADCAST { - if message.payload.len() != 8 { - return CtapHid::error_message(cid, CtapHid::ERR_INVALID_LEN); - } + if message.payload.len() != 8 { + return CtapHid::error_message(cid, CtapHid::ERR_INVALID_LEN); + } + let new_cid = if cid == CtapHid::CHANNEL_BROADCAST { // TODO: Prevent allocating 2^32 channels. self.allocated_cids += 1; - let allocated_cid = (self.allocated_cids as u32).to_ne_bytes(); - - let mut payload = vec![0; 17]; - payload[..8].copy_from_slice(&message.payload); - payload[8..12].copy_from_slice(&allocated_cid); - payload[12] = CtapHid::PROTOCOL_VERSION; - payload[13] = CtapHid::DEVICE_VERSION_MAJOR; - payload[14] = CtapHid::DEVICE_VERSION_MINOR; - payload[15] = CtapHid::DEVICE_VERSION_BUILD; - payload[16] = CtapHid::CAPABILITIES; - - // This unwrap is safe because the payload length is 17 <= 7609 bytes. - CtapHid::split_message(Message { - cid, - cmd: CtapHid::COMMAND_INIT, - payload, - }) - .unwrap() + (self.allocated_cids as u32).to_ne_bytes() } else { // Sync the channel and discard the current transaction. - // TODO: The specification (version 20190130) wording isn't clear about - // the payload format in this case. - // - // This unwrap is safe because the payload length is 0 <= 7609 bytes. - CtapHid::split_message(Message { - cid, - cmd: CtapHid::COMMAND_INIT, - payload: vec![], - }) - .unwrap() - } + cid + }; + + let mut payload = vec![0; 17]; + payload[..8].copy_from_slice(&message.payload); + payload[8..12].copy_from_slice(&new_cid); + payload[12] = CtapHid::PROTOCOL_VERSION; + payload[13] = CtapHid::DEVICE_VERSION_MAJOR; + payload[14] = CtapHid::DEVICE_VERSION_MINOR; + payload[15] = CtapHid::DEVICE_VERSION_BUILD; + payload[16] = CtapHid::CAPABILITIES; + + // This unwrap is safe because the payload length is 17 <= 7609 bytes. + CtapHid::split_message(Message { + cid, + cmd: CtapHid::COMMAND_INIT, + payload, + }) + .unwrap() } // CTAP specification (version 20190130) section 8.1.9.1.4 CtapHid::COMMAND_PING => { @@ -307,7 +299,9 @@ impl CtapHid { HidPacketIterator::none() } Err((cid, error)) => { - if !self.is_allocated_channel(cid) { + if !self.is_allocated_channel(cid) + && error != receive::Error::UnexpectedContinuation + { CtapHid::error_message(cid, CtapHid::ERR_INVALID_CHANNEL) } else { match error { @@ -523,11 +517,32 @@ mod test { } } + #[test] + fn test_spurious_continuation_packet() { + let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {}; + let user_immediately_present = |_| Ok(()); + let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE); + let mut ctap_hid = CtapHid::new(); + + let mut packet = [0x00; 64]; + packet[0..7].copy_from_slice(&[0xC1, 0xC1, 0xC1, 0xC1, 0x00, 0x51, 0x51]); + let mut assembler_reply = MessageAssembler::new(); + for pkt_reply in ctap_hid.process_hid_packet(&packet, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE, &mut ctap_state) { + // Continuation packets are silently ignored. + assert_eq!( + assembler_reply + .parse_packet(&pkt_reply, DUMMY_TIMESTAMP) + .unwrap(), + None + ); + } + } + #[test] fn test_command_init() { let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {}; let user_immediately_present = |_| Ok(()); - let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present); + let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE); let mut ctap_hid = CtapHid::new(); let reply = process_messages( @@ -568,11 +583,71 @@ mod test { ); } + #[test] + fn test_command_init_for_sync() { + let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {}; + let user_immediately_present = |_| Ok(()); + let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE); + let mut ctap_hid = CtapHid::new(); + let cid = cid_from_init(&mut ctap_hid, &mut ctap_state); + + // Ping packet with a length longer than one packet. + let mut packet1 = [0x51; 64]; + packet1[..4].copy_from_slice(&cid); + packet1[4..7].copy_from_slice(&[0x81, 0x02, 0x00]); + // Init packet on the same channel. + let mut packet2 = [0x00; 64]; + packet2[..4].copy_from_slice(&cid); + packet2[4..15].copy_from_slice(&[ + 0x86, 0x00, 0x08, 0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78, 0x9A, 0xBC, 0xDE, 0xF0, + ]); + let mut result = Vec::new(); + let mut assembler_reply = MessageAssembler::new(); + for pkt_request in &[packet1, packet2] { + for pkt_reply in + ctap_hid.process_hid_packet(&pkt_request, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE, &mut ctap_state) + { + if let Some(message) = assembler_reply + .parse_packet(&pkt_reply, DUMMY_TIMESTAMP) + .unwrap() + { + result.push(message); + } + } + } + assert_eq!( + result, + vec![Message { + cid, + cmd: CtapHid::COMMAND_INIT, + payload: vec![ + 0x12, // Nonce + 0x34, + 0x56, + 0x78, + 0x9A, + 0xBC, + 0xDE, + 0xF0, + cid[0], // Allocated CID + cid[1], + cid[2], + cid[3], + 0x02, // Protocol version + 0x00, // Device version + 0x00, + 0x00, + CtapHid::CAPABILITIES + ] + }] + ); + } + #[test] fn test_command_ping() { let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {}; let user_immediately_present = |_| Ok(()); - let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present); + let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE); let mut ctap_hid = CtapHid::new(); let cid = cid_from_init(&mut ctap_hid, &mut ctap_state); diff --git a/src/ctap/hid/receive.rs b/src/ctap/hid/receive.rs index fef51a4..b522837 100644 --- a/src/ctap/hid/receive.rs +++ b/src/ctap/hid/receive.rs @@ -586,5 +586,33 @@ mod test { ); } + #[test] + fn test_init_sync() { + let mut assembler = MessageAssembler::new(); + // Ping packet with a length longer than one packet. + assert_eq!( + assembler.parse_packet( + &byte_extend(&[0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78, 0x81, 0x02, 0x00], 0x51), + DUMMY_TIMESTAMP + ), + Ok(None) + ); + // Init packet on the same channel. + assert_eq!( + assembler.parse_packet( + &zero_extend(&[ + 0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78, 0x86, 0x00, 0x08, 0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78, 0x9A, 0xBC, + 0xDE, 0xF0 + ]), + DUMMY_TIMESTAMP + ), + Ok(Some(Message { + cid: [0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78], + cmd: 0x06, + payload: vec![0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78, 0x9A, 0xBC, 0xDE, 0xF0] + })) + ); + } + // TODO: more tests } diff --git a/src/ctap/key_material.rs b/src/ctap/key_material.rs index 1958040..2563798 100644 --- a/src/ctap/key_material.rs +++ b/src/ctap/key_material.rs @@ -12,10 +12,14 @@ // See the License for the specific language governing permissions and // limitations under the License. -pub const AAGUID: &[u8; 16] = include_bytes!(concat!(env!("OUT_DIR"), "/opensk_aaguid.bin")); +pub const ATTESTATION_PRIVATE_KEY_LENGTH: usize = 32; +pub const AAGUID_LENGTH: usize = 16; + +pub const AAGUID: &[u8; AAGUID_LENGTH] = + include_bytes!(concat!(env!("OUT_DIR"), "/opensk_aaguid.bin")); pub const ATTESTATION_CERTIFICATE: &[u8] = include_bytes!(concat!(env!("OUT_DIR"), "/opensk_cert.bin")); -pub const ATTESTATION_PRIVATE_KEY: &[u8; 32] = +pub const ATTESTATION_PRIVATE_KEY: &[u8; ATTESTATION_PRIVATE_KEY_LENGTH] = include_bytes!(concat!(env!("OUT_DIR"), "/opensk_pkey.bin")); diff --git a/src/ctap/mod.rs b/src/ctap/mod.rs index 1a98ce5..5fdfa9e 100644 --- a/src/ctap/mod.rs +++ b/src/ctap/mod.rs @@ -33,9 +33,9 @@ use self::command::{ #[cfg(feature = "with_ctap2_1")] use self::data_formats::AuthenticatorTransport; use self::data_formats::{ - CredentialProtectionPolicy, PackedAttestationStatement, PublicKeyCredentialDescriptor, - PublicKeyCredentialParameter, PublicKeyCredentialSource, PublicKeyCredentialType, - PublicKeyCredentialUserEntity, SignatureAlgorithm, + CredentialProtectionPolicy, GetAssertionHmacSecretInput, PackedAttestationStatement, + PublicKeyCredentialDescriptor, PublicKeyCredentialParameter, PublicKeyCredentialSource, + PublicKeyCredentialType, PublicKeyCredentialUserEntity, SignatureAlgorithm, }; use self::hid::ChannelID; #[cfg(feature = "with_ctap2_1")] @@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ use self::response::{ }; use self::status_code::Ctap2StatusCode; use self::storage::PersistentStore; +use self::timed_permission::TimedPermission; #[cfg(feature = "with_ctap1")] use self::timed_permission::U2fUserPresenceState; use alloc::collections::BTreeMap; @@ -65,7 +66,7 @@ use crypto::sha256::Sha256; use crypto::Hash256; #[cfg(feature = "debug_ctap")] use libtock_drivers::console::Console; -use libtock_drivers::timer::{Duration, Timestamp}; +use libtock_drivers::timer::{ClockValue, Duration}; // This flag enables or disables basic attestation for FIDO2. U2F is unaffected by // this setting. The basic attestation uses the signing key from key_material.rs @@ -83,8 +84,10 @@ const USE_SIGNATURE_COUNTER: bool = true; // - 16 byte initialization vector for AES-256, // - 32 byte ECDSA private key for the credential, // - 32 byte relying party ID hashed with SHA256, +// - (optional) 32 byte for HMAC-secret, // - 32 byte HMAC-SHA256 over everything else. -pub const ENCRYPTED_CREDENTIAL_ID_SIZE: usize = 112; +pub const CREDENTIAL_ID_BASE_SIZE: usize = 112; +pub const CREDENTIAL_ID_MAX_SIZE: usize = CREDENTIAL_ID_BASE_SIZE + 32; // Set this bit when checking user presence. const UP_FLAG: u8 = 0x01; // Set this bit when checking user verification. @@ -97,7 +100,8 @@ const ED_FLAG: u8 = 0x80; pub const TOUCH_TIMEOUT_MS: isize = 30000; #[cfg(feature = "with_ctap1")] const U2F_UP_PROMPT_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_ms(10000); -const RESET_TIMEOUT_MS: isize = 10000; +const RESET_TIMEOUT_DURATION: Duration = Duration::from_ms(10000); +const STATEFUL_COMMAND_TIMEOUT_DURATION: