Files
OpenSK/src/ctap/mod.rs
kaczmarczyck b7a3e06cf4 ECDSA signatures and public keys in CTAP (#358)
* ECDSA signatures and public keys in CTAP

* adds one constant usage

* documents pub functions in ECDSA

* typo: involved

* extends wrong length test
2021-08-04 13:39:49 +02:00

2940 lines
114 KiB
Rust

// Copyright 2019-2021 Google LLC
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
pub mod apdu;
mod client_pin;
pub mod command;
mod config_command;
mod credential_management;
mod crypto_wrapper;
#[cfg(feature = "with_ctap1")]
mod ctap1;
mod customization;
pub mod data_formats;
pub mod hid;
mod key_material;
mod large_blobs;
mod pin_protocol;
pub mod response;
pub mod status_code;
mod storage;
mod timed_permission;
mod token_state;
use self::client_pin::{ClientPin, PinPermission};
use self::command::{
AuthenticatorGetAssertionParameters, AuthenticatorMakeCredentialParameters,
AuthenticatorVendorConfigureParameters, Command,
};
use self::config_command::process_config;
use self::credential_management::process_credential_management;
use self::crypto_wrapper::{aes256_cbc_decrypt, aes256_cbc_encrypt};
use self::customization::{
DEFAULT_CRED_PROTECT, ENTERPRISE_ATTESTATION_MODE, ENTERPRISE_RP_ID_LIST,
MAX_CREDENTIAL_COUNT_IN_LIST, MAX_CRED_BLOB_LENGTH, MAX_LARGE_BLOB_ARRAY_SIZE, MAX_MSG_SIZE,
MAX_RP_IDS_LENGTH, USE_BATCH_ATTESTATION, USE_SIGNATURE_COUNTER,
};
use self::data_formats::{
AuthenticatorTransport, CoseKey, CredentialProtectionPolicy, EnterpriseAttestationMode,
GetAssertionExtensions, PackedAttestationStatement, PinUvAuthProtocol,
PublicKeyCredentialDescriptor, PublicKeyCredentialParameter, PublicKeyCredentialSource,
PublicKeyCredentialType, PublicKeyCredentialUserEntity, SignatureAlgorithm,
};
use self::hid::ChannelID;
use self::large_blobs::LargeBlobs;
use self::response::{
AuthenticatorGetAssertionResponse, AuthenticatorGetInfoResponse,
AuthenticatorMakeCredentialResponse, AuthenticatorVendorResponse, ResponseData,
};
use self::status_code::Ctap2StatusCode;
use self::storage::PersistentStore;
use self::timed_permission::TimedPermission;
#[cfg(feature = "with_ctap1")]
use self::timed_permission::U2fUserPresenceState;
use alloc::boxed::Box;
use alloc::string::{String, ToString};
use alloc::vec;
use alloc::vec::Vec;
use arrayref::array_ref;
use byteorder::{BigEndian, ByteOrder};
use core::convert::TryFrom;
#[cfg(feature = "debug_ctap")]
use core::fmt::Write;
use crypto::hmac::{hmac_256, verify_hmac_256};
use crypto::rng256::Rng256;
use crypto::sha256::Sha256;
use crypto::Hash256;
#[cfg(feature = "debug_ctap")]
use libtock_drivers::console::Console;
use libtock_drivers::crp;
use libtock_drivers::timer::{ClockValue, Duration};
use sk_cbor as cbor;
use sk_cbor::cbor_map_options;
pub const INITIAL_SIGNATURE_COUNTER: u32 = 1;
// Our credential ID consists of
// - 16 byte initialization vector for AES-256,
// - 32 byte ECDSA private key for the credential,
// - 32 byte relying party ID hashed with SHA256,
// - 32 byte HMAC-SHA256 over everything else.
pub const CREDENTIAL_ID_SIZE: usize = 112;
// Set this bit when checking user presence.
const UP_FLAG: u8 = 0x01;
// Set this bit when checking user verification.
const UV_FLAG: u8 = 0x04;
// Set this bit when performing attestation.
const AT_FLAG: u8 = 0x40;
// Set this bit when an extension is used.
const ED_FLAG: u8 = 0x80;
// CTAP2 specification section 6 requires that the depth of nested CBOR structures be limited to at most four levels.
const MAX_CBOR_NESTING_DEPTH: i8 = 4;
pub const TOUCH_TIMEOUT_MS: isize = 30000;
#[cfg(feature = "with_ctap1")]
const U2F_UP_PROMPT_TIMEOUT: Duration<isize> = Duration::from_ms(10000);
// TODO(kaczmarczyck) 2.1 allows Reset after Reset and 15 seconds?
const RESET_TIMEOUT_DURATION: Duration<isize> = Duration::from_ms(10000);
const STATEFUL_COMMAND_TIMEOUT_DURATION: Duration<isize> = Duration::from_ms(30000);
pub const FIDO2_VERSION_STRING: &str = "FIDO_2_0";
#[cfg(feature = "with_ctap1")]
pub const U2F_VERSION_STRING: &str = "U2F_V2";
// TODO(#106) change to final string when ready
pub const FIDO2_1_VERSION_STRING: &str = "FIDO_2_1_PRE";
// We currently only support one algorithm for signatures: ES256.
// This algorithm is requested in MakeCredential and advertized in GetInfo.
pub const ES256_CRED_PARAM: PublicKeyCredentialParameter = PublicKeyCredentialParameter {
cred_type: PublicKeyCredentialType::PublicKey,
alg: SignatureAlgorithm::ES256,
};
// Helpers to perform CBOR read/write while respecting CTAP2 nesting limits.
fn cbor_read(encoded_cbor: &[u8]) -> Result<cbor::Value, Ctap2StatusCode> {
cbor::reader::read_nested(encoded_cbor, Some(MAX_CBOR_NESTING_DEPTH))
.map_err(|_e| Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_INVALID_CBOR)
}
fn cbor_write(value: cbor::Value, mut encoded_cbor: &mut Vec<u8>) -> Result<(), Ctap2StatusCode> {
cbor::writer::write_nested(value, &mut encoded_cbor, Some(MAX_CBOR_NESTING_DEPTH))
.map_err(|_e| Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_VENDOR_INTERNAL_ERROR)
}
// This function is adapted from https://doc.rust-lang.org/nightly/src/core/str/mod.rs.html#2110
// (as of 2020-01-20) and truncates to "max" bytes, not breaking the encoding.
// We change the return value, since we don't need the bool.
fn truncate_to_char_boundary(s: &str, mut max: usize) -> &str {
if max >= s.len() {
s
} else {
while !s.is_char_boundary(max) {
max -= 1;
}
&s[..max]
}
}
/// Holds data necessary to sign an assertion for a credential.
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct AssertionInput {
client_data_hash: Vec<u8>,
auth_data: Vec<u8>,
extensions: GetAssertionExtensions,
has_uv: bool,
}
/// Contains the state we need to store for GetNextAssertion.
pub struct AssertionState {
assertion_input: AssertionInput,
// Sorted by ascending order of creation, so the last element is the most recent one.
next_credential_keys: Vec<usize>,
}
/// Stores which command currently holds state for subsequent calls.
pub enum StatefulCommand {
Reset,
GetAssertion(Box<AssertionState>),
EnumerateRps(usize),
EnumerateCredentials(Vec<usize>),
}
/// Stores the current CTAP command state and when it times out.
///
/// Some commands are executed in a series of calls to the authenticator.
/// Interleaving calls to other commands interrupt the current command and
/// remove all state and permissions. Power cycling allows the Reset command,
/// and to prevent misuse or accidents, we disallow Reset after receiving
/// different commands. Therefore, Reset behaves just like all other stateful
/// commands and is included here. Please note that the allowed time for Reset
/// differs from all other stateful commands.
pub struct StatefulPermission {
permission: TimedPermission,
command_type: Option<StatefulCommand>,
}
impl StatefulPermission {
/// Creates the command state at device startup.
///
/// Resets are only possible after a power cycle. Therefore, initialization
/// means allowing Reset, and Reset cannot be granted later.
pub fn new_reset(now: ClockValue) -> StatefulPermission {
StatefulPermission {
permission: TimedPermission::granted(now, RESET_TIMEOUT_DURATION),
command_type: Some(StatefulCommand::Reset),
}
}
/// Clears all permissions and state.
pub fn clear(&mut self) {
self.permission = TimedPermission::waiting();
self.command_type = None;
}
/// Checks the permission timeout.
pub fn check_command_permission(&mut self, now: ClockValue) -> Result<(), Ctap2StatusCode> {
if self.permission.is_granted(now) {
Ok(())
} else {
self.clear();
Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_NOT_ALLOWED)
}
}
/// Gets a reference to the current command state, if any exists.
pub fn get_command(&self) -> Result<&StatefulCommand, Ctap2StatusCode> {
self.command_type
.as_ref()
.ok_or(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_NOT_ALLOWED)
}
/// Sets a new command state, and starts a new clock for timeouts.
pub fn set_command(&mut self, now: ClockValue, new_command_type: StatefulCommand) {
match &new_command_type {
// Reset is only allowed after a power cycle.
StatefulCommand::Reset => unreachable!(),
_ => {
self.permission = TimedPermission::granted(now, STATEFUL_COMMAND_TIMEOUT_DURATION);
self.command_type = Some(new_command_type);
}
}
}
/// Returns the state for the next assertion and advances it.
///
/// The state includes all information from GetAssertion and the storage key
/// to the next credential that needs to be processed.
pub fn next_assertion_credential(
&mut self,
) -> Result<(AssertionInput, usize), Ctap2StatusCode> {
if let Some(StatefulCommand::GetAssertion(assertion_state)) = &mut self.command_type {
let credential_key = assertion_state
.next_credential_keys
.pop()
.ok_or(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_NOT_ALLOWED)?;
Ok((assertion_state.assertion_input.clone(), credential_key))
} else {
Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_NOT_ALLOWED)
}
}
/// Returns the index to the next RP ID for enumeration and advances it.
pub fn next_enumerate_rp(&mut self) -> Result<usize, Ctap2StatusCode> {
if let Some(StatefulCommand::EnumerateRps(rp_id_index)) = &mut self.command_type {
let current_index = *rp_id_index;
*rp_id_index += 1;
Ok(current_index)
} else {
Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_NOT_ALLOWED)
}
}
/// Returns the next storage credential key for enumeration and advances it.
pub fn next_enumerate_credential(&mut self) -> Result<usize, Ctap2StatusCode> {
if let Some(StatefulCommand::EnumerateCredentials(rp_credentials)) = &mut self.command_type
{
rp_credentials
.pop()
.ok_or(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_NOT_ALLOWED)
} else {
Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_NOT_ALLOWED)
}
}
}
// This struct currently holds all state, not only the persistent memory. The persistent members are
// in the persistent store field.
pub struct CtapState<'a, R: Rng256, CheckUserPresence: Fn(ChannelID) -> Result<(), Ctap2StatusCode>>
{
rng: &'a mut R,
// A function to check user presence, ultimately returning true if user presence was detected,
// false otherwise.
check_user_presence: CheckUserPresence,
persistent_store: PersistentStore,
client_pin: ClientPin,
#[cfg(feature = "with_ctap1")]
pub u2f_up_state: U2fUserPresenceState,
// The state initializes to Reset and its timeout, and never goes back to Reset.
stateful_command_permission: StatefulPermission,
large_blobs: LargeBlobs,
}
impl<'a, R, CheckUserPresence> CtapState<'a, R, CheckUserPresence>
where
R: Rng256,
CheckUserPresence: Fn(ChannelID) -> Result<(), Ctap2StatusCode>,
{
pub fn new(
rng: &'a mut R,
check_user_presence: CheckUserPresence,
now: ClockValue,
) -> CtapState<'a, R, CheckUserPresence> {
let persistent_store = PersistentStore::new(rng);
let client_pin = ClientPin::new(rng);
CtapState {
rng,
check_user_presence,
persistent_store,
client_pin,
#[cfg(feature = "with_ctap1")]
u2f_up_state: U2fUserPresenceState::new(
U2F_UP_PROMPT_TIMEOUT,
Duration::from_ms(TOUCH_TIMEOUT_MS),
),
stateful_command_permission: StatefulPermission::new_reset(now),
large_blobs: LargeBlobs::new(),
}
}
pub fn update_timeouts(&mut self, now: ClockValue) {
// Ignore the result, just update.
let _ = self
.stateful_command_permission
.check_command_permission(now);
self.client_pin.update_timeouts(now);
}
pub fn increment_global_signature_counter(&mut self) -> Result<(), Ctap2StatusCode> {
if USE_SIGNATURE_COUNTER {
let increment = self.rng.gen_uniform_u32x8()[0] % 8 + 1;
self.persistent_store
.incr_global_signature_counter(increment)?;
}
Ok(())
}
// Returns whether CTAP1 commands are currently supported.