Duration = Duration::from_ms(30000); pub const FIDO2_VERSION_STRING: &str = "FIDO_2_0"; #[cfg(feature = "with_ctap1")] @@ -131,6 +135,24 @@ fn truncate_to_char_boundary(s: &str, mut max: usize) -> &str { } } +#[derive(Clone)] +struct AssertionInput { + client_data_hash: Vec, + auth_data: Vec, + hmac_secret_input: Option, +} + +struct AssertionState { + assertion_input: AssertionInput, + // Sorted by ascending order of creation, so the last element is the most recent one. + next_credentials: Vec, +} + +enum StatefulCommand { + Reset, + GetAssertion(AssertionState), +} + // This struct currently holds all state, not only the persistent memory. The persistent members are // in the persistent store field. pub struct CtapState<'a, R: Rng256, CheckUserPresence: Fn(ChannelID) -> Result<(), Ctap2StatusCode>> @@ -141,10 +163,11 @@ pub struct CtapState<'a, R: Rng256, CheckUserPresence: Fn(ChannelID) -> Result<( check_user_presence: CheckUserPresence, persistent_store: PersistentStore, pin_protocol_v1: PinProtocolV1, - // This variable will be irreversibly set to false RESET_TIMEOUT_MS milliseconds after boot. - accepts_reset: bool, #[cfg(feature = "with_ctap1")] pub u2f_up_state: U2fUserPresenceState, + // The state initializes to Reset and its timeout, and never goes back to Reset. + stateful_command_permission: TimedPermission, + stateful_command_type: Option, } impl<'a, R, CheckUserPresence> CtapState<'a, R, CheckUserPresence> @@ -157,6 +180,7 @@ where pub fn new( rng: &'a mut R, check_user_presence: CheckUserPresence, + now: ClockValue, ) -> CtapState<'a, R, CheckUserPresence> { let persistent_store = PersistentStore::new(rng); let pin_protocol_v1 = PinProtocolV1::new(rng); @@ -165,18 +189,26 @@ where check_user_presence, persistent_store, pin_protocol_v1, - accepts_reset: true, #[cfg(feature = "with_ctap1")] u2f_up_state: U2fUserPresenceState::new( U2F_UP_PROMPT_TIMEOUT, Duration::from_ms(TOUCH_TIMEOUT_MS), ), + stateful_command_permission: TimedPermission::granted(now, RESET_TIMEOUT_DURATION), + stateful_command_type: Some(StatefulCommand::Reset), } } - pub fn check_disable_reset(&mut self, timestamp: Timestamp) { - if timestamp - Timestamp::::from_ms(0) > Duration::from_ms(RESET_TIMEOUT_MS) { - self.accepts_reset = false; + pub fn update_command_permission(&mut self, now: ClockValue) { + self.stateful_command_permission = self.stateful_command_permission.check_expiration(now); + } + + fn check_command_permission(&mut self, now: ClockValue) -> Result<(), Ctap2StatusCode> { + self.update_command_permission(now); + if self.stateful_command_permission.is_granted(now) { + Ok(()) + } else { + Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_NOT_ALLOWED) } } @@ -195,6 +227,7 @@ where &mut self, private_key: crypto::ecdsa::SecKey, application: &[u8; 32], + cred_random: Option<&[u8; 32]>, ) -> Result, Ctap2StatusCode> { let master_keys = self.persistent_store.master_keys()?; let aes_enc_key = crypto::aes256::EncryptionKey::new(&master_keys.encryption); @@ -203,14 +236,19 @@ where let mut iv = [0; 16]; iv.copy_from_slice(&self.rng.gen_uniform_u8x32()[..16]); - let mut blocks = [[0u8; 16]; 4]; + let block_len = if cred_random.is_some() { 6 } else { 4 }; + let mut blocks = vec![[0u8; 16]; block_len]; blocks[0].copy_from_slice(&sk_bytes[..16]); blocks[1].copy_from_slice(&sk_bytes[16..]); blocks[2].copy_from_slice(&application[..16]); blocks[3].copy_from_slice(&application[16..]); + if let Some(cred_random) = cred_random { + blocks[4].copy_from_slice(&cred_random[..16]); + blocks[5].copy_from_slice(&cred_random[16..]); + } cbc_encrypt(&aes_enc_key, iv, &mut blocks); - let mut encrypted_id = Vec::with_capacity(ENCRYPTED_CREDENTIAL_ID_SIZE); + let mut encrypted_id = Vec::with_capacity(16 * (block_len + 3)); encrypted_id.extend(&iv); for b in &blocks { encrypted_id.extend(b); @@ -228,11 +266,13 @@ where credential_id: Vec, rp_id_hash: &[u8], ) -> Result, Ctap2StatusCode> { - if credential_id.len() != ENCRYPTED_CREDENTIAL_ID_SIZE { - return Ok(None); - } + let has_cred_random = match credential_id.len() { + CREDENTIAL_ID_BASE_SIZE => false, + CREDENTIAL_ID_MAX_SIZE => true, + _ => return Ok(None), + }; let master_keys = self.persistent_store.master_keys()?; - let payload_size = ENCRYPTED_CREDENTIAL_ID_SIZE - 32; + let payload_size = credential_id.len() - 32; if !verify_hmac_256::( &master_keys.hmac, &credential_id[..payload_size], @@ -244,8 +284,9 @@ where let aes_dec_key = crypto::aes256::DecryptionKey::new(&aes_enc_key); let mut iv = [0; 16]; iv.copy_from_slice(&credential_id[..16]); - let mut blocks = [[0u8; 16]; 4]; - for i in 0..4 { + let block_len = if has_cred_random { 6 } else { 4 }; + let mut blocks = vec![[0u8; 16]; block_len]; + for i in 0..block_len { blocks[i].copy_from_slice(&credential_id[16 * (i + 1)..16 * (i + 2)]); } @@ -256,6 +297,14 @@ where decrypted_sk[16..].clone_from_slice(&blocks[1]); decrypted_rp_id_hash[..16].clone_from_slice(&blocks[2]); decrypted_rp_id_hash[16..].clone_from_slice(&blocks[3]); + let cred_random = if has_cred_random { + let mut decrypted_cred_random = [0; 32]; + decrypted_cred_random[..16].clone_from_slice(&blocks[4]); + decrypted_cred_random[16..].clone_from_slice(&blocks[5]); + Some(decrypted_cred_random.to_vec()) + } else { + None + }; if rp_id_hash != decrypted_rp_id_hash { return Ok(None); @@ -269,12 +318,18 @@ where rp_id: String::from(""), user_handle: vec![], other_ui: None, - cred_random: None, + cred_random, cred_protect_policy: None, + creation_order: 0, })) } - pub fn process_command(&mut self, command_cbor: &[u8], cid: ChannelID) -> Vec { + pub fn process_command( + &mut self, + command_cbor: &[u8], + cid: ChannelID, + now: ClockValue, + ) -> Vec { let cmd = Command::deserialize(command_cbor); #[cfg(feature = "debug_ctap")] writeln!(&mut Console::new(), "Received command: {:#?}", cmd).unwrap(); @@ -288,20 +343,35 @@ where Duration::from_ms(TOUCH_TIMEOUT_MS), ); } + match (&command, &self.stateful_command_type) { + ( + Command::AuthenticatorGetNextAssertion, + Some(StatefulCommand::GetAssertion(_)), + ) => (), + (Command::AuthenticatorReset, Some(StatefulCommand::Reset)) => (), + // GetInfo does not reset stateful commands. + (Command::AuthenticatorGetInfo, _) => (), + // AuthenticatorSelection does not reset stateful commands. + #[cfg(feature = "with_ctap2_1")] + (Command::AuthenticatorSelection, _) => (), + (_, _) => { + self.stateful_command_type = None; + } + } let response = match command { Command::AuthenticatorMakeCredential(params) => { self.process_make_credential(params, cid) } Command::AuthenticatorGetAssertion(params) => { - self.process_get_assertion(params, cid) + self.process_get_assertion(params, cid, now) } + Command::AuthenticatorGetNextAssertion => self.process_get_next_assertion(now), Command::AuthenticatorGetInfo => self.process_get_info(), Command::AuthenticatorClientPin(params) => self.process_client_pin(params), - Command::AuthenticatorReset => self.process_reset(cid), + Command::AuthenticatorReset => self.process_reset(cid, now), #[cfg(feature = "with_ctap2_1")] Command::AuthenticatorSelection => self.process_selection(cid), - // TODO(kaczmarczyck) implement GetNextAssertion and FIDO 2.1 commands - _ => self.process_unknown_command(), + // TODO(kaczmarczyck) implement FIDO 2.1 commands }; #[cfg(feature = "debug_ctap")] writeln!(&mut Console::new(), "Sending response: {:#?}", response).unwrap(); @@ -325,6 +395,33 @@ where } } + fn pin_uv_auth_precheck( + &mut self, + pin_uv_auth_param: &Option>, + pin_uv_auth_protocol: Option, + cid: ChannelID, + ) -> Result<(), Ctap2StatusCode> { + if let Some(auth_param) = &pin_uv_auth_param { + // This case was added in FIDO 2.1. + if auth_param.is_empty() { + (self.check_user_presence)(cid)?; + if self.persistent_store.pin_hash()?.is_none() { + return Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_PIN_NOT_SET); + } else { + return Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_PIN_INVALID); + } + } + + match pin_uv_auth_protocol { + Some(CtapState::::PIN_PROTOCOL_VERSION) => Ok(()), + Some(_) => Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_PIN_AUTH_INVALID), + None => Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_MISSING_PARAMETER), + } + } else { + Ok(()) + } + } + fn process_make_credential( &mut self, make_credential_params: AuthenticatorMakeCredentialParameters, @@ -342,25 +439,7 @@ where pin_uv_auth_protocol, } = make_credential_params; - if let Some(auth_param) = &pin_uv_auth_param { - // This case was added in FIDO 2.1. - if auth_param.is_empty() { - if self.persistent_store.pin_hash()?.is_none() { - return Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_PIN_NOT_SET); - } else { - return Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_PIN_INVALID); - } - } - - match pin_uv_auth_protocol { - Some(protocol) => { - if protocol != CtapState::::PIN_PROTOCOL_VERSION { - return Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_PIN_AUTH_INVALID); - } - } - None => return Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_MISSING_PARAMETER), - } - } + self.pin_uv_auth_precheck(&pin_uv_auth_param, pin_uv_auth_protocol, cid)?; if !pub_key_cred_params.contains(&ES256_CRED_PARAM) { return Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM); @@ -380,24 +459,23 @@ where }; let cred_random = if use_hmac_extension { - if !options.rk { - // The extension is actually supported, but we need resident keys. - return Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION); - } - Some(self.rng.gen_uniform_u8x32().to_vec()) + Some(self.rng.gen_uniform_u8x32()) } else { None }; - // TODO(kaczmarczyck) unsolicited output for default credProtect level let has_extension_output = use_hmac_extension || cred_protect_policy.is_some(); let rp_id = rp.rp_id; + let rp_id_hash = Sha256::hash(rp_id.as_bytes()); if let Some(exclude_list) = exclude_list { for cred_desc in exclude_list { if self .persistent_store .find_credential(&rp_id, &cred_desc.key_id, pin_uv_auth_param.is_none())? .is_some() + || self + .decrypt_credential_source(cred_desc.key_id, &rp_id_hash)? + .is_some() { // Perform this check, so bad actors can't brute force exclude_list // without user interaction. @@ -446,7 +524,6 @@ where let sk = crypto::ecdsa::SecKey::gensk(self.rng); let pk = sk.genpk(); - let rp_id_hash = Sha256::hash(rp_id.as_bytes()); let credential_id = if options.rk { let random_id = self.rng.gen_uniform_u8x32().to_vec(); let credential_source = PublicKeyCredentialSource { @@ -460,13 +537,14 @@ where other_ui: user .user_display_name .map(|s| truncate_to_char_boundary(&s, 64).to_string()), - cred_random, + cred_random: cred_random.map(|c| c.to_vec()), cred_protect_policy, + creation_order: self.persistent_store.new_creation_order()?, }; self.persistent_store.store_credential(credential_source)?; random_id } else { - self.encrypt_key_handle(sk.clone(), &rp_id_hash)? + self.encrypt_key_handle(sk.clone(), &rp_id_hash, cred_random.as_ref())? }; let mut auth_data = self.generate_auth_data(&rp_id_hash, flags)?; @@ -495,25 +573,27 @@ where let mut signature_data = auth_data.clone(); signature_data.extend(client_data_hash); - // We currently use the presence of the attestation private key in the persistent storage to - // decide whether batch attestation is needed. - let (signature, x5c) = match self.persistent_store.attestation_private_key()? { - Some(attestation_private_key) => { - let attestation_key = - crypto::ecdsa::SecKey::from_bytes(attestation_private_key).unwrap(); - let attestation_certificate = self - .persistent_store - .attestation_certificate()? - .ok_or(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_VENDOR_INTERNAL_ERROR)?; - ( - attestation_key.sign_rfc6979::(&signature_data), - Some(vec![attestation_certificate]), - ) - } - None => ( + + let (signature, x5c) = if USE_BATCH_ATTESTATION { + let attestation_private_key = self + .persistent_store + .attestation_private_key()? + .ok_or(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_VENDOR_INTERNAL_ERROR)?; + let attestation_key = + crypto::ecdsa::SecKey::from_bytes(attestation_private_key).unwrap(); + let attestation_certificate = self + .persistent_store + .attestation_certificate()? + .ok_or(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_VENDOR_INTERNAL_ERROR)?; + ( + attestation_key.sign_rfc6979::(&signature_data), + Some(vec![attestation_certificate]), + ) + } else { + ( sk.sign_rfc6979::(&signature_data), None, - ), + ) }; let attestation_statement = PackedAttestationStatement { alg: SignatureAlgorithm::ES256 as i64, @@ -530,10 +610,96 @@ where )) } + // Processes the input of a get_assertion operation for a given credential + // and returns the correct Get(Next)Assertion response. + fn assertion_response( + &self, + credential: PublicKeyCredentialSource, + assertion_input: AssertionInput, + number_of_credentials: Option, + ) -> Result { + let AssertionInput { + client_data_hash, + mut auth_data, + hmac_secret_input, + } = assertion_input; + + // Process extensions. + if let Some(hmac_secret_input) = hmac_secret_input { + let encrypted_output = self + .pin_protocol_v1 + .process_hmac_secret(hmac_secret_input, &credential.cred_random)?; + let extensions_output = cbor_map! { + "hmac-secret" => encrypted_output, + }; + if !cbor::write(extensions_output, &mut auth_data) { + return Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_VENDOR_RESPONSE_CANNOT_WRITE_CBOR); + } + } + + let mut signature_data = auth_data.clone(); + signature_data.extend(client_data_hash); + let signature = credential + .private_key + .sign_rfc6979::(&signature_data); + + let cred_desc = PublicKeyCredentialDescriptor { + key_type: PublicKeyCredentialType::PublicKey, + key_id: credential.credential_id, + transports: None, // You can set USB as a hint here. + }; + let user = if !credential.user_handle.is_empty() { + Some(PublicKeyCredentialUserEntity { + user_id: credential.user_handle, + user_name: None, + user_display_name: credential.other_ui, + user_icon: None, + }) + } else { + None + }; + Ok(ResponseData::AuthenticatorGetAssertion( + AuthenticatorGetAssertionResponse { + credential: Some(cred_desc), + auth_data, + signature: signature.to_asn1_der(), + user, + number_of_credentials: number_of_credentials.map(|n| n as u64), + }, + )) + } + + // Returns the first applicable credential from the allow list. + fn get_any_credential_from_allow_list( + &mut self, + allow_list: Vec, + rp_id: &str, + rp_id_hash: &[u8], + has_uv: bool, + ) -> Result, Ctap2StatusCode> { + for allowed_credential in allow_list { + let credential = self.persistent_store.find_credential( + rp_id, + &allowed_credential.key_id, + !has_uv, + )?; + if credential.is_some() { + return Ok(credential); + } + let credential = + self.decrypt_credential_source(allowed_credential.key_id, &rp_id_hash)?; + if credential.is_some() { + return Ok(credential); + } + } + Ok(None) + } + fn process_get_assertion( &mut self, get_assertion_params: AuthenticatorGetAssertionParameters, cid: ChannelID, + now: ClockValue, ) -> Result { let AuthenticatorGetAssertionParameters { rp_id, @@ -545,25 +711,7 @@ where pin_uv_auth_protocol, } = get_assertion_params; - if let Some(auth_param) = &pin_uv_auth_param { - // This case was added in FIDO 2.1. - if auth_param.is_empty() { - if self.persistent_store.pin_hash()?.is_none() { - return Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_PIN_NOT_SET); - } else { - return Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_PIN_INVALID); - } - } - - match pin_uv_auth_protocol { - Some(protocol) => { - if protocol != CtapState::::PIN_PROTOCOL_VERSION { - return Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_PIN_AUTH_INVALID); - } - } - None => return Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_MISSING_PARAMETER), - } - } + self.pin_uv_auth_precheck(&pin_uv_auth_param, pin_uv_auth_protocol, cid)?; let hmac_secret_input = extensions.map(|e| e.hmac_secret).flatten(); if hmac_secret_input.is_some() && !options.up { @@ -610,92 +758,75 @@ where } let rp_id_hash = Sha256::hash(rp_id.as_bytes()); - let mut decrypted_credential = None; - let credentials = if let Some(allow_list) = allow_list { - let mut found_credentials = vec![]; - for allowed_credential in allow_list { - match self.persistent_store.find_credential( - &rp_id, - &allowed_credential.key_id, - !has_uv, - )? { - Some(credential) => { - found_credentials.push(credential); - } - None => { - if decrypted_credential.is_none() { - decrypted_credential = self.decrypt_credential_source( - allowed_credential.key_id, - &rp_id_hash, - )?; - } - } - } + let mut applicable_credentials = if let Some(allow_list) = allow_list { + if let Some(credential) = + self.get_any_credential_from_allow_list(allow_list, &rp_id, &rp_id_hash, has_uv)? + { + vec![credential] + } else { + vec![] } - found_credentials } else { - // TODO(kaczmarczyck) use GetNextAssertion self.persistent_store.filter_credential(&rp_id, !has_uv)? }; + // Remove user identifiable information without uv. + if !has_uv { + for credential in &mut applicable_credentials { + credential.other_ui = None; + } + } + applicable_credentials.sort_unstable_by_key(|c| c.creation_order); - let credential = if let Some(credential) = credentials.first() { - credential - } else { - decrypted_credential - .as_ref() - .ok_or(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_NO_CREDENTIALS)? - }; - + // This check comes before CTAP2_ERR_NO_CREDENTIALS in CTAP 2.0. + // For CTAP 2.1, it was moved to a later protocol step. if options.up { (self.check_user_presence)(cid)?; } + let credential = applicable_credentials + .pop() + .ok_or(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_NO_CREDENTIALS)?; + self.increment_global_signature_counter()?; - let mut auth_data = self.generate_auth_data(&rp_id_hash, flags)?; - // Process extensions. - if let Some(hmac_secret_input) = hmac_secret_input { - let encrypted_output = self - .pin_protocol_v1 - .process_hmac_secret(hmac_secret_input, &credential.cred_random)?; - let extensions_output = cbor_map! { - "hmac-secret" => encrypted_output, - }; - if !cbor::write(extensions_output, &mut auth_data) { - return Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_VENDOR_RESPONSE_CANNOT_WRITE_CBOR); - } - } - - let mut signature_data = auth_data.clone(); - signature_data.extend(client_data_hash); - let signature = credential - .private_key - .sign_rfc6979::(&signature_data); - - let cred_desc = PublicKeyCredentialDescriptor { - key_type: PublicKeyCredentialType::PublicKey, - key_id: credential.credential_id.clone(), - transports: None, // You can set USB as a hint here. + let assertion_input = AssertionInput { + client_data_hash, + auth_data: self.generate_auth_data(&rp_id_hash, flags)?, + hmac_secret_input, }; - let user = if (flags & UV_FLAG != 0) && !credential.user_handle.is_empty() { - Some(PublicKeyCredentialUserEntity { - user_id: credential.user_handle.clone(), - user_name: None, - user_display_name: credential.other_ui.clone(), - user_icon: None, - }) - } else { + let number_of_credentials = if applicable_credentials.is_empty() { None + } else { + let number_of_credentials = Some(applicable_credentials.len() + 1); + self.stateful_command_permission = + TimedPermission::granted(now, STATEFUL_COMMAND_TIMEOUT_DURATION); + self.stateful_command_type = Some(StatefulCommand::GetAssertion(AssertionState { + assertion_input: assertion_input.clone(), + next_credentials: applicable_credentials, + })); + number_of_credentials }; - Ok(ResponseData::AuthenticatorGetAssertion( - AuthenticatorGetAssertionResponse { - credential: Some(cred_desc), - auth_data, - signature: signature.to_asn1_der(), - user, - number_of_credentials: None, - }, - )) + self.assertion_response(credential, assertion_input, number_of_credentials) + } + + fn process_get_next_assertion( + &mut self, + now: ClockValue, + ) -> Result { + self.check_command_permission(now)?; + let (assertion_input, credential) = + if let Some(StatefulCommand::GetAssertion(assertion_state)) = + &mut self.stateful_command_type + { + let credential = assertion_state + .next_credentials + .pop() + .ok_or(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_NOT_ALLOWED)?; + (assertion_state.assertion_input.clone(), credential) + } else { + return Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_NOT_ALLOWED); + }; + self.assertion_response(credential, assertion_input, None) } fn process_get_info(&self) -> Result { @@ -725,10 +856,9 @@ where ]), #[cfg(feature = "with_ctap2_1")] max_credential_count_in_list: MAX_CREDENTIAL_COUNT_IN_LIST.map(|c| c as u64), - // You can use ENCRYPTED_CREDENTIAL_ID_SIZE here, but if your - // browser passes that value, it might be used to fingerprint. + // #TODO(106) update with version 2.1 of HMAC-secret #[cfg(feature = "with_ctap2_1")] - max_credential_id_length: None, + max_credential_id_length: Some(CREDENTIAL_ID_BASE_SIZE as u64 + 32), #[cfg(feature = "with_ctap2_1")] transports: Some(vec![AuthenticatorTransport::Usb]), #[cfg(feature = "with_ctap2_1")] @@ -753,10 +883,17 @@ where ) } - fn process_reset(&mut self, cid: ChannelID) -> Result { + fn process_reset( + &mut self, + cid: ChannelID, + now: ClockValue, + ) -> Result { // Resets are only possible in the first 10 seconds after booting. - if !self.accepts_reset { - return Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_NOT_ALLOWED); + // TODO(kaczmarczyck) 2.1 allows Reset after Reset and 15 seconds? + self.check_command_permission(now)?; + match &self.stateful_command_type { + Some(StatefulCommand::Reset) => (), + _ => return Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_NOT_ALLOWED), } (self.check_user_presence)(cid)?; @@ -778,10 +915,6 @@ where Ok(ResponseData::AuthenticatorSelection) } - fn process_unknown_command(&self) -> Result { - Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP1_ERR_INVALID_COMMAND) - } - pub fn generate_auth_data( &self, rp_id_hash: &[u8], @@ -805,13 +938,15 @@ where #[cfg(test)] mod test { use super::data_formats::{ - CoseKey, GetAssertionExtensions, GetAssertionHmacSecretInput, GetAssertionOptions, - MakeCredentialExtensions, MakeCredentialOptions, PublicKeyCredentialRpEntity, - PublicKeyCredentialUserEntity, + CoseKey, GetAssertionExtensions, GetAssertionOptions, MakeCredentialExtensions, + MakeCredentialOptions, PublicKeyCredentialRpEntity, PublicKeyCredentialUserEntity, }; use super::*; + use cbor::cbor_array; use crypto::rng256::ThreadRng256; + const CLOCK_FREQUENCY_HZ: usize = 32768; + const DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE: ClockValue = ClockValue::new(0, CLOCK_FREQUENCY_HZ); // The keep-alive logic in the processing of some commands needs a channel ID to send // keep-alive packets to. // In tests where we define a dummy user-presence check that immediately returns, the channel @@ -822,11 +957,11 @@ mod test { fn test_get_info() { let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {}; let user_immediately_present = |_| Ok(()); - let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present); - let info_reponse = ctap_state.process_command(&[0x04], DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID); + let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE); + let info_reponse = ctap_state.process_command(&[0x04], DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE); #[cfg(feature = "with_ctap2_1")] - let mut expected_response = vec![0x00, 0xA9, 0x01]; + let mut expected_response = vec![0x00, 0xAA, 0x01]; #[cfg(not(feature = "with_ctap2_1"))] let mut expected_response = vec![0x00, 0xA6, 0x01]; // The difference here is a longer array of supported versions. @@ -861,9 +996,9 @@ mod test { #[cfg(feature = "with_ctap2_1")] expected_response.extend( [ - 0x09, 0x81, 0x63, 0x75, 0x73, 0x62, 0x0A, 0x81, 0xA2, 0x63, 0x61, 0x6C, 0x67, 0x26, - 0x64, 0x74, 0x79, 0x70, 0x65, 0x6A, 0x70, 0x75, 0x62, 0x6C, 0x69, 0x63, 0x2D, 0x6B, - 0x65, 0x79, 0x0D, 0x04, + 0x08, 0x18, 0x90, 0x09, 0x81, 0x63, 0x75, 0x73, 0x62, 0x0A, 0x81, 0xA2, 0x63, 0x61, + 0x6C, 0x67, 0x26, 0x64, 0x74, 0x79, 0x70, 0x65, 0x6A, 0x70, 0x75, 0x62, 0x6C, 0x69, + 0x63, 0x2D, 0x6B, 0x65, 0x79, 0x0D, 0x04, ] .iter(), ); @@ -879,7 +1014,7 @@ mod test { rp_icon: None, }; let user = PublicKeyCredentialUserEntity { - user_id: vec![0xFA, 0xB1, 0xA2], + user_id: vec![0x1D], user_name: None, user_display_name: None, user_icon: None, @@ -932,7 +1067,7 @@ mod test { fn test_residential_process_make_credential() { let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {}; let user_immediately_present = |_| Ok(()); - let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present); + let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE); let make_credential_params = create_minimal_make_credential_parameters(); let make_credential_response = @@ -968,7 +1103,7 @@ mod test { fn test_non_residential_process_make_credential() { let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {}; let user_immediately_present = |_| Ok(()); - let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present); + let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE); let mut make_credential_params = create_minimal_make_credential_parameters(); make_credential_params.options.rk = false; @@ -990,7 +1125,7 @@ mod test { 0x12, 0x55, 0x86, 0xCE, 0x19, 0x47, 0x41, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, ]; expected_auth_data.extend(&ctap_state.persistent_store.aaguid().unwrap()); - expected_auth_data.extend(&[0x00, ENCRYPTED_CREDENTIAL_ID_SIZE as u8]); + expected_auth_data.extend(&[0x00, CREDENTIAL_ID_BASE_SIZE as u8]); assert_eq!( auth_data[0..expected_auth_data.len()], expected_auth_data[..] @@ -1005,7 +1140,7 @@ mod test { fn test_process_make_credential_unsupported_algorithm() { let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {}; let user_immediately_present = |_| Ok(()); - let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present); + let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE); let mut make_credential_params = create_minimal_make_credential_parameters(); make_credential_params.pub_key_cred_params = vec![]; @@ -1023,7 +1158,7 @@ mod test { let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {}; let excluded_private_key = crypto::ecdsa::SecKey::gensk(&mut rng); let user_immediately_present = |_| Ok(()); - let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present); + let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE); let excluded_credential_id = vec![0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67]; let make_credential_params = @@ -1037,6 +1172,7 @@ mod test { other_ui: None, cred_random: None, cred_protect_policy: None, + creation_order: 0, }; assert!(ctap_state .persistent_store @@ -1055,7 +1191,7 @@ mod test { fn test_process_make_credential_credential_with_cred_protect() { let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {}; let user_immediately_present = |_| Ok(()); - let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present); + let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE); let test_policy = CredentialProtectionPolicy::UserVerificationOptionalWithCredentialIdList; let make_credential_params = @@ -1109,7 +1245,57 @@ mod test { fn test_process_make_credential_hmac_secret() { let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {}; let user_immediately_present = |_| Ok(()); - let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present); + let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE); + + let extensions = Some(MakeCredentialExtensions { + hmac_secret: true, + cred_protect: None, + }); + let mut make_credential_params = create_minimal_make_credential_parameters(); + make_credential_params.options.rk = false; + make_credential_params.extensions = extensions; + let make_credential_response = + ctap_state.process_make_credential(make_credential_params, DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID); + + match make_credential_response.unwrap() { + ResponseData::AuthenticatorMakeCredential(make_credential_response) => { + let AuthenticatorMakeCredentialResponse { + fmt, + auth_data, + att_stmt, + } = make_credential_response; + // The expected response is split to only assert the non-random parts. + assert_eq!(fmt, "packed"); + let mut expected_auth_data = vec![ + 0xA3, 0x79, 0xA6, 0xF6, 0xEE, 0xAF, 0xB9, 0xA5, 0x5E, 0x37, 0x8C, 0x11, 0x80, + 0x34, 0xE2, 0x75, 0x1E, 0x68, 0x2F, 0xAB, 0x9F, 0x2D, 0x30, 0xAB, 0x13, 0xD2, + 0x12, 0x55, 0x86, 0xCE, 0x19, 0x47, 0xC1, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + ]; + expected_auth_data.extend(&ctap_state.persistent_store.aaguid().unwrap()); + expected_auth_data.extend(&[0x00, CREDENTIAL_ID_MAX_SIZE as u8]); + assert_eq!( + auth_data[0..expected_auth_data.len()], + expected_auth_data[..] + ); + let expected_extension_cbor = vec![ + 0xA1, 0x6B, 0x68, 0x6D, 0x61, 0x63, 0x2D, 0x73, 0x65, 0x63, 0x72, 0x65, 0x74, + 0xF5, + ]; + assert_eq!