// If alwaysUv is enabled and the authenticator does not support internal UV,
// CTAP1 needs to be disabled.
#[cfg(feature = "with_ctap1")]
pub fn allows_ctap1(&self) -> Result<bool, Ctap2StatusCode> {
Ok(!self.persistent_store.has_always_uv()?)
}
// Encrypts the private key and relying party ID hash into a credential ID. Other
// information, such as a user name, are not stored, because encrypted credential IDs
// are used for credentials stored server-side. Also, we want the key handle to be
// compatible with U2F.
pub fn encrypt_key_handle(
&mut self,
private_key: crypto::ecdsa::SecKey,
application: &[u8; 32],
) -> Result<Vec<u8>, Ctap2StatusCode> {
let master_keys = self.persistent_store.master_keys()?;
let aes_enc_key = crypto::aes256::EncryptionKey::new(&master_keys.encryption);
let mut plaintext = [0; 64];
private_key.to_bytes(array_mut_ref!(plaintext, 0, 32));
plaintext[32..64].copy_from_slice(application);
let mut encrypted_id = aes256_cbc_encrypt(self.rng, &aes_enc_key, &plaintext, true)?;
let id_hmac = hmac_256::<Sha256>(&master_keys.hmac, &encrypted_id[..]);
encrypted_id.extend(&id_hmac);
Ok(encrypted_id)
}
// Decrypts a credential ID and writes the private key into a PublicKeyCredentialSource.
// None is returned if the HMAC test fails or the relying party does not match the
// decrypted relying party ID hash.
pub fn decrypt_credential_source(
&self,
credential_id: Vec<u8>,
rp_id_hash: &[u8],
) -> Result<Option<PublicKeyCredentialSource>, Ctap2StatusCode> {
if credential_id.len() != CREDENTIAL_ID_SIZE {
return Ok(None);
}
let master_keys = self.persistent_store.master_keys()?;
let payload_size = credential_id.len() - 32;
if !verify_hmac_256::<Sha256>(
&master_keys.hmac,
&credential_id[..payload_size],
array_ref![credential_id, payload_size, 32],
) {
return Ok(None);
}
let aes_enc_key = crypto::aes256::EncryptionKey::new(&master_keys.encryption);
let decrypted_id = aes256_cbc_decrypt(&aes_enc_key, &credential_id[..payload_size], true)?;
if rp_id_hash != &decrypted_id[32..64] {
return Ok(None);
}
let sk_option = crypto::ecdsa::SecKey::from_bytes(array_ref!(decrypted_id, 0, 32));
Ok(sk_option.map(|sk| PublicKeyCredentialSource {
key_type: PublicKeyCredentialType::PublicKey,
credential_id,
private_key: sk,
rp_id: String::from(""),
user_handle: vec![],
user_display_name: None,
cred_protect_policy: None,
creation_order: 0,
user_name: None,
user_icon: None,
cred_blob: None,
large_blob_key: None,
}))
}
pub fn process_command(
&mut self,
command_cbor: &[u8],
cid: ChannelID,
now: ClockValue,
) -> Vec<u8> {
let cmd = Command::deserialize(command_cbor);
#[cfg(feature = "debug_ctap")]
writeln!(&mut Console::new(), "Received command: {:#?}", cmd).unwrap();
match cmd {
Ok(command) => {
// Correct behavior between CTAP1 and CTAP2 isn't defined yet. Just a guess.
#[cfg(feature = "with_ctap1")]
{
self.u2f_up_state = U2fUserPresenceState::new(
U2F_UP_PROMPT_TIMEOUT,
Duration::from_ms(TOUCH_TIMEOUT_MS),
);
}
match (&command, self.stateful_command_permission.get_command()) {
(Command::AuthenticatorGetNextAssertion, Ok(StatefulCommand::GetAssertion(_)))
| (Command::AuthenticatorReset, Ok(StatefulCommand::Reset))
// AuthenticatorGetInfo still allows Reset.
| (Command::AuthenticatorGetInfo, Ok(StatefulCommand::Reset))
// AuthenticatorSelection still allows Reset.
| (Command::AuthenticatorSelection, Ok(StatefulCommand::Reset))
// AuthenticatorCredentialManagement handles its subcommands later.
| (
Command::AuthenticatorCredentialManagement(_),
Ok(StatefulCommand::EnumerateRps(_)),
)
| (
Command::AuthenticatorCredentialManagement(_),
Ok(StatefulCommand::EnumerateCredentials(_)),
) => (),
(_, _) => self.stateful_command_permission.clear(),
}
let response = match command {
Command::AuthenticatorMakeCredential(params) => {
self.process_make_credential(params, cid)
}
Command::AuthenticatorGetAssertion(params) => {
self.process_get_assertion(params, cid, now)
}
Command::AuthenticatorGetNextAssertion => self.process_get_next_assertion(now),
Command::AuthenticatorGetInfo => self.process_get_info(),
Command::AuthenticatorClientPin(params) => self.client_pin.process_command(
self.rng,
&mut self.persistent_store,
params,
now,
),
Command::AuthenticatorReset => self.process_reset(cid, now),
Command::AuthenticatorCredentialManagement(params) => {
process_credential_management(
&mut self.persistent_store,
&mut self.stateful_command_permission,
&mut self.client_pin,
params,
now,
)
}
Command::AuthenticatorSelection => self.process_selection(cid),
Command::AuthenticatorLargeBlobs(params) => self.large_blobs.process_command(
&mut self.persistent_store,
&mut self.client_pin,
params,
),
Command::AuthenticatorConfig(params) => {
process_config(&mut self.persistent_store, &mut self.client_pin, params)
}
// Vendor specific commands
Command::AuthenticatorVendorConfigure(params) => {
self.process_vendor_configure(params, cid)
}
};
#[cfg(feature = "debug_ctap")]
writeln!(&mut Console::new(), "Sending response: {:#?}", response).unwrap();
match response {
Ok(response_data) => {
let mut response_vec = vec![0x00];
if let Some(value) = response_data.into() {
if cbor_write(value, &mut response_vec).is_err() {
response_vec =
vec![Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_VENDOR_INTERNAL_ERROR as u8];
}
}
response_vec
}
Err(error_code) => vec![error_code as u8],
}
}
Err(error_code) => vec![error_code as u8],
}
}
fn pin_uv_auth_precheck(
&mut self,
pin_uv_auth_param: &Option<Vec<u8>>,
pin_uv_auth_protocol: Option<PinUvAuthProtocol>,
cid: ChannelID,
) -> Result<(), Ctap2StatusCode> {
if let Some(auth_param) = &pin_uv_auth_param {
// This case was added in FIDO 2.1.
if auth_param.is_empty() {
(self.check_user_presence)(cid)?;
if self.persistent_store.pin_hash()?.is_none() {
return Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_PIN_NOT_SET);
} else {
return Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_PIN_INVALID);
}
}
pin_uv_auth_protocol.ok_or(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_MISSING_PARAMETER)?;
}
Ok(())
}
fn process_make_credential(
&mut self,
make_credential_params: AuthenticatorMakeCredentialParameters,
cid: ChannelID,
) -> Result<ResponseData, Ctap2StatusCode> {
let AuthenticatorMakeCredentialParameters {
client_data_hash,
rp,
user,
pub_key_cred_params,
exclude_list,
extensions,
options,
pin_uv_auth_param,
pin_uv_auth_protocol,
enterprise_attestation,
} = make_credential_params;
self.pin_uv_auth_precheck(&pin_uv_auth_param, pin_uv_auth_protocol, cid)?;
if !pub_key_cred_params.contains(&ES256_CRED_PARAM) {
return Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM);
}
let rp_id = rp.rp_id;
let ep_att = if let Some(enterprise_attestation) = enterprise_attestation {
let authenticator_mode =
ENTERPRISE_ATTESTATION_MODE.ok_or(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP1_ERR_INVALID_PARAMETER)?;
if !self.persistent_store.enterprise_attestation()? {
return Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP1_ERR_INVALID_PARAMETER);
}
match (
EnterpriseAttestationMode::try_from(enterprise_attestation)?,
authenticator_mode,
) {
(
EnterpriseAttestationMode::PlatformManaged,
EnterpriseAttestationMode::PlatformManaged,
) => ENTERPRISE_RP_ID_LIST.contains(&rp_id.as_str()),
_ => true,
}
} else {
false
};
// MakeCredential always requires user presence.
// User verification depends on the PIN auth inputs, which are checked here.
// The ED flag is added later, if applicable.
let has_uv = pin_uv_auth_param.is_some();
let mut flags = match pin_uv_auth_param {
Some(pin_uv_auth_param) => {
// This case is not mentioned in CTAP2.1, so we keep 2.0 logic.
if self.persistent_store.pin_hash()?.is_none() {
return Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_PIN_NOT_SET);
}
self.client_pin.verify_pin_uv_auth_token(
&client_data_hash,
&pin_uv_auth_param,
pin_uv_auth_protocol.ok_or(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_MISSING_PARAMETER)?,
)?;
self.client_pin
.has_permission(PinPermission::MakeCredential)?;
self.client_pin.check_user_verified_flag()?;
// Checking for the correct permissions_rp_id is specified earlier.
// Error codes are identical though, so the implementation can be identical with
// GetAssertion.
self.client_pin.ensure_rp_id_permission(&rp_id)?;
UV_FLAG
}
None => {
if options.uv {
return Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_INVALID_OPTION);
}
if self.persistent_store.has_always_uv()? {
return Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_PUAT_REQUIRED);
}
// Corresponds to makeCredUvNotRqd set to true.
if options.rk && self.persistent_store.pin_hash()?.is_some() {
return Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_PUAT_REQUIRED);
}
0x00
}
};
flags |= UP_FLAG | AT_FLAG;
let rp_id_hash = Sha256::hash(rp_id.as_bytes());
if let Some(exclude_list) = exclude_list {
for cred_desc in exclude_list {
if self
.persistent_store
.find_credential(&rp_id, &cred_desc.key_id, !has_uv)?
.is_some()
|| self
.decrypt_credential_source(cred_desc.key_id, &rp_id_hash)?
.is_some()
{
// Perform this check, so bad actors can't brute force exclude_list
// without user interaction.
let _ = (self.check_user_presence)(cid);
return Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_CREDENTIAL_EXCLUDED);
}
}
}
(self.check_user_presence)(cid)?;
self.client_pin.clear_token_flags();
let mut cred_protect_policy = extensions.cred_protect;
if cred_protect_policy.unwrap_or(CredentialProtectionPolicy::UserVerificationOptional)
< DEFAULT_CRED_PROTECT.unwrap_or(CredentialProtectionPolicy::UserVerificationOptional)
{
cred_protect_policy = DEFAULT_CRED_PROTECT;
}
let min_pin_length = extensions.min_pin_length
&& self
.persistent_store
.min_pin_length_rp_ids()?