( + auth_data[auth_data.len() - expected_extension_cbor.len()..auth_data.len()], + expected_extension_cbor[..] + ); + assert_eq!(att_stmt.alg, SignatureAlgorithm::ES256 as i64); + } + _ => panic!("Invalid response type"), + } + } + + #[test] + fn test_process_make_credential_hmac_secret_resident_key() { + let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {}; + let user_immediately_present = |_| Ok(()); + let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE); let extensions = Some(MakeCredentialExtensions { hmac_secret: true, @@ -1158,7 +1344,8 @@ mod test { fn test_process_make_credential_cancelled() { let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {}; let user_presence_always_cancel = |_| Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_KEEPALIVE_CANCEL); - let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_presence_always_cancel); + let mut ctap_state = + CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_presence_always_cancel, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE); let make_credential_params = create_minimal_make_credential_parameters(); let make_credential_response = @@ -1170,11 +1357,43 @@ mod test { ); } + fn check_assertion_response( + response: Result, + expected_user_id: Vec, + expected_number_of_credentials: Option, + ) { + match response.unwrap() { + ResponseData::AuthenticatorGetAssertion(get_assertion_response) => { + let AuthenticatorGetAssertionResponse { + auth_data, + user, + number_of_credentials, + .. + } = get_assertion_response; + let expected_auth_data = vec![ + 0xA3, 0x79, 0xA6, 0xF6, 0xEE, 0xAF, 0xB9, 0xA5, 0x5E, 0x37, 0x8C, 0x11, 0x80, + 0x34, 0xE2, 0x75, 0x1E, 0x68, 0x2F, 0xAB, 0x9F, 0x2D, 0x30, 0xAB, 0x13, 0xD2, + 0x12, 0x55, 0x86, 0xCE, 0x19, 0x47, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, + ]; + assert_eq!(auth_data, expected_auth_data); + let expected_user = PublicKeyCredentialUserEntity { + user_id: expected_user_id, + user_name: None, + user_display_name: None, + user_icon: None, + }; + assert_eq!(user, Some(expected_user)); + assert_eq!(number_of_credentials, expected_number_of_credentials); + } + _ => panic!("Invalid response type"), + } + } + #[test] fn test_residential_process_get_assertion() { let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {}; let user_immediately_present = |_| Ok(()); - let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present); + let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE); let make_credential_params = create_minimal_make_credential_parameters(); assert!(ctap_state @@ -1193,28 +1412,79 @@ mod test { pin_uv_auth_param: None, pin_uv_auth_protocol: None, }; - let get_assertion_response = - ctap_state.process_get_assertion(get_assertion_params, DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID); + let get_assertion_response = ctap_state.process_get_assertion( + get_assertion_params, + DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID, + DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE, + ); + check_assertion_response(get_assertion_response, vec![0x1D], None); + } - match get_assertion_response.unwrap() { - ResponseData::AuthenticatorGetAssertion(get_assertion_response) => { - let AuthenticatorGetAssertionResponse { - auth_data, - user, - number_of_credentials, - .. - } = get_assertion_response; - let expected_auth_data = vec![ - 0xA3, 0x79, 0xA6, 0xF6, 0xEE, 0xAF, 0xB9, 0xA5, 0x5E, 0x37, 0x8C, 0x11, 0x80, - 0x34, 0xE2, 0x75, 0x1E, 0x68, 0x2F, 0xAB, 0x9F, 0x2D, 0x30, 0xAB, 0x13, 0xD2, - 0x12, 0x55, 0x86, 0xCE, 0x19, 0x47, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, - ]; - assert_eq!(auth_data, expected_auth_data); - assert!(user.is_none()); - assert!(number_of_credentials.is_none()); + #[test] + fn test_process_get_assertion_hmac_secret() { + let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {}; + let sk = crypto::ecdh::SecKey::gensk(&mut rng); + let user_immediately_present = |_| Ok(()); + let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE); + + let make_extensions = Some(MakeCredentialExtensions { + hmac_secret: true, + cred_protect: None, + }); + let mut make_credential_params = create_minimal_make_credential_parameters(); + make_credential_params.options.rk = false; + make_credential_params.extensions = make_extensions; + let make_credential_response = + ctap_state.process_make_credential(make_credential_params, DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID); + assert!(make_credential_response.is_ok()); + let credential_id = match make_credential_response.unwrap() { + ResponseData::AuthenticatorMakeCredential(make_credential_response) => { + let auth_data = make_credential_response.auth_data; + let offset = 37 + ctap_state.persistent_store.aaguid().unwrap().len(); + assert_eq!(auth_data[offset], 0x00); + assert_eq!(auth_data[offset + 1] as usize, CREDENTIAL_ID_MAX_SIZE); + auth_data[offset + 2..offset + 2 + CREDENTIAL_ID_MAX_SIZE].to_vec() } _ => panic!("Invalid response type"), - } + }; + + let pk = sk.genpk(); + let hmac_secret_input = GetAssertionHmacSecretInput { + key_agreement: CoseKey::from(pk), + salt_enc: vec![0x02; 32], + salt_auth: vec![0x03; 16], + }; + let get_extensions = Some(GetAssertionExtensions { + hmac_secret: Some(hmac_secret_input), + }); + + let cred_desc = PublicKeyCredentialDescriptor { + key_type: PublicKeyCredentialType::PublicKey, + key_id: credential_id, + transports: None, + }; + let get_assertion_params = AuthenticatorGetAssertionParameters { + rp_id: String::from("example.com"), + client_data_hash: vec![0xCD], + allow_list: Some(vec![cred_desc]), + extensions: get_extensions, + options: GetAssertionOptions { + up: false, + uv: false, + }, + pin_uv_auth_param: None, + pin_uv_auth_protocol: None, + }; + let get_assertion_response = ctap_state.process_get_assertion( + get_assertion_params, + DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID, + DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE, + ); + + assert_eq!( + get_assertion_response, + Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION) + ); } #[test] @@ -1222,7 +1492,7 @@ mod test { let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {}; let sk = crypto::ecdh::SecKey::gensk(&mut rng); let user_immediately_present = |_| Ok(()); - let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present); + let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE); let make_extensions = Some(MakeCredentialExtensions { hmac_secret: true, @@ -1256,8 +1526,11 @@ mod test { pin_uv_auth_param: None, pin_uv_auth_protocol: None, }; - let get_assertion_response = - ctap_state.process_get_assertion(get_assertion_params, DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID); + let get_assertion_response = ctap_state.process_get_assertion( + get_assertion_params, + DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID, + DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE, + ); assert_eq!( get_assertion_response, @@ -1271,7 +1544,7 @@ mod test { let private_key = crypto::ecdsa::SecKey::gensk(&mut rng); let credential_id = rng.gen_uniform_u8x32().to_vec(); let user_immediately_present = |_| Ok(()); - let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present); + let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE); let cred_desc = PublicKeyCredentialDescriptor { key_type: PublicKeyCredentialType::PublicKey, @@ -1283,12 +1556,13 @@ mod test { credential_id: credential_id.clone(), private_key: private_key.clone(), rp_id: String::from("example.com"), - user_handle: vec![0x00], + user_handle: vec![0x1D], other_ui: None, cred_random: None, cred_protect_policy: Some( CredentialProtectionPolicy::UserVerificationOptionalWithCredentialIdList, ), + creation_order: 0, }; assert!(ctap_state .persistent_store @@ -1307,8 +1581,11 @@ mod test { pin_uv_auth_param: None, pin_uv_auth_protocol: None, }; - let get_assertion_response = - ctap_state.process_get_assertion(get_assertion_params, DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID); + let get_assertion_response = ctap_state.process_get_assertion( + get_assertion_params, + DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID, + DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE, + ); assert_eq!( get_assertion_response, Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_NO_CREDENTIALS), @@ -1326,19 +1603,23 @@ mod test { pin_uv_auth_param: None, pin_uv_auth_protocol: None, }; - let get_assertion_response = - ctap_state.process_get_assertion(get_assertion_params, DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID); - assert!(get_assertion_response.is_ok()); + let get_assertion_response = ctap_state.process_get_assertion( + get_assertion_params, + DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID, + DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE, + ); + check_assertion_response(get_assertion_response, vec![0x1D], None); let credential = PublicKeyCredentialSource { key_type: PublicKeyCredentialType::PublicKey, credential_id, private_key, rp_id: String::from("example.com"), - user_handle: vec![0x00], + user_handle: vec![0x1D], other_ui: None, cred_random: None, cred_protect_policy: Some(CredentialProtectionPolicy::UserVerificationRequired), + creation_order: 0, }; assert!(ctap_state .persistent_store @@ -1357,20 +1638,187 @@ mod test { pin_uv_auth_param: None, pin_uv_auth_protocol: None, }; - let get_assertion_response = - ctap_state.process_get_assertion(get_assertion_params, DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID); + let get_assertion_response = ctap_state.process_get_assertion( + get_assertion_params, + DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID, + DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE, + ); assert_eq!