.contains(&rp_id);
// None for no input, false for invalid input, true for valid input.
let has_cred_blob_output = extensions.cred_blob.is_some();
let cred_blob = extensions
.cred_blob
.filter(|c| options.rk && c.len() <= MAX_CRED_BLOB_LENGTH);
let cred_blob_output = if has_cred_blob_output {
Some(cred_blob.is_some())
} else {
None
};
let has_extension_output = extensions.hmac_secret
|| extensions.cred_protect.is_some()
|| min_pin_length
|| has_cred_blob_output;
if has_extension_output {
flags |= ED_FLAG
};
let large_blob_key = match (options.rk, extensions.large_blob_key) {
(true, Some(true)) => Some(self.rng.gen_uniform_u8x32().to_vec()),
_ => None,
};
let sk = crypto::ecdsa::SecKey::gensk(self.rng);
let pk = sk.genpk();
let credential_id = if options.rk {
let random_id = self.rng.gen_uniform_u8x32().to_vec();
let credential_source = PublicKeyCredentialSource {
key_type: PublicKeyCredentialType::PublicKey,
credential_id: random_id.clone(),
private_key: sk.clone(),
rp_id,
user_handle: user.user_id,
// This input is user provided, so we crop it to 64 byte for storage.
// The UTF8 encoding is always preserved, so the string might end up shorter.
user_display_name: user
.user_display_name
.map(|s| truncate_to_char_boundary(&s, 64).to_string()),
cred_protect_policy,
creation_order: self.persistent_store.new_creation_order()?,
user_name: user
.user_name
.map(|s| truncate_to_char_boundary(&s, 64).to_string()),
user_icon: user
.user_icon
.map(|s| truncate_to_char_boundary(&s, 64).to_string()),
cred_blob,
large_blob_key: large_blob_key.clone(),
};
self.persistent_store.store_credential(credential_source)?;
random_id
} else {
self.encrypt_key_handle(sk.clone(), &rp_id_hash)?
};
let mut auth_data = self.generate_auth_data(&rp_id_hash, flags)?;
auth_data.extend(&self.persistent_store.aaguid()?);
// The length is fixed to 0x20 or 0x70 and fits one byte.
if credential_id.len() > 0xFF {
return Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_VENDOR_INTERNAL_ERROR);
}
auth_data.extend(vec![0x00, credential_id.len() as u8]);
auth_data.extend(&credential_id);
cbor_write(cbor::Value::from(CoseKey::from(pk)), &mut auth_data)?;
if has_extension_output {
let hmac_secret_output = if extensions.hmac_secret {
Some(true)
} else {
None
};
let min_pin_length_output = if min_pin_length {
Some(self.persistent_store.min_pin_length()? as u64)
} else {
None
};
let cred_protect_output = extensions.cred_protect.and(cred_protect_policy);
let extensions_output = cbor_map_options! {
"credBlob" => cred_blob_output,
"credProtect" => cred_protect_output,
"hmac-secret" => hmac_secret_output,
"minPinLength" => min_pin_length_output,
};
cbor_write(extensions_output, &mut auth_data)?;
}
let mut signature_data = auth_data.clone();
signature_data.extend(client_data_hash);
let (signature, x5c) = if USE_BATCH_ATTESTATION || ep_att {
let attestation_private_key = self
.persistent_store
.attestation_private_key()?
.ok_or(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_VENDOR_INTERNAL_ERROR)?;
let attestation_key =
crypto::ecdsa::SecKey::from_bytes(&attestation_private_key).unwrap();
let attestation_certificate = self
.persistent_store
.attestation_certificate()?
.ok_or(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_VENDOR_INTERNAL_ERROR)?;
(
attestation_key.sign_rfc6979::<Sha256>(&signature_data),
Some(vec![attestation_certificate]),
)
} else {
(sk.sign_rfc6979::<Sha256>(&signature_data), None)
};
let attestation_statement = PackedAttestationStatement {
alg: SignatureAlgorithm::ES256 as i64,
sig: signature.to_asn1_der(),
x5c,
ecdaa_key_id: None,
};
let ep_att = if ep_att { Some(true) } else { None };
Ok(ResponseData::AuthenticatorMakeCredential(
AuthenticatorMakeCredentialResponse {
fmt: String::from("packed"),
auth_data,
att_stmt: attestation_statement,
ep_att,
large_blob_key,
},
))
}
// Generates a different per-credential secret for each UV mode.
// The computation is deterministic, and private_key expected to be unique.
fn generate_cred_random(
&mut self,
private_key: &crypto::ecdsa::SecKey,
has_uv: bool,
) -> Result<[u8; 32], Ctap2StatusCode> {
let mut private_key_bytes = [0u8; 32];
private_key.to_bytes(&mut private_key_bytes);
let key = self.persistent_store.cred_random_secret(has_uv)?;
Ok(hmac_256::<Sha256>(&key, &private_key_bytes))
}
// Processes the input of a get_assertion operation for a given credential
// and returns the correct Get(Next)Assertion response.
fn assertion_response(
&mut self,
mut credential: PublicKeyCredentialSource,
assertion_input: AssertionInput,
number_of_credentials: Option<usize>,
) -> Result<ResponseData, Ctap2StatusCode> {
let AssertionInput {
client_data_hash,
mut auth_data,
extensions,
has_uv,
} = assertion_input;
// Process extensions.
if extensions.hmac_secret.is_some() || extensions.cred_blob {
let encrypted_output = if let Some(hmac_secret_input) = extensions.hmac_secret {
let cred_random = self.generate_cred_random(&credential.private_key, has_uv)?;
Some(self.client_pin.process_hmac_secret(
self.rng,
hmac_secret_input,
&cred_random,
)?)
} else {
None
};
// This could be written more nicely with `then_some` when stable.
let cred_blob = if extensions.cred_blob {
Some(credential.cred_blob.unwrap_or_default())
} else {
None
};
let extensions_output = cbor_map_options! {
"credBlob" => cred_blob,
"hmac-secret" => encrypted_output,
};
cbor_write(extensions_output, &mut auth_data)?;
}
let large_blob_key = match extensions.large_blob_key {
Some(true) => credential.large_blob_key,
_ => None,
};
let mut signature_data = auth_data.clone();
signature_data.extend(client_data_hash);
let signature = credential
.private_key
.sign_rfc6979::<Sha256>(&signature_data);
let cred_desc = PublicKeyCredentialDescriptor {
key_type: PublicKeyCredentialType::PublicKey,
key_id: credential.credential_id,
transports: None, // You can set USB as a hint here.
};
// Remove user identifiable information without uv.
if !has_uv {
credential.user_name = None;
credential.user_display_name = None;
credential.user_icon = None;
}
let user = if !credential.user_handle.is_empty() {
Some(PublicKeyCredentialUserEntity {
user_id: credential.user_handle,
user_name: credential.user_name,
user_display_name: credential.user_display_name,
user_icon: credential.user_icon,
})
} else {
None
};
Ok(ResponseData::AuthenticatorGetAssertion(
AuthenticatorGetAssertionResponse {
credential: Some(cred_desc),
auth_data,
signature: signature.to_asn1_der(),
user,
number_of_credentials: number_of_credentials.map(|n| n as u64),
large_blob_key,
},
))
}
// Returns the first applicable credential from the allow list.
fn get_any_credential_from_allow_list(
&mut self,
allow_list: Vec<PublicKeyCredentialDescriptor>,
rp_id: &str,
rp_id_hash: &[u8],
has_uv: bool,
) -> Result<Option<PublicKeyCredentialSource>, Ctap2StatusCode> {
for allowed_credential in allow_list {
let credential = self.persistent_store.find_credential(
rp_id,
&allowed_credential.key_id,
!has_uv,
)?;
if credential.is_some() {
return Ok(credential);
}
let credential =
self.decrypt_credential_source(allowed_credential.key_id, &rp_id_hash)?;
if credential.is_some() {
return Ok(credential);
}
}
Ok(None)
}
fn process_get_assertion(
&mut self,
get_assertion_params: AuthenticatorGetAssertionParameters,
cid: ChannelID,
now: ClockValue,
) -> Result<ResponseData, Ctap2StatusCode> {
let AuthenticatorGetAssertionParameters {
rp_id,
client_data_hash,
allow_list,
extensions,
options,
pin_uv_auth_param,
pin_uv_auth_protocol,
} = get_assertion_params;
self.pin_uv_auth_precheck(&pin_uv_auth_param, pin_uv_auth_protocol, cid)?;
if extensions.hmac_secret.is_some() && !options.up {
// The extension is actually supported, but we need user presence.
return Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_OPTION);
}
// The user verification bit depends on the existance of PIN auth, since we do
// not support internal UV. User presence is requested as an option.
let has_uv = pin_uv_auth_param.is_some();
let mut flags = match pin_uv_auth_param {
Some(pin_uv_auth_param) => {
// This case is not mentioned in CTAP2.1, so we keep 2.0 logic.
if self.persistent_store.pin_hash()?.is_none() {
return Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_PIN_NOT_SET);
}
self.client_pin.verify_pin_uv_auth_token(
&client_data_hash,
&pin_uv_auth_param,
pin_uv_auth_protocol.ok_or(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_MISSING_PARAMETER)?,
)?;
self.client_pin
.has_permission(PinPermission::GetAssertion)?;
// Checking for the UV flag is specified earlier for GetAssertion.
// Error codes are identical though, so the implementation can be identical with
// MakeCredential.
self.client_pin.check_user_verified_flag()?;
self.client_pin.ensure_rp_id_permission(&rp_id)?;
UV_FLAG
}
None => {
if options.uv {
return Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_INVALID_OPTION);
}
if options.up && self.persistent_store.has_always_uv()? {
return Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_PUAT_REQUIRED);
}
0x00
}
};
if options.up {
flags |= UP_FLAG;
}
if extensions.hmac_secret.is_some() || extensions.cred_blob {
flags |= ED_FLAG;
}
let rp_id_hash = Sha256::hash(rp_id.as_bytes());
let (credential, next_credential_keys) = if let Some(allow_list) = allow_list {
(
self.get_any_credential_from_allow_list(allow_list, &rp_id, &rp_id_hash, has_uv)?,
vec![],
)
} else {
let mut iter_result = Ok(());
let iter = self.persistent_store.iter_credentials(&mut iter_result)?;
let mut stored_credentials: Vec<(usize, u64)> = iter
.filter_map(|(key, credential)| {
if credential.rp_id == rp_id && (has_uv || credential.is_discoverable()) {
Some((key, credential.creation_order))
} else {
None
}
})
.collect();
iter_result?;
stored_credentials.sort_unstable_by_key(|&(_key, order)| order);
let mut stored_credentials: Vec<usize> = stored_credentials
.into_iter()
.map(|(key, _order)| key)
.collect();
let credential = stored_credentials
.pop()
.map(|key| self.persistent_store.get_credential(key))
.transpose()?;
(credential, stored_credentials)
};
let credential = credential.ok_or(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_NO_CREDENTIALS)?;
// This check comes before CTAP2_ERR_NO_CREDENTIALS in CTAP 2.0.
if options.up {
(self.check_user_presence)(cid)?;
self.client_pin.clear_token_flags();
}
self.increment_global_signature_counter()?;
let assertion_input = AssertionInput {
client_data_hash,
auth_data: self.generate_auth_data(&rp_id_hash, flags)?,
extensions,
has_uv,
};
let number_of_credentials = if next_credential_keys.is_empty() {
None
} else {
let number_of_credentials = Some(next_credential_keys.len() + 1);
let assertion_state = StatefulCommand::GetAssertion(Box::new(AssertionState {
assertion_input: assertion_input.clone(),
next_credential_keys,
}));
self.stateful_command_permission
.set_command(now, assertion_state);
number_of_credentials
};
self.assertion_response(credential, assertion_input, number_of_credentials)
}
fn process_get_next_assertion(
&mut self,
now: ClockValue,
) -> Result<ResponseData, Ctap2StatusCode> {
self.stateful_command_permission
.check_command_permission(now)?;
let (assertion_input, credential_key) = self
.stateful_command_permission
.next_assertion_credential()?;
let credential = self.persistent_store.get_credential(credential_key)?;
self.assertion_response(credential, assertion_input, None)
}
fn process_get_info(&self) -> Result<ResponseData, Ctap2StatusCode> {
let has_always_uv = self.persistent_store.has_always_uv()?;
#[cfg_attr(not(feature = "with_ctap1"), allow(unused_mut))]
let mut versions = vec![
String::from(FIDO2_VERSION_STRING),
String::from(FIDO2_1_VERSION_STRING),
];
#[cfg(feature = "with_ctap1")]
{
if !has_always_uv {
versions.insert(0, String::from(U2F_VERSION_STRING))
}
}
let mut options = vec![];
if ENTERPRISE_ATTESTATION_MODE.is_some() {
options.push((
String::from("ep"),
self.persistent_store.enterprise_attestation()?,
));
}
options.append(&mut vec![
(String::from("rk"), true),
(String::from("up"), true),
(String::from("alwaysUv"), has_always_uv),
(String::from("credMgmt"), true),
(String::from("authnrCfg"), true),
(
String::from("clientPin"),
self.persistent_store.pin_hash()?.is_some(),
),
(String::from("largeBlobs"), true),
(String::from("pinUvAuthToken"), true),
(String::from("setMinPINLength"), true),
(String::from("makeCredUvNotRqd"), !has_always_uv),
]);
Ok(ResponseData::AuthenticatorGetInfo(
AuthenticatorGetInfoResponse {
versions,
extensions: Some(vec![
String::from("hmac-secret"),
String::from("credProtect"),
String::from("minPinLength"),
String::from("credBlob"),
String::from("largeBlobKey"),
]),
aaguid: self.persistent_store.aaguid()?,
options: Some(options),
max_msg_size: Some(MAX_MSG_SIZE as u64),
// The order implies preference. We favor the new V2.
pin_protocols: Some(vec![
PinUvAuthProtocol::V2 as u64,
PinUvAuthProtocol::V1 as u64,
]),
max_credential_count_in_list: MAX_CREDENTIAL_COUNT_IN_LIST.map(|c| c as u64),
max_credential_id_length: Some(CREDENTIAL_ID_SIZE as u64),
transports: Some(vec![AuthenticatorTransport::Usb]),
algorithms: Some(vec![ES256_CRED_PARAM]),
max_serialized_large_blob_array: Some(MAX_LARGE_BLOB_ARRAY_SIZE as u64),
force_pin_change: Some(self.persistent_store.has_force_pin_change()?),
min_pin_length: self.persistent_store.min_pin_length()?,
firmware_version: None,
max_cred_blob_length: Some(MAX_CRED_BLOB_LENGTH as u64),
max_rp_ids_for_set_min_pin_length: Some(MAX_RP_IDS_LENGTH as u64),
certifications: None,
remaining_discoverable_credentials: Some(
self.persistent_store.remaining_credentials()? as u64,
),
},
))
}
fn process_reset(
&mut self,
cid: ChannelID,
now: ClockValue,
) -> Result<ResponseData, Ctap2StatusCode> {
self.stateful_command_permission
.check_command_permission(now)?;
match self.stateful_command_permission.get_command()? {
StatefulCommand::Reset => (),
_ => return Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_NOT_ALLOWED),
}
(self.check_user_presence)(cid)?;
self.persistent_store.reset(self.rng)?;
self.client_pin.reset(self.rng);
#[cfg(feature = "with_ctap1")]
{
self.u2f_up_state = U2fUserPresenceState::new(
U2F_UP_PROMPT_TIMEOUT,
Duration::from_ms(TOUCH_TIMEOUT_MS),
);
}
Ok(ResponseData::AuthenticatorReset)
}
fn process_selection(&self, cid: ChannelID) -> Result<ResponseData, Ctap2StatusCode> {
(self.check_user_presence)(cid)?;
Ok(ResponseData::AuthenticatorSelection)
}
fn process_vendor_configure(
&mut self,
params: AuthenticatorVendorConfigureParameters,
cid: ChannelID,
) -> Result<ResponseData, Ctap2StatusCode> {
(self.check_user_presence)(cid)?;
// Sanity checks
let current_priv_key = self.persistent_store.attestation_private_key()?;
let current_cert = self.persistent_store.attestation_certificate()?;
let response = match params.attestation_material {
// Only reading values.
None => AuthenticatorVendorResponse {
cert_programmed: current_cert.is_some(),
pkey_programmed: current_priv_key.is_some(),
},
// Device is already fully programmed. We don't leak information.
Some(_) if current_cert.is_some() && current_priv_key.is_some() => {
AuthenticatorVendorResponse {
cert_programmed: true,
pkey_programmed: true,
}
}
// Device is partially or not programmed. We complete the process.
Some(data) => {
if let Some(current_cert) = &current_cert {
if current_cert != &data.certificate {
return Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP1_ERR_INVALID_PARAMETER);
}
}
if let Some(current_priv_key) = &current_priv_key {
if current_priv_key != &data.private_key {
return Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP1_ERR_INVALID_PARAMETER);
}
}
if current_cert.is_none() {
self.persistent_store
.set_attestation_certificate(&data.certificate)?;
}
if current_priv_key.is_none() {
self.persistent_store
.set_attestation_private_key(&data.private_key)?;
}
AuthenticatorVendorResponse {
cert_programmed: true,
pkey_programmed: true,
}
}
};
if params.lockdown {
// To avoid bricking the authenticator, we only allow lockdown
// to happen if both values are programmed or if both U2F/CTAP1 and
// batch attestation are disabled.
#[cfg(feature = "with_ctap1")]
let need_certificate = true;
#[cfg(not(feature = "with_ctap1"))]
let need_certificate = USE_BATCH_ATTESTATION;
if (need_certificate && !(response.pkey_programmed && response.cert_programmed))
|| crp::set_protection(crp::ProtectionLevel::FullyLocked).is_err()
{
return Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_VENDOR_INTERNAL_ERROR);
}
}
Ok(ResponseData::AuthenticatorVendor(response))
}
pub fn generate_auth_data(
&self,
rp_id_hash: &[u8],
flag_byte: u8,
) -> Result<Vec<u8>, Ctap2StatusCode> {
let mut auth_data = vec![];
auth_data.extend(rp_id_hash);
auth_data.push(flag_byte);
// The global counter is only increased if USE_SIGNATURE_COUNTER is true.
// It uses a big-endian representation.
let mut signature_counter = [0u8; 4];
BigEndian::write_u32(
&mut signature_counter,
self.persistent_store.global_signature_counter()?,
);
auth_data.extend(&signature_counter);
Ok(auth_data)
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod test {
use super::client_pin::PIN_TOKEN_LENGTH;
use super::command::{AuthenticatorAttestationMaterial, AuthenticatorClientPinParameters};
use super::data_formats::{
ClientPinSubCommand, CoseKey, GetAssertionHmacSecretInput, GetAssertionOptions,
MakeCredentialExtensions, MakeCredentialOptions, PinUvAuthProtocol,
PublicKeyCredentialRpEntity, PublicKeyCredentialUserEntity,
};
use super::pin_protocol::{authenticate_pin_uv_auth_token, PinProtocol};
use super::*;
use cbor::{cbor_array, cbor_array_vec, cbor_map};
use crypto::rng256::ThreadRng256;
const CLOCK_FREQUENCY_HZ: usize = 32768;
const DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE: ClockValue = ClockValue::new(0, CLOCK_FREQUENCY_HZ);
// The keep-alive logic in the processing of some commands needs a channel ID to send
// keep-alive packets to.
// In tests where we define a dummy user-presence check that immediately returns, the channel
// ID is irrelevant, so we pass this (dummy but valid) value.
const DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID: ChannelID = [0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78];
fn check_make_response(
make_credential_response: Result<ResponseData, Ctap2StatusCode>,
flags: u8,
expected_aaguid: &[u8],
expected_credential_id_size: u8,
expected_extension_cbor: &[u8],
) {
match make_credential_response.unwrap() {
ResponseData::AuthenticatorMakeCredential(make_credential_response) => {
let AuthenticatorMakeCredentialResponse {
fmt,
auth_data,
att_stmt,
ep_att,
large_blob_key,
} = make_credential_response;
// The expected response is split to only assert the non-random parts.
assert_eq!(fmt, "packed");
let mut expected_auth_data = vec![
0xA3, 0x79, 0xA6, 0xF6, 0xEE, 0xAF, 0xB9, 0xA5, 0x5E, 0x37, 0x8C, 0x11, 0x80,
0x34, 0xE2, 0x75, 0x1E, 0x68, 0x2F, 0xAB, 0x9F, 0x2D, 0x30, 0xAB, 0x13, 0xD2,
0x12, 0x55, 0x86, 0xCE, 0x19, 0x47, flags, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
];
expected_auth_data.push(INITIAL_SIGNATURE_COUNTER as u8);
expected_auth_data.extend(expected_aaguid);
expected_auth_data.extend(&[0x00, expected_credential_id_size]);
assert_eq!(
auth_data[0..expected_auth_data.len()],
expected_auth_data[..]