( get_assertion_response, Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_NO_CREDENTIALS), ); } + #[test] + fn test_process_get_next_assertion_two_credentials() { + let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {}; + let user_immediately_present = |_| Ok(()); + let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE); + + let mut make_credential_params = create_minimal_make_credential_parameters(); + make_credential_params.user.user_id = vec![0x01]; + assert!(ctap_state + .process_make_credential(make_credential_params, DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID) + .is_ok()); + let mut make_credential_params = create_minimal_make_credential_parameters(); + make_credential_params.user.user_id = vec![0x02]; + assert!(ctap_state + .process_make_credential(make_credential_params, DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID) + .is_ok()); + + let get_assertion_params = AuthenticatorGetAssertionParameters { + rp_id: String::from("example.com"), + client_data_hash: vec![0xCD], + allow_list: None, + extensions: None, + options: GetAssertionOptions { + up: false, + uv: false, + }, + pin_uv_auth_param: None, + pin_uv_auth_protocol: None, + }; + let get_assertion_response = ctap_state.process_get_assertion( + get_assertion_params, + DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID, + DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE, + ); + check_assertion_response(get_assertion_response, vec![0x02], Some(2)); + + let get_assertion_response = ctap_state.process_get_next_assertion(DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE); + check_assertion_response(get_assertion_response, vec![0x01], None); + + let get_assertion_response = ctap_state.process_get_next_assertion(DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE); + assert_eq!( + get_assertion_response, + Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_NOT_ALLOWED) + ); + } + + #[test] + fn test_process_get_next_assertion_three_credentials() { + let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {}; + let user_immediately_present = |_| Ok(()); + let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE); + + let mut make_credential_params = create_minimal_make_credential_parameters(); + make_credential_params.user.user_id = vec![0x01]; + assert!(ctap_state + .process_make_credential(make_credential_params, DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID) + .is_ok()); + let mut make_credential_params = create_minimal_make_credential_parameters(); + make_credential_params.user.user_id = vec![0x02]; + assert!(ctap_state + .process_make_credential(make_credential_params, DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID) + .is_ok()); + let mut make_credential_params = create_minimal_make_credential_parameters(); + make_credential_params.user.user_id = vec![0x03]; + assert!(ctap_state + .process_make_credential(make_credential_params, DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID) + .is_ok()); + + let get_assertion_params = AuthenticatorGetAssertionParameters { + rp_id: String::from("example.com"), + client_data_hash: vec![0xCD], + allow_list: None, + extensions: None, + options: GetAssertionOptions { + up: false, + uv: false, + }, + pin_uv_auth_param: None, + pin_uv_auth_protocol: None, + }; + let get_assertion_response = ctap_state.process_get_assertion( + get_assertion_params, + DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID, + DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE, + ); + check_assertion_response(get_assertion_response, vec![0x03], Some(3)); + + let get_assertion_response = ctap_state.process_get_next_assertion(DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE); + check_assertion_response(get_assertion_response, vec![0x02], None); + + let get_assertion_response = ctap_state.process_get_next_assertion(DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE); + check_assertion_response(get_assertion_response, vec![0x01], None); + + let get_assertion_response = ctap_state.process_get_next_assertion(DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE); + assert_eq!( + get_assertion_response, + Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_NOT_ALLOWED) + ); + } + + #[test] + fn test_process_get_next_assertion_not_allowed() { + let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {}; + let user_immediately_present = |_| Ok(()); + let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE); + + let get_assertion_response = ctap_state.process_get_next_assertion(DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE); + assert_eq!( + get_assertion_response, + Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_NOT_ALLOWED) + ); + + let mut make_credential_params = create_minimal_make_credential_parameters(); + make_credential_params.user.user_id = vec![0x01]; + assert!(ctap_state + .process_make_credential(make_credential_params, DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID) + .is_ok()); + let mut make_credential_params = create_minimal_make_credential_parameters(); + make_credential_params.user.user_id = vec![0x02]; + assert!(ctap_state + .process_make_credential(make_credential_params, DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID) + .is_ok()); + + let get_assertion_params = AuthenticatorGetAssertionParameters { + rp_id: String::from("example.com"), + client_data_hash: vec![0xCD], + allow_list: None, + extensions: None, + options: GetAssertionOptions { + up: false, + uv: false, + }, + pin_uv_auth_param: None, + pin_uv_auth_protocol: None, + }; + let get_assertion_response = ctap_state.process_get_assertion( + get_assertion_params, + DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID, + DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE, + ); + assert!(get_assertion_response.is_ok()); + + // This is a MakeCredential command. + let mut command_cbor = vec![0x01]; + let cbor_value = cbor_map! { + 1 => vec![0xCD; 16], + 2 => cbor_map! { + "id" => "example.com", + }, + 3 => cbor_map! { + "id" => vec![0x1D, 0x1D, 0x1D, 0x1D], + }, + 4 => cbor_array![ES256_CRED_PARAM], + }; + assert!(cbor::write(cbor_value, &mut command_cbor)); + ctap_state.process_command(&command_cbor, DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE); + + let get_assertion_response = ctap_state.process_get_next_assertion(DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE); + assert_eq!( + get_assertion_response, + Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_NOT_ALLOWED) + ); + } + #[test] fn test_process_reset() { let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {}; let user_immediately_present = |_| Ok(()); let private_key = crypto::ecdsa::SecKey::gensk(&mut rng); - let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present); + let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE); let credential_id = vec![0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67]; let credential_source = PublicKeyCredentialSource { @@ -1382,6 +1830,7 @@ mod test { other_ui: None, cred_random: None, cred_protect_policy: None, + creation_order: 0, }; assert!(ctap_state .persistent_store @@ -1389,7 +1838,8 @@ mod test { .is_ok()); assert!(ctap_state.persistent_store.count_credentials().unwrap() > 0); - let reset_reponse = ctap_state.process_command(&[0x07], DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID); + let reset_reponse = + ctap_state.process_command(&[0x07], DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE); let expected_response = vec![0x00]; assert_eq!(reset_reponse, expected_response); assert!(ctap_state.persistent_store.count_credentials().unwrap() == 0); @@ -1399,9 +1849,10 @@ mod test { fn test_process_reset_cancelled() { let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {}; let user_presence_always_cancel = |_| Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_KEEPALIVE_CANCEL); - let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_presence_always_cancel); + let mut ctap_state = + CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_presence_always_cancel, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE); - let reset_reponse = ctap_state.process_reset(DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID); + let reset_reponse = ctap_state.process_reset(DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE); assert_eq!( reset_reponse, @@ -1409,14 +1860,28 @@ mod test { ); } + #[test] + fn test_process_reset_not_first() { + let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {}; + let user_immediately_present = |_| Ok(()); + let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE); + + // This is a GetNextAssertion command. + ctap_state.process_command(&[0x08], DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE); + + let reset_reponse = ctap_state.process_reset(DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE); + assert_eq!(reset_reponse, Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_NOT_ALLOWED)); + } + #[test] fn test_process_unknown_command() { let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {}; let user_immediately_present = |_| Ok(()); - let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present); + let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE); // This command does not exist. - let reset_reponse = ctap_state.process_command(&[0xDF], DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID); + let reset_reponse = + ctap_state.process_command(&[0xDF], DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE); let expected_response = vec![Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP1_ERR_INVALID_COMMAND as u8]; assert_eq!