);
assert_eq!(
&auth_data[auth_data.len() - expected_extension_cbor.len()..auth_data.len()],
expected_extension_cbor
);
assert!(ep_att.is_none());
assert_eq!(att_stmt.alg, SignatureAlgorithm::ES256 as i64);
assert_eq!(large_blob_key, None);
}
_ => panic!("Invalid response type"),
}
}
#[test]
fn test_get_info() {
let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {};
let user_immediately_present = |_| Ok(());
let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE);
let info_reponse = ctap_state.process_command(&[0x04], DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE);
let expected_cbor = cbor_map_options! {
0x01 => cbor_array_vec![vec![
#[cfg(feature = "with_ctap1")]
String::from(U2F_VERSION_STRING),
String::from(FIDO2_VERSION_STRING),
String::from(FIDO2_1_VERSION_STRING),
]],
0x02 => cbor_array![
String::from("hmac-secret"),
String::from("credProtect"),
String::from("minPinLength"),
String::from("credBlob"),
String::from("largeBlobKey"),
],
0x03 => ctap_state.persistent_store.aaguid().unwrap(),
0x04 => cbor_map_options! {
"ep" => ENTERPRISE_ATTESTATION_MODE.map(|_| false),
"rk" => true,
"up" => true,
"alwaysUv" => false,
"credMgmt" => true,
"authnrCfg" => true,
"clientPin" => false,
"largeBlobs" => true,
"pinUvAuthToken" => true,
"setMinPINLength" => true,
"makeCredUvNotRqd" => true,
},
0x05 => MAX_MSG_SIZE as u64,
0x06 => cbor_array![2, 1],
0x07 => MAX_CREDENTIAL_COUNT_IN_LIST.map(|c| c as u64),
0x08 => CREDENTIAL_ID_SIZE as u64,
0x09 => cbor_array!["usb"],
0x0A => cbor_array![ES256_CRED_PARAM],
0x0B => MAX_LARGE_BLOB_ARRAY_SIZE as u64,
0x0C => false,
0x0D => ctap_state.persistent_store.min_pin_length().unwrap() as u64,
0x0F => MAX_CRED_BLOB_LENGTH as u64,
0x10 => MAX_RP_IDS_LENGTH as u64,
0x14 => ctap_state.persistent_store.remaining_credentials().unwrap() as u64,
};
let mut response_cbor = vec![0x00];
assert!(cbor_write(expected_cbor, &mut response_cbor).is_ok());
assert_eq!(info_reponse, response_cbor);
}
fn create_minimal_make_credential_parameters() -> AuthenticatorMakeCredentialParameters {
let client_data_hash = vec![0xCD];
let rp = PublicKeyCredentialRpEntity {
rp_id: String::from("example.com"),
rp_name: None,
rp_icon: None,
};
let user = PublicKeyCredentialUserEntity {
user_id: vec![0x1D],
user_name: None,
user_display_name: None,
user_icon: None,
};
let pub_key_cred_params = vec![ES256_CRED_PARAM];
let options = MakeCredentialOptions {
rk: true,
uv: false,
};
AuthenticatorMakeCredentialParameters {
client_data_hash,
rp,
user,
pub_key_cred_params,
exclude_list: None,
extensions: MakeCredentialExtensions::default(),
options,
pin_uv_auth_param: None,
pin_uv_auth_protocol: None,
enterprise_attestation: None,
}
}
fn create_make_credential_parameters_with_exclude_list(
excluded_credential_id: &[u8],
) -> AuthenticatorMakeCredentialParameters {
let excluded_credential_descriptor = PublicKeyCredentialDescriptor {
key_type: PublicKeyCredentialType::PublicKey,
key_id: excluded_credential_id.to_vec(),
transports: None,
};
let exclude_list = Some(vec![excluded_credential_descriptor]);
let mut make_credential_params = create_minimal_make_credential_parameters();
make_credential_params.exclude_list = exclude_list;
make_credential_params
}
fn create_make_credential_parameters_with_cred_protect_policy(
policy: CredentialProtectionPolicy,
) -> AuthenticatorMakeCredentialParameters {
let extensions = MakeCredentialExtensions {
cred_protect: Some(policy),
..Default::default()
};
let mut make_credential_params = create_minimal_make_credential_parameters();
make_credential_params.extensions = extensions;
make_credential_params
}
#[test]
fn test_resident_process_make_credential() {
let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {};
let user_immediately_present = |_| Ok(());
let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE);
let make_credential_params = create_minimal_make_credential_parameters();
let make_credential_response =
ctap_state.process_make_credential(make_credential_params, DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID);
check_make_response(
make_credential_response,
0x41,
&ctap_state.persistent_store.aaguid().unwrap(),
0x20,
&[],
);
}
#[test]
fn test_non_resident_process_make_credential() {
let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {};
let user_immediately_present = |_| Ok(());
let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE);
let mut make_credential_params = create_minimal_make_credential_parameters();
make_credential_params.options.rk = false;
let make_credential_response =
ctap_state.process_make_credential(make_credential_params, DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID);
check_make_response(
make_credential_response,
0x41,
&ctap_state.persistent_store.aaguid().unwrap(),
CREDENTIAL_ID_SIZE as u8,
&[],
);
}
#[test]
fn test_process_make_credential_unsupported_algorithm() {
let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {};
let user_immediately_present = |_| Ok(());
let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE);
let mut make_credential_params = create_minimal_make_credential_parameters();
make_credential_params.pub_key_cred_params = vec![];
let make_credential_response =
ctap_state.process_make_credential(make_credential_params, DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID);
assert_eq!(
make_credential_response,
Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM)
);
}
#[test]
fn test_process_make_credential_credential_excluded() {
let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {};
let excluded_private_key = crypto::ecdsa::SecKey::gensk(&mut rng);
let user_immediately_present = |_| Ok(());
let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE);
let excluded_credential_id = vec![0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67];
let make_credential_params =
create_make_credential_parameters_with_exclude_list(&excluded_credential_id);
let excluded_credential_source = PublicKeyCredentialSource {
key_type: PublicKeyCredentialType::PublicKey,
credential_id: excluded_credential_id,
private_key: excluded_private_key,
rp_id: String::from("example.com"),
user_handle: vec![],
user_display_name: None,
cred_protect_policy: None,
creation_order: 0,
user_name: None,
user_icon: None,
cred_blob: None,
large_blob_key: None,
};
assert!(ctap_state
.persistent_store
.store_credential(excluded_credential_source)
.is_ok());
let make_credential_response =
ctap_state.process_make_credential(make_credential_params, DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID);
assert_eq!(
make_credential_response,
Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_CREDENTIAL_EXCLUDED)
);
}
#[test]
fn test_process_make_credential_credential_with_cred_protect() {
let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {};
let user_immediately_present = |_| Ok(());
let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE);
let test_policy = CredentialProtectionPolicy::UserVerificationOptionalWithCredentialIdList;
let make_credential_params =
create_make_credential_parameters_with_cred_protect_policy(test_policy);
let make_credential_response =
ctap_state.process_make_credential(make_credential_params, DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID);
assert!(make_credential_response.is_ok());
let mut iter_result = Ok(());
let iter = ctap_state
.persistent_store
.iter_credentials(&mut iter_result)
.unwrap();
// There is only 1 credential, so last is good enough.
let (_, stored_credential) = iter.last().unwrap();
iter_result.unwrap();
let credential_id = stored_credential.credential_id;
assert_eq!(stored_credential.cred_protect_policy, Some(test_policy));
let make_credential_params =
create_make_credential_parameters_with_exclude_list(&credential_id);
let make_credential_response =
ctap_state.process_make_credential(make_credential_params, DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID);
assert_eq!(
make_credential_response,
Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_CREDENTIAL_EXCLUDED)
);
let test_policy = CredentialProtectionPolicy::UserVerificationRequired;
let make_credential_params =
create_make_credential_parameters_with_cred_protect_policy(test_policy);
let make_credential_response =
ctap_state.process_make_credential(make_credential_params, DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID);
assert!(make_credential_response.is_ok());
let mut iter_result = Ok(());
let iter = ctap_state
.persistent_store
.iter_credentials(&mut iter_result)
.unwrap();
// There is only 1 credential, so last is good enough.
let (_, stored_credential) = iter.last().unwrap();
iter_result.unwrap();
let credential_id = stored_credential.credential_id;
assert_eq!(stored_credential.cred_protect_policy, Some(test_policy));
let make_credential_params =
create_make_credential_parameters_with_exclude_list(&credential_id);
let make_credential_response =
ctap_state.process_make_credential(make_credential_params, DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID);
assert!(make_credential_response.is_ok());
}
#[test]
fn test_process_make_credential_hmac_secret() {
let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {};
let user_immediately_present = |_| Ok(());
let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE);
let extensions = MakeCredentialExtensions {
hmac_secret: true,
..Default::default()
};
let mut make_credential_params = create_minimal_make_credential_parameters();
make_credential_params.options.rk = false;
make_credential_params.extensions = extensions;
let make_credential_response =
ctap_state.process_make_credential(make_credential_params, DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID);
let expected_extension_cbor = [
0xA1, 0x6B, 0x68, 0x6D, 0x61, 0x63, 0x2D, 0x73, 0x65, 0x63, 0x72, 0x65, 0x74, 0xF5,
];
check_make_response(
make_credential_response,
0xC1,
&ctap_state.persistent_store.aaguid().unwrap(),
CREDENTIAL_ID_SIZE as u8,
&expected_extension_cbor,
);
}
#[test]
fn test_process_make_credential_hmac_secret_resident_key() {
let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {};
let user_immediately_present = |_| Ok(());
let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE);
let extensions = MakeCredentialExtensions {
hmac_secret: true,
..Default::default()
};
let mut make_credential_params = create_minimal_make_credential_parameters();
make_credential_params.extensions = extensions;
let make_credential_response =
ctap_state.process_make_credential(make_credential_params, DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID);
let expected_extension_cbor = [
0xA1, 0x6B, 0x68, 0x6D, 0x61, 0x63, 0x2D, 0x73, 0x65, 0x63, 0x72, 0x65, 0x74, 0xF5,
];
check_make_response(
make_credential_response,
0xC1,
&ctap_state.persistent_store.aaguid().unwrap(),
0x20,
&expected_extension_cbor,
);
}
#[test]
fn test_process_make_credential_min_pin_length() {
let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {};
let user_immediately_present = |_| Ok(());
let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE);
// First part: The extension is ignored, since the RP ID is not on the list.
let extensions = MakeCredentialExtensions {
min_pin_length: true,
..Default::default()
};
let mut make_credential_params = create_minimal_make_credential_parameters();
make_credential_params.extensions = extensions;
let make_credential_response =
ctap_state.process_make_credential(make_credential_params, DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID);
check_make_response(
make_credential_response,
0x41,
&ctap_state.persistent_store.aaguid().unwrap(),
0x20,
&[],
);
// Second part: The extension is used.
assert_eq!(
ctap_state
.persistent_store
.set_min_pin_length_rp_ids(vec!["example.com".to_string()]),
Ok(())
);
let extensions = MakeCredentialExtensions {
min_pin_length: true,
..Default::default()
};
let mut make_credential_params = create_minimal_make_credential_parameters();
make_credential_params.extensions = extensions;
let make_credential_response =
ctap_state.process_make_credential(make_credential_params, DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID);
let expected_extension_cbor = [
0xA1, 0x6C, 0x6D, 0x69, 0x6E, 0x50, 0x69, 0x6E, 0x4C, 0x65, 0x6E, 0x67, 0x74, 0x68,
0x04,
];
check_make_response(
make_credential_response,
0xC1,
&ctap_state.persistent_store.aaguid().unwrap(),
0x20,
&expected_extension_cbor,
);
}
#[test]
fn test_process_make_credential_cred_blob_ok() {
let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {};
let user_immediately_present = |_| Ok(());
let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE);
let extensions = MakeCredentialExtensions {
cred_blob: Some(vec![0xCB]),
..Default::default()
};
let mut make_credential_params = create_minimal_make_credential_parameters();
make_credential_params.extensions = extensions;
let make_credential_response =
ctap_state.process_make_credential(make_credential_params, DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID);
let expected_extension_cbor = [
0xA1, 0x68, 0x63, 0x72, 0x65, 0x64, 0x42, 0x6C, 0x6F, 0x62, 0xF5,
];
check_make_response(
make_credential_response,
0xC1,
&ctap_state.persistent_store.aaguid().unwrap(),
0x20,
&expected_extension_cbor,
);
let mut iter_result = Ok(());
let iter = ctap_state
.persistent_store
.iter_credentials(&mut iter_result)
.unwrap();
// There is only 1 credential, so last is good enough.
let (_, stored_credential) = iter.last().unwrap();
iter_result.unwrap();
assert_eq!(stored_credential.cred_blob, Some(vec![0xCB]));
}
#[test]
fn test_process_make_credential_cred_blob_too_big() {
let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {};
let user_immediately_present = |_| Ok(());
let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE);
let extensions = MakeCredentialExtensions {
cred_blob: Some(vec![0xCB; MAX_CRED_BLOB_LENGTH + 1]),
..Default::default()
};
let mut make_credential_params = create_minimal_make_credential_parameters();
make_credential_params.extensions = extensions;
let make_credential_response =
ctap_state.process_make_credential(make_credential_params, DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID);
let expected_extension_cbor = [
0xA1, 0x68, 0x63, 0x72, 0x65, 0x64, 0x42, 0x6C, 0x6F, 0x62, 0xF4,
];
check_make_response(
make_credential_response,
0xC1,
&ctap_state.persistent_store.aaguid().unwrap(),
0x20,
&expected_extension_cbor,
);
let mut iter_result = Ok(());
let iter = ctap_state
.persistent_store
.iter_credentials(&mut iter_result)
.unwrap();
// There is only 1 credential, so last is good enough.
let (_, stored_credential) = iter.last().unwrap();
iter_result.unwrap();
assert_eq!(stored_credential.cred_blob, None);
}
#[test]
fn test_process_make_credential_large_blob_key() {
let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {};
let user_immediately_present = |_| Ok(());
let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE);
let extensions = MakeCredentialExtensions {
large_blob_key: Some(true),
..Default::default()
};
let mut make_credential_params = create_minimal_make_credential_parameters();
make_credential_params.extensions = extensions;
let make_credential_response =
ctap_state.process_make_credential(make_credential_params, DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID);
let large_blob_key = match make_credential_response.unwrap() {
ResponseData::AuthenticatorMakeCredential(make_credential_response) => {
make_credential_response.large_blob_key.unwrap()
}
_ => panic!("Invalid response type"),
};
assert_eq!(large_blob_key.len(), 32);
let mut iter_result = Ok(());
let iter = ctap_state
.persistent_store
.iter_credentials(&mut iter_result)
.unwrap();
// There is only 1 credential, so last is good enough.
let (_, stored_credential) = iter.last().unwrap();
iter_result.unwrap();
assert_eq!(stored_credential.large_blob_key.unwrap(), large_blob_key);
}
fn test_helper_process_make_credential_with_pin_and_uv(
pin_uv_auth_protocol: PinUvAuthProtocol,
) {
let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {};
let key_agreement_key = crypto::ecdh::SecKey::gensk(&mut rng);
let pin_uv_auth_token = [0x91; PIN_TOKEN_LENGTH];
let client_pin =
ClientPin::new_test(key_agreement_key, pin_uv_auth_token, pin_uv_auth_protocol);
let user_immediately_present = |_| Ok(());
let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE);
ctap_state.client_pin = client_pin;
ctap_state.persistent_store.set_pin(&[0x88; 16], 4).unwrap();
let client_data_hash = [0xCD];
let pin_uv_auth_param = authenticate_pin_uv_auth_token(
&pin_uv_auth_token,
&client_data_hash,
pin_uv_auth_protocol,
);
let mut make_credential_params = create_minimal_make_credential_parameters();
make_credential_params.options.uv = true;
make_credential_params.pin_uv_auth_param = Some(pin_uv_auth_param);
make_credential_params.pin_uv_auth_protocol = Some(pin_uv_auth_protocol);
let make_credential_response =
ctap_state.process_make_credential(make_credential_params.clone(), DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID);
check_make_response(
make_credential_response,
0x45,
&ctap_state.persistent_store.aaguid().unwrap(),
0x20,
&[],
);
let make_credential_response =
ctap_state.process_make_credential(make_credential_params, DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID);
assert_eq!(
make_credential_response,
Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_PIN_AUTH_INVALID)
)
}
#[test]
fn test_process_make_credential_with_pin_and_uv_v1() {
test_helper_process_make_credential_with_pin_and_uv(PinUvAuthProtocol::V1);
}
#[test]
fn test_process_make_credential_with_pin_and_uv_v2() {
test_helper_process_make_credential_with_pin_and_uv(PinUvAuthProtocol::V2);
}
#[test]
fn test_non_resident_process_make_credential_with_pin() {
let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {};
let user_immediately_present = |_| Ok(());
let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE);
ctap_state.persistent_store.set_pin(&[0x88; 16], 4).unwrap();
let mut make_credential_params = create_minimal_make_credential_parameters();
make_credential_params.options.rk = false;
let make_credential_response =
ctap_state.process_make_credential(make_credential_params, DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID);
check_make_response(
make_credential_response,
0x41,
&ctap_state.persistent_store.aaguid().unwrap(),
0x70,
&[],
);
}
#[test]
fn test_resident_process_make_credential_with_pin() {
let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {};
let user_immediately_present = |_| Ok(());
let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE);
ctap_state.persistent_store.set_pin(&[0x88; 16], 4).unwrap();
let make_credential_params = create_minimal_make_credential_parameters();
let make_credential_response =
ctap_state.process_make_credential(make_credential_params, DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID);
assert_eq!(
make_credential_response,
Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_PUAT_REQUIRED)
);
}
#[test]
fn test_process_make_credential_with_pin_always_uv() {
let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {};
let user_immediately_present = |_| Ok(());
let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE);
ctap_state.persistent_store.toggle_always_uv().unwrap();
let make_credential_params = create_minimal_make_credential_parameters();
let make_credential_response =
ctap_state.process_make_credential(make_credential_params, DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID);
assert_eq!(
make_credential_response,
Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_PUAT_REQUIRED)
);
ctap_state.persistent_store.set_pin(&[0x88; 16], 4).unwrap();
let mut make_credential_params = create_minimal_make_credential_parameters();
make_credential_params.pin_uv_auth_param = Some(vec![0xA4; 16]);
make_credential_params.pin_uv_auth_protocol = Some(PinUvAuthProtocol::V1);
let make_credential_response =
ctap_state.process_make_credential(make_credential_params, DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID);
assert_eq!(
make_credential_response,
Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_PIN_AUTH_INVALID)
);
}
#[test]
fn test_process_make_credential_cancelled() {
let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {};
let user_presence_always_cancel = |_| Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_KEEPALIVE_CANCEL);
let mut ctap_state =
CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_presence_always_cancel, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE);
let make_credential_params = create_minimal_make_credential_parameters();
let make_credential_response =
ctap_state.process_make_credential(make_credential_params, DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID);
assert_eq!(
make_credential_response,
Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_KEEPALIVE_CANCEL)
);
}
fn check_assertion_response_with_user(
response: Result<ResponseData, Ctap2StatusCode>,
expected_user: PublicKeyCredentialUserEntity,
flags: u8,
signature_counter: u32,
expected_number_of_credentials: Option<u64>,
expected_extension_cbor: &[u8],
) {
match response.unwrap() {
ResponseData::AuthenticatorGetAssertion(get_assertion_response) => {
let AuthenticatorGetAssertionResponse {
auth_data,
user,
number_of_credentials,
..
} = get_assertion_response;
let mut expected_auth_data = vec![
0xA3, 0x79, 0xA6, 0xF6, 0xEE, 0xAF, 0xB9, 0xA5, 0x5E, 0x37, 0x8C, 0x11, 0x80,
0x34, 0xE2, 0x75, 0x1E, 0x68, 0x2F, 0xAB, 0x9F, 0x2D, 0x30, 0xAB, 0x13, 0xD2,
0x12, 0x55, 0x86, 0xCE, 0x19, 0x47, flags, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
];
let signature_counter_position = expected_auth_data.len() - 4;
BigEndian::write_u32(
&mut expected_auth_data[signature_counter_position..],
signature_counter,
);
expected_auth_data.extend(expected_extension_cbor);
assert_eq!(auth_data, expected_auth_data);
assert_eq!(user, Some(expected_user));
assert_eq!(number_of_credentials, expected_number_of_credentials);
}
_ => panic!("Invalid response type"),
}
}
fn check_assertion_response_with_extension(
response: Result<ResponseData, Ctap2StatusCode>,
expected_user_id: Vec<u8>,
signature_counter: u32,
expected_number_of_credentials: Option<u64>,
expected_extension_cbor: &[u8],
) {
let expected_user = PublicKeyCredentialUserEntity {
user_id: expected_user_id,
user_name: None,
user_display_name: None,
user_icon: None,
};
check_assertion_response_with_user(
response,
expected_user,
0x80,
signature_counter,
expected_number_of_credentials,
expected_extension_cbor,
);
}
fn check_assertion_response(
response: Result<ResponseData, Ctap2StatusCode>,
expected_user_id: Vec<u8>,
signature_counter: u32,
expected_number_of_credentials: Option<u64>,
) {
let expected_user = PublicKeyCredentialUserEntity {
user_id: expected_user_id,
user_name: None,
user_display_name: None,
user_icon: None,
};
check_assertion_response_with_user(
response,
expected_user,
0x00,
signature_counter,
expected_number_of_credentials,
&[],
);
}
#[test]
fn test_resident_process_get_assertion() {
let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {};
let user_immediately_present = |_| Ok(());
let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE);
let make_credential_params = create_minimal_make_credential_parameters();
assert!(ctap_state
.process_make_credential(make_credential_params, DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID)
.is_ok());
let get_assertion_params = AuthenticatorGetAssertionParameters {
rp_id: String::from("example.com"),
client_data_hash: vec![0xCD],
allow_list: None,
extensions: GetAssertionExtensions::default(),
options: GetAssertionOptions {
up: false,
uv: false,
},
pin_uv_auth_param: None,
pin_uv_auth_protocol: None,
};
let get_assertion_response = ctap_state.process_get_assertion(
get_assertion_params,
DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID,
DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE,
);
let signature_counter = ctap_state
.persistent_store
.global_signature_counter()
.unwrap();
check_assertion_response(get_assertion_response, vec![0x1D], signature_counter, None);
}
fn get_assertion_hmac_secret_params(
key_agreement_key: crypto::ecdh::SecKey,
key_agreement_response: ResponseData,
credential_id: Option<Vec<u8>>,
pin_uv_auth_protocol: PinUvAuthProtocol,
) -> AuthenticatorGetAssertionParameters {
let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {};
let platform_public_key = key_agreement_key.genpk();
let public_key = match key_agreement_response {
ResponseData::AuthenticatorClientPin(Some(client_pin_response)) => {
client_pin_response.key_agreement.unwrap()
}
_ => panic!("Invalid response type"),
};
let pin_protocol = PinProtocol::new_test(key_agreement_key, [0x91; 32]);
let shared_secret = pin_protocol
.decapsulate(public_key, pin_uv_auth_protocol)
.unwrap();
let salt = vec![0x01; 32];
let salt_enc = shared_secret.as_ref().encrypt(&mut rng, &salt).unwrap();
let salt_auth = shared_secret.authenticate(&salt_enc);
let hmac_secret_input = GetAssertionHmacSecretInput {
key_agreement: CoseKey::from(platform_public_key),
salt_enc,
salt_auth,
pin_uv_auth_protocol,
};
let get_extensions = GetAssertionExtensions {
hmac_secret: Some(hmac_secret_input),
..Default::default()
};
let credential_descriptor = credential_id.map(|key_id| PublicKeyCredentialDescriptor {
key_type: PublicKeyCredentialType::PublicKey,
key_id,
transports: None,
});
let allow_list = credential_descriptor.map(|c| vec![c]);
AuthenticatorGetAssertionParameters {
rp_id: String::from("example.com"),
client_data_hash: vec![0xCD],
allow_list,
extensions: get_extensions,
options: GetAssertionOptions {
up: true,
uv: false,
},
pin_uv_auth_param: None,
pin_uv_auth_protocol: None,
}
}
fn test_helper_process_get_assertion_hmac_secret(pin_uv_auth_protocol: PinUvAuthProtocol) {
let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {};
let key_agreement_key = crypto::ecdh::SecKey::gensk(&mut rng);
let user_immediately_present = |_| Ok(());
let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE);
let make_extensions = MakeCredentialExtensions {
hmac_secret: true,
..Default::default()
};
let mut make_credential_params = create_minimal_make_credential_parameters();
make_credential_params.options.rk = false;
make_credential_params.extensions = make_extensions;
let make_credential_response =
ctap_state.process_make_credential(make_credential_params, DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID);
assert!(make_credential_response.is_ok());
let credential_id = match make_credential_response.unwrap() {
ResponseData::AuthenticatorMakeCredential(make_credential_response) => {
let auth_data = make_credential_response.auth_data;
let offset = 37 + ctap_state.persistent_store.aaguid().unwrap().len();
assert_eq!(auth_data[offset], 0x00);
assert_eq!(auth_data[offset + 1] as usize, CREDENTIAL_ID_SIZE);
auth_data[offset + 2..offset + 2 + CREDENTIAL_ID_SIZE].to_vec()
}