(reset_reponse, expected_response); } @@ -1426,13 +1891,13 @@ mod test { let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {}; let user_immediately_present = |_| Ok(()); let private_key = crypto::ecdsa::SecKey::gensk(&mut rng); - let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present); + let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE); // Usually, the relying party ID or its hash is provided by the client. // We are not testing the correctness of our SHA256 here, only if it is checked. let rp_id_hash = [0x55; 32]; let encrypted_id = ctap_state - .encrypt_key_handle(private_key.clone(), &rp_id_hash) + .encrypt_key_handle(private_key.clone(), &rp_id_hash, None) .unwrap(); let decrypted_source = ctap_state .decrypt_credential_source(encrypted_id, &rp_id_hash) @@ -1442,17 +1907,63 @@ mod test { assert_eq!(private_key, decrypted_source.private_key); } + #[test] + fn test_encrypt_decrypt_credential_with_cred_random() { + let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {}; + let user_immediately_present = |_| Ok(()); + let private_key = crypto::ecdsa::SecKey::gensk(&mut rng); + let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE); + + // Usually, the relying party ID or its hash is provided by the client. + // We are not testing the correctness of our SHA256 here, only if it is checked. + let rp_id_hash = [0x55; 32]; + let cred_random = [0xC9; 32]; + let encrypted_id = ctap_state + .encrypt_key_handle(private_key.clone(), &rp_id_hash, Some(&cred_random)) + .unwrap(); + let decrypted_source = ctap_state + .decrypt_credential_source(encrypted_id, &rp_id_hash) + .unwrap() + .unwrap(); + + assert_eq!(private_key, decrypted_source.private_key); + assert_eq!(Some(cred_random.to_vec()), decrypted_source.cred_random); + } + #[test] fn test_encrypt_decrypt_bad_hmac() { let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {}; let user_immediately_present = |_| Ok(()); let private_key = crypto::ecdsa::SecKey::gensk(&mut rng); - let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present); + let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE); // Same as above. let rp_id_hash = [0x55; 32]; let encrypted_id = ctap_state - .encrypt_key_handle(private_key, &rp_id_hash) + .encrypt_key_handle(private_key, &rp_id_hash, None) + .unwrap(); + for i in 0..encrypted_id.len() { + let mut modified_id = encrypted_id.clone(); + modified_id[i] ^= 0x01; + assert!(ctap_state + .decrypt_credential_source(modified_id, &rp_id_hash) + .unwrap() + .is_none()); + } + } + + #[test] + fn test_encrypt_decrypt_bad_hmac_with_cred_random() { + let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {}; + let user_immediately_present = |_| Ok(()); + let private_key = crypto::ecdsa::SecKey::gensk(&mut rng); + let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE); + + // Same as above. + let rp_id_hash = [0x55; 32]; + let cred_random = [0xC9; 32]; + let encrypted_id = ctap_state + .encrypt_key_handle(private_key, &rp_id_hash, Some(&cred_random)) .unwrap(); for i in 0..encrypted_id.len() { let mut modified_id = encrypted_id.clone(); diff --git a/src/ctap/pin_protocol_v1.rs b/src/ctap/pin_protocol_v1.rs index c03b81b..564ca6d 100644 --- a/src/ctap/pin_protocol_v1.rs +++ b/src/ctap/pin_protocol_v1.rs @@ -19,7 +19,6 @@ use super::status_code::Ctap2StatusCode; use super::storage::PersistentStore; #[cfg(feature = "with_ctap2_1")] use alloc::string::String; -#[cfg(feature = "with_ctap2_1")] use alloc::vec; use alloc::vec::Vec; use arrayref::array_ref; @@ -74,10 +73,9 @@ fn encrypt_hmac_secret_output( let mut cred_random_secret = [0u8; 32]; cred_random_secret.copy_from_slice(cred_random); - // Initialization of 4 blocks in any case makes this function more readable. - let mut blocks = [[0u8; 16]; 4]; // With the if clause restriction above, block_len can only be 2 or 4. let block_len = salt_enc.len() / 16; + let mut blocks = vec![[0u8; 16]; block_len]; for i in 0..block_len { blocks[i].copy_from_slice(&salt_enc[16 * i..16 * (i + 1)]); } @@ -85,8 +83,8 @@ fn encrypt_hmac_secret_output( let mut decrypted_salt1 = [0u8; 32]; decrypted_salt1[..16].copy_from_slice(&blocks[0]); - let output1 = hmac_256::(&cred_random_secret, &decrypted_salt1[..]); decrypted_salt1[16..].copy_from_slice(&blocks[1]); + let output1 = hmac_256::(&cred_random_secret, &decrypted_salt1[..]); for i in 0..2 { blocks[i].copy_from_slice(&output1[16 * i..16 * (i + 1)]); } @@ -638,36 +636,52 @@ impl PinProtocolV1 { #[cfg(test)] mod test { use super::*; - use arrayref::array_refs; use crypto::rng256::ThreadRng256; // Stores a PIN hash corresponding to the dummy PIN "1234". fn set_standard_pin(persistent_store: &mut PersistentStore) { let mut pin = [0u8; 64]; - pin[0] = 0x31; - pin[1] = 0x32; - pin[2] = 0x33; - pin[3] = 0x34; + pin[..4].copy_from_slice(b"1234"); let mut pin_hash = [0u8; 16]; pin_hash.copy_from_slice(&Sha256::hash(&pin[..])[..16]); persistent_store.set_pin_hash(&pin_hash).unwrap(); } + // Encrypts the message with a zero IV and key derived from shared_secret. + fn encrypt_message(shared_secret: &[u8; 32], message: &[u8]) -> Vec { + assert!(message.len() % 16 == 0); + let block_len = message.len() / 16; + let mut blocks = vec![[0u8; 16]; block_len]; + for i in 0..block_len { + blocks[i][..].copy_from_slice(&message[i * 16..(i + 1) * 16]); + } + let aes_enc_key = crypto::aes256::EncryptionKey::new(shared_secret); + let iv = [0u8; 16]; + cbc_encrypt(&aes_enc_key, iv, &mut blocks); + blocks.iter().flatten().cloned().collect::>() + } + + // Decrypts the message with a zero IV and key derived from shared_secret. + fn decrypt_message(shared_secret: &[u8; 32], message: &[u8]) -> Vec { + assert!(message.len() % 16 == 0); + let block_len = message.len() / 16; + let mut blocks = vec![[0u8; 16]; block_len]; + for i in 0..block_len { + blocks[i][..].copy_from_slice(&message[i * 16..(i + 1) * 16]); + } + let aes_enc_key = crypto::aes256::EncryptionKey::new(shared_secret); + let aes_dec_key = crypto::aes256::DecryptionKey::new(&aes_enc_key); + let iv = [0u8; 16]; + cbc_decrypt(&aes_dec_key, iv, &mut blocks); + blocks.iter().flatten().cloned().collect::>() + } + // Fails on PINs bigger than 64 bytes. fn encrypt_pin(shared_secret: &[u8; 32], pin: Vec) -> Vec { assert!(pin.len() <= 64); let mut padded_pin = [0u8; 64]; padded_pin[..pin.len()].copy_from_slice(&pin[..]); - let aes_enc_key = crypto::aes256::EncryptionKey::new(shared_secret); - let mut blocks = [[0u8; 16]; 4]; - let (b0, b1, b2, b3) = array_refs!(&padded_pin, 16, 16, 16, 16); - blocks[0][..].copy_from_slice(b0); - blocks[1][..].copy_from_slice(b1); - blocks[2][..].copy_from_slice(b2); - blocks[3][..].copy_from_slice(b3); - let iv = [0u8; 16]; - cbc_encrypt(&aes_enc_key, iv, &mut blocks); - blocks.iter().flatten().cloned().collect::>() + encrypt_message(shared_secret, &padded_pin) } // Encrypts the dummy PIN "1234". @@ -677,22 +691,10 @@ mod test { // Encrypts the PIN hash corresponding to the dummy PIN "1234". fn encrypt_standard_pin_hash(shared_secret: &[u8; 32]) -> Vec { - let aes_enc_key = crypto::aes256::EncryptionKey::new(shared_secret); let mut pin = [0u8; 64]; - pin[0] = 0x31; - pin[1] = 0x32; - pin[2] = 0x33; - pin[3] = 0x34; + pin[..4].copy_from_slice(b"1234"); let pin_hash = Sha256::hash(&pin); - - let mut blocks = [[0u8; 16]; 1]; - blocks[0].copy_from_slice(&pin_hash[..16]); - let iv = [0u8; 16]; - cbc_encrypt(&aes_enc_key, iv, &mut blocks); - - let mut encrypted_pin_hash = Vec::with_capacity(16); - encrypted_pin_hash.extend(&blocks[0]); - encrypted_pin_hash + encrypt_message(shared_secret, &pin_hash[..16]) } #[test] @@ -1184,6 +1186,56 @@ mod test { output, Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION) ); + + let mut salt_enc = [0x00; 32]; + let cred_random = [0xC9; 32]; + + // Test values to check for reproducibility. + let salt1 = [0x01; 32]; + let salt2 = [0x02; 32]; + let expected_output1 = hmac_256::(&cred_random, &salt1); + let expected_output2 = hmac_256::(&cred_random, &salt2); + + let salt_enc1 = encrypt_message(&shared_secret, &salt1); + salt_enc.copy_from_slice(salt_enc1.as_slice()); + let output = encrypt_hmac_secret_output(&shared_secret, &salt_enc, &cred_random).unwrap(); + let output_dec = decrypt_message(&shared_secret, &output); + assert_eq!(&output_dec, &expected_output1); + + let salt_enc2 = &encrypt_message(&shared_secret, &salt2); + salt_enc.copy_from_slice(salt_enc2.as_slice()); + let output = encrypt_hmac_secret_output(&shared_secret, &salt_enc, &cred_random).unwrap(); + let output_dec = decrypt_message(&shared_secret, &output); + assert_eq!(&output_dec, &expected_output2); + + let mut salt_enc = [0x00; 64]; + let mut salt12 = [0x00; 64]; + salt12[..32].copy_from_slice(&salt1); + salt12[32..].copy_from_slice(&salt2); + let salt_enc12 = encrypt_message(&shared_secret, &salt12); + salt_enc.copy_from_slice(salt_enc12.as_slice()); + let output = encrypt_hmac_secret_output(&shared_secret, &salt_enc, &cred_random).unwrap(); + let output_dec = decrypt_message(&shared_secret, &output); + assert_eq!(&output_dec[..32], &expected_output1); + assert_eq!(&output_dec[32..], &expected_output2); + + let mut salt_enc = [0x00; 64]; + let mut salt02 = [0x00; 64]; + salt02[32..].copy_from_slice(&salt2); + let salt_enc02 = encrypt_message(&shared_secret, &salt02); + salt_enc.copy_from_slice(salt_enc02.as_slice()); + let output = encrypt_hmac_secret_output(&shared_secret, &salt_enc, &cred_random).unwrap(); + let output_dec = decrypt_message(&shared_secret, &output); + assert_eq!