_ => panic!("Invalid response type"),
};
let client_pin_params = AuthenticatorClientPinParameters {
pin_uv_auth_protocol,
sub_command: ClientPinSubCommand::GetKeyAgreement,
key_agreement: None,
pin_uv_auth_param: None,
new_pin_enc: None,
pin_hash_enc: None,
permissions: None,
permissions_rp_id: None,
};
let key_agreement_response = ctap_state.client_pin.process_command(
ctap_state.rng,
&mut ctap_state.persistent_store,
client_pin_params,
DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE,
);
let get_assertion_params = get_assertion_hmac_secret_params(
key_agreement_key,
key_agreement_response.unwrap(),
Some(credential_id),
pin_uv_auth_protocol,
);
let get_assertion_response = ctap_state.process_get_assertion(
get_assertion_params,
DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID,
DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE,
);
assert!(get_assertion_response.is_ok());
}
#[test]
fn test_process_get_assertion_hmac_secret_v1() {
test_helper_process_get_assertion_hmac_secret(PinUvAuthProtocol::V1);
}
#[test]
fn test_process_get_assertion_hmac_secret_v2() {
test_helper_process_get_assertion_hmac_secret(PinUvAuthProtocol::V2);
}
fn test_helper_resident_process_get_assertion_hmac_secret(
pin_uv_auth_protocol: PinUvAuthProtocol,
) {
let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {};
let key_agreement_key = crypto::ecdh::SecKey::gensk(&mut rng);
let user_immediately_present = |_| Ok(());
let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE);
let make_extensions = MakeCredentialExtensions {
hmac_secret: true,
..Default::default()
};
let mut make_credential_params = create_minimal_make_credential_parameters();
make_credential_params.extensions = make_extensions;
assert!(ctap_state
.process_make_credential(make_credential_params, DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID)
.is_ok());
let client_pin_params = AuthenticatorClientPinParameters {
pin_uv_auth_protocol,
sub_command: ClientPinSubCommand::GetKeyAgreement,
key_agreement: None,
pin_uv_auth_param: None,
new_pin_enc: None,
pin_hash_enc: None,
permissions: None,
permissions_rp_id: None,
};
let key_agreement_response = ctap_state.client_pin.process_command(
ctap_state.rng,
&mut ctap_state.persistent_store,
client_pin_params,
DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE,
);
let get_assertion_params = get_assertion_hmac_secret_params(
key_agreement_key,
key_agreement_response.unwrap(),
None,
pin_uv_auth_protocol,
);
let get_assertion_response = ctap_state.process_get_assertion(
get_assertion_params,
DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID,
DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE,
);
assert!(get_assertion_response.is_ok());
}
#[test]
fn test_process_resident_get_assertion_hmac_secret_v1() {
test_helper_resident_process_get_assertion_hmac_secret(PinUvAuthProtocol::V1);
}
#[test]
fn test_resident_process_get_assertion_hmac_secret_v2() {
test_helper_resident_process_get_assertion_hmac_secret(PinUvAuthProtocol::V2);
}
#[test]
fn test_resident_process_get_assertion_with_cred_protect() {
let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {};
let private_key = crypto::ecdsa::SecKey::gensk(&mut rng);
let credential_id = rng.gen_uniform_u8x32().to_vec();
let user_immediately_present = |_| Ok(());
let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE);
let cred_desc = PublicKeyCredentialDescriptor {
key_type: PublicKeyCredentialType::PublicKey,
key_id: credential_id.clone(),
transports: None,
};
let credential = PublicKeyCredentialSource {
key_type: PublicKeyCredentialType::PublicKey,
credential_id: credential_id.clone(),
private_key: private_key.clone(),
rp_id: String::from("example.com"),
user_handle: vec![0x1D],
user_display_name: None,
cred_protect_policy: Some(
CredentialProtectionPolicy::UserVerificationOptionalWithCredentialIdList,
),
creation_order: 0,
user_name: None,
user_icon: None,
cred_blob: None,
large_blob_key: None,
};
assert!(ctap_state
.persistent_store
.store_credential(credential)
.is_ok());
let get_assertion_params = AuthenticatorGetAssertionParameters {
rp_id: String::from("example.com"),
client_data_hash: vec![0xCD],
allow_list: None,
extensions: GetAssertionExtensions::default(),
options: GetAssertionOptions {
up: false,
uv: false,
},
pin_uv_auth_param: None,
pin_uv_auth_protocol: None,
};
let get_assertion_response = ctap_state.process_get_assertion(
get_assertion_params,
DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID,
DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE,
);
assert_eq!(
get_assertion_response,
Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_NO_CREDENTIALS),
);
let get_assertion_params = AuthenticatorGetAssertionParameters {
rp_id: String::from("example.com"),
client_data_hash: vec![0xCD],
allow_list: Some(vec![cred_desc.clone()]),
extensions: GetAssertionExtensions::default(),
options: GetAssertionOptions {
up: false,
uv: false,
},
pin_uv_auth_param: None,
pin_uv_auth_protocol: None,
};
let get_assertion_response = ctap_state.process_get_assertion(
get_assertion_params,
DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID,
DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE,
);
let signature_counter = ctap_state
.persistent_store
.global_signature_counter()
.unwrap();
check_assertion_response(get_assertion_response, vec![0x1D], signature_counter, None);
let credential = PublicKeyCredentialSource {
key_type: PublicKeyCredentialType::PublicKey,
credential_id,
private_key,
rp_id: String::from("example.com"),
user_handle: vec![0x1D],
user_display_name: None,
cred_protect_policy: Some(CredentialProtectionPolicy::UserVerificationRequired),
creation_order: 0,
user_name: None,
user_icon: None,
cred_blob: None,
large_blob_key: None,
};
assert!(ctap_state
.persistent_store
.store_credential(credential)
.is_ok());
let get_assertion_params = AuthenticatorGetAssertionParameters {
rp_id: String::from("example.com"),
client_data_hash: vec![0xCD],
allow_list: Some(vec![cred_desc]),
extensions: GetAssertionExtensions::default(),
options: GetAssertionOptions {
up: false,
uv: false,
},
pin_uv_auth_param: None,
pin_uv_auth_protocol: None,
};
let get_assertion_response = ctap_state.process_get_assertion(
get_assertion_params,
DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID,
DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE,
);
assert_eq!(
get_assertion_response,
Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_NO_CREDENTIALS),
);
}
#[test]
fn test_process_get_assertion_with_cred_blob() {
let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {};
let private_key = crypto::ecdsa::SecKey::gensk(&mut rng);
let credential_id = rng.gen_uniform_u8x32().to_vec();
let user_immediately_present = |_| Ok(());
let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE);
let credential = PublicKeyCredentialSource {
key_type: PublicKeyCredentialType::PublicKey,
credential_id,
private_key,
rp_id: String::from("example.com"),
user_handle: vec![0x1D],
user_display_name: None,
cred_protect_policy: None,
creation_order: 0,
user_name: None,
user_icon: None,
cred_blob: Some(vec![0xCB]),
large_blob_key: None,
};
assert!(ctap_state
.persistent_store
.store_credential(credential)
.is_ok());
let extensions = GetAssertionExtensions {
cred_blob: true,
..Default::default()
};
let get_assertion_params = AuthenticatorGetAssertionParameters {
rp_id: String::from("example.com"),
client_data_hash: vec![0xCD],
allow_list: None,
extensions,
options: GetAssertionOptions {
up: false,
uv: false,
},
pin_uv_auth_param: None,
pin_uv_auth_protocol: None,
};
let get_assertion_response = ctap_state.process_get_assertion(
get_assertion_params,
DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID,
DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE,
);
let signature_counter = ctap_state
.persistent_store
.global_signature_counter()
.unwrap();
let expected_extension_cbor = [
0xA1, 0x68, 0x63, 0x72, 0x65, 0x64, 0x42, 0x6C, 0x6F, 0x62, 0x41, 0xCB,
];
check_assertion_response_with_extension(
get_assertion_response,
vec![0x1D],
signature_counter,
None,
&expected_extension_cbor,
);
}
#[test]
fn test_process_get_assertion_with_large_blob_key() {
let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {};
let private_key = crypto::ecdsa::SecKey::gensk(&mut rng);
let credential_id = rng.gen_uniform_u8x32().to_vec();
let user_immediately_present = |_| Ok(());
let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE);
let credential = PublicKeyCredentialSource {
key_type: PublicKeyCredentialType::PublicKey,
credential_id,
private_key,
rp_id: String::from("example.com"),
user_handle: vec![0x1D],
user_display_name: None,
cred_protect_policy: None,
creation_order: 0,
user_name: None,
user_icon: None,
cred_blob: None,
large_blob_key: Some(vec![0x1C; 32]),
};
assert!(ctap_state
.persistent_store
.store_credential(credential)
.is_ok());
let extensions = GetAssertionExtensions {
large_blob_key: Some(true),
..Default::default()
};
let get_assertion_params = AuthenticatorGetAssertionParameters {
rp_id: String::from("example.com"),
client_data_hash: vec![0xCD],
allow_list: None,
extensions,
options: GetAssertionOptions {
up: false,
uv: false,
},
pin_uv_auth_param: None,
pin_uv_auth_protocol: None,
};
let get_assertion_response = ctap_state.process_get_assertion(
get_assertion_params,
DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID,
DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE,
);
let large_blob_key = match get_assertion_response.unwrap() {
ResponseData::AuthenticatorGetAssertion(get_assertion_response) => {
get_assertion_response.large_blob_key.unwrap()
}
_ => panic!("Invalid response type"),
};
assert_eq!(large_blob_key, vec![0x1C; 32]);
}
fn test_helper_process_get_next_assertion_two_credentials_with_uv(
pin_uv_auth_protocol: PinUvAuthProtocol,
) {
let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {};
let key_agreement_key = crypto::ecdh::SecKey::gensk(&mut rng);
let pin_uv_auth_token = [0x88; 32];
let client_pin =
ClientPin::new_test(key_agreement_key, pin_uv_auth_token, pin_uv_auth_protocol);
let user_immediately_present = |_| Ok(());
let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE);
let mut make_credential_params = create_minimal_make_credential_parameters();
let user1 = PublicKeyCredentialUserEntity {
user_id: vec![0x01],
user_name: Some("user1".to_string()),
user_display_name: Some("User One".to_string()),
user_icon: Some("icon1".to_string()),
};
make_credential_params.user = user1.clone();
assert!(ctap_state
.process_make_credential(make_credential_params, DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID)
.is_ok());
let mut make_credential_params = create_minimal_make_credential_parameters();
let user2 = PublicKeyCredentialUserEntity {
user_id: vec![0x02],
user_name: Some("user2".to_string()),
user_display_name: Some("User Two".to_string()),
user_icon: Some("icon2".to_string()),
};
make_credential_params.user = user2.clone();
assert!(ctap_state
.process_make_credential(make_credential_params, DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID)
.is_ok());
ctap_state.client_pin = client_pin;
// The PIN length is outside of the test scope and most likely incorrect.