(&output_dec[32..], &expected_output2); + + let mut salt_enc = [0x00; 64]; + let mut salt10 = [0x00; 64]; + salt10[..32].copy_from_slice(&salt1); + let salt_enc10 = encrypt_message(&shared_secret, &salt10); + salt_enc.copy_from_slice(salt_enc10.as_slice()); + let output = encrypt_hmac_secret_output(&shared_secret, &salt_enc, &cred_random).unwrap(); + let output_dec = decrypt_message(&shared_secret, &output); + assert_eq!(&output_dec[..32], &expected_output1); } #[cfg(feature = "with_ctap2_1")] diff --git a/src/ctap/storage.rs b/src/ctap/storage.rs index 127dc23..7952d75 100644 --- a/src/ctap/storage.rs +++ b/src/ctap/storage.rs @@ -15,9 +15,9 @@ #[cfg(feature = "with_ctap2_1")] use crate::ctap::data_formats::{extract_array, extract_text_string}; use crate::ctap::data_formats::{CredentialProtectionPolicy, PublicKeyCredentialSource}; +use crate::ctap::key_material; use crate::ctap::pin_protocol_v1::PIN_AUTH_LENGTH; use crate::ctap::status_code::Ctap2StatusCode; -use crate::ctap::{key_material, USE_BATCH_ATTESTATION}; use crate::embedded_flash::{self, StoreConfig, StoreEntry, StoreError}; use alloc::string::String; #[cfg(any(test, feature = "ram_storage", feature = "with_ctap2_1"))] @@ -76,8 +76,6 @@ const MIN_PIN_LENGTH_RP_IDS: usize = 9; const NUM_TAGS: usize = 10; const MAX_PIN_RETRIES: u8 = 8; -const ATTESTATION_PRIVATE_KEY_LENGTH: usize = 32; -const AAGUID_LENGTH: usize = 16; #[cfg(feature = "with_ctap2_1")] const DEFAULT_MIN_PIN_LENGTH: u8 = 4; // TODO(kaczmarczyck) use this for the minPinLength extension @@ -231,22 +229,29 @@ impl PersistentStore { }) .unwrap(); } - // The following 3 entries are meant to be written by vendor-specific commands. - if USE_BATCH_ATTESTATION { - if self.store.find_one(&Key::AttestationPrivateKey).is_none() { - self.set_attestation_private_key(key_material::ATTESTATION_PRIVATE_KEY) - .unwrap(); - } - if self.store.find_one(&Key::AttestationCertificate).is_none() { - self.set_attestation_certificate(key_material::ATTESTATION_CERTIFICATE) - .unwrap(); - } - } + // TODO(jmichel): remove this when vendor command is in place + #[cfg(not(test))] + self.load_attestation_data_from_firmware(); + if self.store.find_one(&Key::Aaguid).is_none() { self.set_aaguid(key_material::AAGUID).unwrap(); } } + // TODO(jmichel): remove this function when vendor command is in place. + #[cfg(not(test))] + fn load_attestation_data_from_firmware(&mut self) { + // The following 2 entries are meant to be written by vendor-specific commands. + if self.store.find_one(&Key::AttestationPrivateKey).is_none() { + self.set_attestation_private_key(key_material::ATTESTATION_PRIVATE_KEY) + .unwrap(); + } + if self.store.find_one(&Key::AttestationCertificate).is_none() { + self.set_attestation_certificate(key_material::ATTESTATION_CERTIFICATE) + .unwrap(); + } + } + pub fn find_credential( &self, rp_id: &str, @@ -337,6 +342,26 @@ impl PersistentStore { .count()) } + pub fn new_creation_order(&self) -> Result { + Ok(self + .store + .find_all(&Key::Credential { + rp_id: None, + credential_id: None, + user_handle: None, + }) + .filter_map(|(_, entry)| { + debug_assert_eq!(entry.tag, TAG_CREDENTIAL); + let credential = deserialize_credential(entry.data); + debug_assert!(credential.is_some()); + credential + }) + .map(|c| c.creation_order) + .max() + .unwrap_or(0) + .wrapping_add(1)) + } + pub fn global_signature_counter(&self) -> Result { Ok(self .store @@ -525,29 +550,33 @@ impl PersistentStore { pub fn attestation_private_key( &self, - ) -> Result, Ctap2StatusCode> { + ) -> Result, Ctap2StatusCode> { let data = match self.store.find_one(&Key::AttestationPrivateKey) { None => return Ok(None), Some((_, entry)) => entry.data, }; - if data.len() != ATTESTATION_PRIVATE_KEY_LENGTH { + if data.len() != key_material::ATTESTATION_PRIVATE_KEY_LENGTH { return Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_VENDOR_INTERNAL_ERROR); } - Ok(Some(array_ref!(data, 0, ATTESTATION_PRIVATE_KEY_LENGTH))) + Ok(Some(array_ref!( + data, + 0, + key_material::ATTESTATION_PRIVATE_KEY_LENGTH + ))) } pub fn set_attestation_private_key( &mut self, - attestation_private_key: &[u8; ATTESTATION_PRIVATE_KEY_LENGTH], + attestation_private_key: &[u8; key_material::ATTESTATION_PRIVATE_KEY_LENGTH], ) -> Result<(), Ctap2StatusCode> { let entry = StoreEntry { tag: ATTESTATION_PRIVATE_KEY, data: attestation_private_key, - sensitive: false, + sensitive: true, }; match self.store.find_one(&Key::AttestationPrivateKey) { None => self.store.insert(entry)?, - Some((index, _)) => self.store.replace(index, entry)?, + _ => return Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_VENDOR_INTERNAL_ERROR), } Ok(()) } @@ -571,24 +600,27 @@ impl PersistentStore { }; match self.store.find_one(&Key::AttestationCertificate) { None => self.store.insert(entry)?, - Some((index, _)) => self.store.replace(index, entry)?, + _ => return Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_VENDOR_INTERNAL_ERROR), } Ok(()) } - pub fn aaguid(&self) -> Result<[u8; AAGUID_LENGTH], Ctap2StatusCode> { + pub fn aaguid(&self) -> Result<[u8; key_material::AAGUID_LENGTH], Ctap2StatusCode> { let (_, entry) = self .store .find_one(&Key::Aaguid) .ok_or(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_VENDOR_INTERNAL_ERROR)?; let data = entry.data; - if data.len() != AAGUID_LENGTH { + if data.len() != key_material::AAGUID_LENGTH { return Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_VENDOR_INTERNAL_ERROR); } - Ok(*array_ref![data, 0, AAGUID_LENGTH]) + Ok(*array_ref![data, 0, key_material::AAGUID_LENGTH]) } - pub fn set_aaguid(&mut self, aaguid: &[u8; AAGUID_LENGTH]) -> Result<(), Ctap2StatusCode> { + pub fn set_aaguid( + &mut self, + aaguid: &[u8; key_material::AAGUID_LENGTH], + ) -> Result<(), Ctap2StatusCode> { let entry = StoreEntry { tag: AAGUID, data: aaguid, @@ -690,6 +722,7 @@ mod test { other_ui: None, cred_random: None, cred_protect_policy: None, + creation_order: 0, } } @@ -725,6 +758,21 @@ mod test { assert!(persistent_store.count_credentials().unwrap() > 0); } + #[test] + fn test_credential_order() { + let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {}; + let mut persistent_store = PersistentStore::new(&mut rng); + let credential_source = create_credential_source(&mut rng, "example.com", vec![]); + let current_latest_creation = credential_source.creation_order; + assert!(persistent_store.store_credential(credential_source).is_ok()); + let mut credential_source = create_credential_source(&mut rng, "example.com", vec![]); + credential_source.creation_order = persistent_store.new_creation_order().unwrap(); + assert!(credential_source.creation_order > current_latest_creation); + let current_latest_creation = credential_source.creation_order; + assert!(persistent_store.store_credential(credential_source).is_ok()); + assert!(persistent_store.new_creation_order().unwrap() > current_latest_creation); + } + #[test] #[allow(clippy::assertions_on_constants)] fn test_fill_store() { @@ -853,6 +901,7 @@ mod test { cred_protect_policy: Some( CredentialProtectionPolicy::UserVerificationOptionalWithCredentialIdList, ), + creation_order: 0, }; assert!(persistent_store.store_credential(credential).is_ok()); @@ -894,6 +943,7 @@ mod test { other_ui: None, cred_random: None, cred_protect_policy: None, + creation_order: 0, }; assert_eq!(found_credential, Some(expected_credential)); } @@ -913,6 +963,7 @@ mod test { other_ui: None, cred_random: None, cred_protect_policy: Some(CredentialProtectionPolicy::UserVerificationRequired), + creation_order: 0, }; assert!(persistent_store.store_credential(credential).is_ok()); @@ -1090,6 +1141,7 @@ mod test { other_ui: None, cred_random: None, cred_protect_policy: None, + creation_order: 0, }; let serialized = serialize_credential(credential.clone()).unwrap(); let reconstructed = deserialize_credential(&serialized).unwrap(); diff --git a/src/main.rs b/src/main.rs index 855325e..51c8305 100644 --- a/src/main.rs +++ b/src/main.rs @@ -37,9 +37,11 @@ use libtock_drivers::console::Console; use libtock_drivers::led; use libtock_drivers::result::{FlexUnwrap, TockError}; use libtock_drivers::timer; +use libtock_drivers::timer::Duration; #[cfg(feature = "debug_ctap")] use libtock_drivers::timer::Timer; -use libtock_drivers::timer::{Duration, Timestamp}; +#[cfg(feature = "debug_ctap")] +use libtock_drivers::timer::Timestamp; use libtock_drivers::usb_ctap_hid; const KEEPALIVE_DELAY_MS: isize = 100; @@ -57,12 +59,13 @@ fn main() { panic!("Cannot setup USB driver"); } + let boot_time = timer.get_current_clock().flex_unwrap(); let mut rng = TockRng256 {}; - let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, check_user_presence); + let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, check_user_presence, boot_time); let mut ctap_hid = CtapHid::new(); let mut led_counter = 0; - let mut last_led_increment = timer.get_current_clock().flex_unwrap(); + let mut last_led_increment = boot_time; // Main loop. If CTAP1 is used, we register button presses for U2F while receiving and waiting. // The way TockOS and apps currently interact, callbacks need a yield syscall to execute, @@ -115,7 +118,7 @@ fn main() { // These calls are making sure that even for long inactivity, wrapping clock values // never randomly wink or grant user presence for U2F. - ctap_state.check_disable_reset(Timestamp::::from_clock_value(now)); + ctap_state.update_command_permission(now); ctap_hid.wink_permission = ctap_hid.wink_permission.check_expiration(now); if has_packet {