ctap_state.persistent_store.set_pin(&[0u8; 16], 4).unwrap();
let client_data_hash = vec![0xCD];
let pin_uv_auth_param = authenticate_pin_uv_auth_token(
&pin_uv_auth_token,
&client_data_hash,
pin_uv_auth_protocol,
);
let get_assertion_params = AuthenticatorGetAssertionParameters {
rp_id: String::from("example.com"),
client_data_hash,
allow_list: None,
extensions: GetAssertionExtensions::default(),
options: GetAssertionOptions {
up: false,
uv: true,
},
pin_uv_auth_param: Some(pin_uv_auth_param),
pin_uv_auth_protocol: Some(pin_uv_auth_protocol),
};
let get_assertion_response = ctap_state.process_get_assertion(
get_assertion_params,
DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID,
DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE,
);
let signature_counter = ctap_state
.persistent_store
.global_signature_counter()
.unwrap();
check_assertion_response_with_user(
get_assertion_response,
user2,
0x04,
signature_counter,
Some(2),
&[],
);
let get_assertion_response = ctap_state.process_get_next_assertion(DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE);
check_assertion_response_with_user(
get_assertion_response,
user1,
0x04,
signature_counter,
None,
&[],
);
let get_assertion_response = ctap_state.process_get_next_assertion(DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE);
assert_eq!(
get_assertion_response,
Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_NOT_ALLOWED)
);
}
#[test]
fn test_process_get_next_assertion_two_credentials_with_uv_v1() {
test_helper_process_get_next_assertion_two_credentials_with_uv(PinUvAuthProtocol::V1);
}
#[test]
fn test_process_get_next_assertion_two_credentials_with_uv_v2() {
test_helper_process_get_next_assertion_two_credentials_with_uv(PinUvAuthProtocol::V2);
}
#[test]
fn test_process_get_next_assertion_three_credentials_no_uv() {
let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {};
let user_immediately_present = |_| Ok(());
let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE);
let mut make_credential_params = create_minimal_make_credential_parameters();
make_credential_params.user.user_id = vec![0x01];
make_credential_params.user.user_name = Some("removed".to_string());
make_credential_params.user.user_display_name = Some("removed".to_string());
make_credential_params.user.user_icon = Some("removed".to_string());
assert!(ctap_state
.process_make_credential(make_credential_params, DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID)
.is_ok());
let mut make_credential_params = create_minimal_make_credential_parameters();
make_credential_params.user.user_id = vec![0x02];
make_credential_params.user.user_name = Some("removed".to_string());
make_credential_params.user.user_display_name = Some("removed".to_string());
make_credential_params.user.user_icon = Some("removed".to_string());
assert!(ctap_state
.process_make_credential(make_credential_params, DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID)
.is_ok());
let mut make_credential_params = create_minimal_make_credential_parameters();
make_credential_params.user.user_id = vec![0x03];
make_credential_params.user.user_name = Some("removed".to_string());
make_credential_params.user.user_display_name = Some("removed".to_string());
make_credential_params.user.user_icon = Some("removed".to_string());
assert!(ctap_state
.process_make_credential(make_credential_params, DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID)
.is_ok());
let get_assertion_params = AuthenticatorGetAssertionParameters {
rp_id: String::from("example.com"),
client_data_hash: vec![0xCD],
allow_list: None,
extensions: GetAssertionExtensions::default(),
options: GetAssertionOptions {
up: false,
uv: false,
},
pin_uv_auth_param: None,
pin_uv_auth_protocol: None,
};
let get_assertion_response = ctap_state.process_get_assertion(
get_assertion_params,
DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID,
DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE,
);
let signature_counter = ctap_state
.persistent_store
.global_signature_counter()
.unwrap();
check_assertion_response(
get_assertion_response,
vec![0x03],
signature_counter,
Some(3),
);
let get_assertion_response = ctap_state.process_get_next_assertion(DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE);
check_assertion_response(get_assertion_response, vec![0x02], signature_counter, None);
let get_assertion_response = ctap_state.process_get_next_assertion(DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE);
check_assertion_response(get_assertion_response, vec![0x01], signature_counter, None);
let get_assertion_response = ctap_state.process_get_next_assertion(DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE);
assert_eq!(
get_assertion_response,
Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_NOT_ALLOWED)
);
}
#[test]
fn test_process_get_next_assertion_not_allowed() {
let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {};
let user_immediately_present = |_| Ok(());
let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE);
let get_assertion_response = ctap_state.process_get_next_assertion(DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE);
assert_eq!(
get_assertion_response,
Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_NOT_ALLOWED)
);
let mut make_credential_params = create_minimal_make_credential_parameters();
make_credential_params.user.user_id = vec![0x01];
assert!(ctap_state
.process_make_credential(make_credential_params, DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID)
.is_ok());
let mut make_credential_params = create_minimal_make_credential_parameters();
make_credential_params.user.user_id = vec![0x02];
assert!(ctap_state
.process_make_credential(make_credential_params, DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID)
.is_ok());
let get_assertion_params = AuthenticatorGetAssertionParameters {
rp_id: String::from("example.com"),
client_data_hash: vec![0xCD],
allow_list: None,
extensions: GetAssertionExtensions::default(),
options: GetAssertionOptions {
up: false,
uv: false,
},
pin_uv_auth_param: None,
pin_uv_auth_protocol: None,
};
let get_assertion_response = ctap_state.process_get_assertion(
get_assertion_params,
DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID,
DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE,
);
assert!(get_assertion_response.is_ok());
// This is a MakeCredential command.
let mut command_cbor = vec![0x01];
let cbor_value = cbor_map! {
1 => vec![0xCD; 16],
2 => cbor_map! {
"id" => "example.com",
},
3 => cbor_map! {
"id" => vec![0x1D, 0x1D, 0x1D, 0x1D],
},
4 => cbor_array![ES256_CRED_PARAM],
};
assert!(cbor_write(cbor_value, &mut command_cbor).is_ok());
ctap_state.process_command(&command_cbor, DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE);
let get_assertion_response = ctap_state.process_get_next_assertion(DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE);
assert_eq!(
get_assertion_response,
Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_NOT_ALLOWED)
);
}
#[test]
fn test_process_reset() {
let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {};
let user_immediately_present = |_| Ok(());
let private_key = crypto::ecdsa::SecKey::gensk(&mut rng);
let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE);
let credential_id = vec![0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67];
let credential_source = PublicKeyCredentialSource {
key_type: PublicKeyCredentialType::PublicKey,
credential_id,
private_key,
rp_id: String::from("example.com"),
user_handle: vec![],
user_display_name: None,
cred_protect_policy: None,
creation_order: 0,
user_name: None,
user_icon: None,
cred_blob: None,
large_blob_key: None,
};
assert!(ctap_state
.persistent_store
.store_credential(credential_source)
.is_ok());
assert!(ctap_state.persistent_store.count_credentials().unwrap() > 0);
let reset_reponse =
ctap_state.process_command(&[0x07], DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE);
let expected_response = vec![0x00];
assert_eq!(reset_reponse, expected_response);
assert!(ctap_state.persistent_store.count_credentials().unwrap() == 0);
}
#[test]
fn test_process_reset_cancelled() {
let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {};
let user_presence_always_cancel = |_| Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_KEEPALIVE_CANCEL);
let mut ctap_state =
CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_presence_always_cancel, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE);
let reset_reponse = ctap_state.process_reset(DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE);
assert_eq!(
reset_reponse,
Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_KEEPALIVE_CANCEL)
);
}
#[test]
fn test_process_reset_not_first() {
let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {};
let user_immediately_present = |_| Ok(());
let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE);
// This is a GetNextAssertion command.
ctap_state.process_command(&[0x08], DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE);
let reset_reponse = ctap_state.process_reset(DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE);
assert_eq!(reset_reponse, Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_NOT_ALLOWED));
}
#[test]
fn test_process_credential_management_unknown_subcommand() {
let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {};
let user_immediately_present = |_| Ok(());
let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE);
// The subcommand 0xEE does not exist.
let reponse = ctap_state.process_command(
&[0x0A, 0xA1, 0x01, 0x18, 0xEE],
DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID,
DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE,
);
let expected_response = vec![Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_INVALID_SUBCOMMAND as u8];
assert_eq!(reponse, expected_response);
}
#[test]
fn test_process_unknown_command() {
let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {};
let user_immediately_present = |_| Ok(());
let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE);
// This command does not exist.
let reponse = ctap_state.process_command(&[0xDF], DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE);
let expected_response = vec![Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP1_ERR_INVALID_COMMAND as u8];
assert_eq!(reponse, expected_response);
}
#[test]
fn test_encrypt_decrypt_credential() {
let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {};
let user_immediately_present = |_| Ok(());
let private_key = crypto::ecdsa::SecKey::gensk(&mut rng);
let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE);
// Usually, the relying party ID or its hash is provided by the client.
// We are not testing the correctness of our SHA256 here, only if it is checked.
let rp_id_hash = [0x55; 32];
let encrypted_id = ctap_state
.encrypt_key_handle(private_key.clone(), &rp_id_hash)
.unwrap();
let decrypted_source = ctap_state
.decrypt_credential_source(encrypted_id, &rp_id_hash)
.unwrap()
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(private_key, decrypted_source.private_key);
}
#[test]
fn test_encrypt_decrypt_bad_hmac() {
let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {};
let user_immediately_present = |_| Ok(());
let private_key = crypto::ecdsa::SecKey::gensk(&mut rng);
let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE);
// Same as above.
let rp_id_hash = [0x55; 32];
let encrypted_id = ctap_state
.encrypt_key_handle(private_key, &rp_id_hash)
.unwrap();
for i in 0..encrypted_id.len() {
let mut modified_id = encrypted_id.clone();
modified_id[i] ^= 0x01;
assert!(ctap_state
.decrypt_credential_source(modified_id, &rp_id_hash)
.unwrap()
.is_none());
}
}
#[test]
fn test_signature_counter() {
let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {};
let user_immediately_present = |_| Ok(());
let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE);
let mut last_counter = ctap_state
.persistent_store
.global_signature_counter()
.unwrap();
assert!(last_counter > 0);
for _ in 0..100 {
assert!(ctap_state.increment_global_signature_counter().is_ok());
let next_counter = ctap_state
.persistent_store
.global_signature_counter()
.unwrap();
assert!(next_counter > last_counter);
last_counter = next_counter;
}
}
#[test]
fn test_vendor_configure() {
let mut rng = ThreadRng256 {};
let user_immediately_present = |_| Ok(());
let mut ctap_state = CtapState::new(&mut rng, user_immediately_present, DUMMY_CLOCK_VALUE);
// Nothing should be configured at the beginning
let response = ctap_state.process_vendor_configure(
AuthenticatorVendorConfigureParameters {
lockdown: false,
attestation_material: None,
},
DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID,
);
assert_eq!(
response,
Ok(ResponseData::AuthenticatorVendor(
AuthenticatorVendorResponse {
cert_programmed: false,
pkey_programmed: false,
}
))
);
// Inject dummy values
let dummy_key = [0x41u8; key_material::ATTESTATION_PRIVATE_KEY_LENGTH];
let dummy_cert = [0xddu8; 20];
let response = ctap_state.process_vendor_configure(
AuthenticatorVendorConfigureParameters {
lockdown: false,
attestation_material: Some(AuthenticatorAttestationMaterial {
certificate: dummy_cert.to_vec(),
private_key: dummy_key,
}),
},
DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID,
);
assert_eq!(
response,
Ok(ResponseData::AuthenticatorVendor(
AuthenticatorVendorResponse {
cert_programmed: true,
pkey_programmed: true,
}
))
);
assert_eq!(
ctap_state
.persistent_store
.attestation_certificate()
.unwrap()
.unwrap(),
dummy_cert
);
assert_eq!(
ctap_state
.persistent_store
.attestation_private_key()
.unwrap()
.unwrap(),
dummy_key
);
// Try to inject other dummy values and check that initial values are retained.
let other_dummy_key = [0x44u8; key_material::ATTESTATION_PRIVATE_KEY_LENGTH];
let response = ctap_state.process_vendor_configure(
AuthenticatorVendorConfigureParameters {
lockdown: false,
attestation_material: Some(AuthenticatorAttestationMaterial {
certificate: dummy_cert.to_vec(),
private_key: other_dummy_key,
}),
},
DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID,
);
assert_eq!(
response,
Ok(ResponseData::AuthenticatorVendor(
AuthenticatorVendorResponse {
cert_programmed: true,
pkey_programmed: true,
}
))
);
assert_eq!(
ctap_state
.persistent_store
.attestation_certificate()
.unwrap()
.unwrap(),
dummy_cert
);
assert_eq!(
ctap_state
.persistent_store
.attestation_private_key()
.unwrap()
.unwrap(),
dummy_key
);
// Now try to lock the device
let response = ctap_state.process_vendor_configure(
AuthenticatorVendorConfigureParameters {
lockdown: true,
attestation_material: None,
},
DUMMY_CHANNEL_ID,
);
assert_eq!(
response,
Ok(ResponseData::AuthenticatorVendor(
AuthenticatorVendorResponse {
cert_programmed: true,
pkey_programmed: true,
}
))
);
}
}