Improved documentation for customization (#287)
* move constants to new file, and update documentation * documentation improvements, deploy checks tests * fix pylint * improved code style * swap build and check
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src/ctap/customization.rs
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269
src/ctap/customization.rs
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// Copyright 2021 Google LLC
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//
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// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
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// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
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// You may obtain a copy of the License at
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//
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// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
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//
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// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
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// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
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// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
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// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
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// limitations under the License.
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//! This file contains all customizable constants.
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//!
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//! If you adapt them, make sure to run the tests before flashing the firmware.
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//! Our deploy script enforces the invariants.
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use crate::ctap::data_formats::{CredentialProtectionPolicy, EnterpriseAttestationMode};
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// ###########################################################################
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// Constants for adjusting privacy and protection levels.
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// ###########################################################################
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/// Changes the default level for the credProtect extension.
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///
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/// You can change this value to one of the following for more privacy:
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/// - CredentialProtectionPolicy::UserVerificationOptionalWithCredentialIdList
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/// - CredentialProtectionPolicy::UserVerificationRequired
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///
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/// UserVerificationOptionalWithCredentialIdList
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/// Resident credentials are discoverable with
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/// - an allowList,
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/// - an excludeList,
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/// - user verification.
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///
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/// UserVerificationRequired
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/// Resident credentials are discoverable with user verification only.
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///
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/// This can improve privacy, but can make usage less comfortable.
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pub const DEFAULT_CRED_PROTECT: Option<CredentialProtectionPolicy> = None;
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/// Sets the initial minimum PIN length in code points.
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///
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/// # Invariant
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///
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/// - The minimum PIN length must be at least 4.
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/// - The minimum PIN length must be at most 63.
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/// - DEFAULT_MIN_PIN_LENGTH_RP_IDS must be non-empty if MAX_RP_IDS_LENGTH is 0.
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///
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/// Requiring longer PINs can help establish trust between users and relying
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/// parties. It makes user verification harder to break, but less convenient.
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/// NIST recommends at least 6-digit PINs in section 5.1.9.1:
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/// https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-3/sp800-63b.html
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///
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/// Reset reverts the minimum PIN length to this DEFAULT_MIN_PIN_LENGTH.
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pub const DEFAULT_MIN_PIN_LENGTH: u8 = 4;
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/// Lists relying parties that can read the minimum PIN length.
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///
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/// # Invariant
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///
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/// - DEFAULT_MIN_PIN_LENGTH_RP_IDS must be non-empty if MAX_RP_IDS_LENGTH is 0
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///
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/// Only the RP IDs listed in DEFAULT_MIN_PIN_LENGTH_RP_IDS are allowed to read
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/// the minimum PIN length with the minPinLength extension.
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pub const DEFAULT_MIN_PIN_LENGTH_RP_IDS: &[&str] = &[];
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/// Enforces the alwaysUv option.
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///
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/// When setting to true, commands require a PIN.
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/// Also, alwaysUv can not be disabled by commands.
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///
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/// A certification (additional to FIDO Alliance's) might require enforcing
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/// alwaysUv. Otherwise, users should have the choice to configure alwaysUv.
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/// Calling toggleAlwaysUv is preferred over enforcing alwaysUv here.
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pub const ENFORCE_ALWAYS_UV: bool = false;
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/// Allows usage of enterprise attestation.
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///
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/// # Invariant
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///
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/// - Enterprise and batch attestation can not both be active.
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/// - If the mode is VendorFacilitated, ENTERPRISE_RP_ID_LIST must be non-empty.
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///
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/// For privacy reasons, it is disabled by default. You can choose between:
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/// - EnterpriseAttestationMode::VendorFacilitated
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/// - EnterpriseAttestationMode::PlatformManaged
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///
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/// VendorFacilitated
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/// Enterprise attestation is restricted to ENTERPRISE_RP_ID_LIST. Add your
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/// enterprises domain, e.g. "example.com", to the list below.
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///
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/// PlatformManaged
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/// All relying parties can request an enterprise attestation. The authenticator
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/// trusts the platform to filter requests.
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///
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/// To enable the feature, send the subcommand enableEnterpriseAttestation in
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/// AuthenticatorConfig. An enterprise might want to customize the type of
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/// attestation that is used. OpenSK defaults to batch attestation. Configuring
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/// individual certificates then makes authenticators identifiable.
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///
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/// OpenSK prevents activating batch and enterprise attestation together. The
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/// current implementation uses the same key material at the moment, and these
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/// two modes have conflicting privacy guarantees.
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/// If you implement your own enterprise attestation mechanism, and you want
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/// batch attestation at the same time, proceed carefully and remove the
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/// assertion.
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pub const ENTERPRISE_ATTESTATION_MODE: Option<EnterpriseAttestationMode> = None;
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/// Lists relying party IDs that can perform enterprise attestation.
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///
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/// # Invariant
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///
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/// - If the mode is VendorFacilitated, ENTERPRISE_RP_ID_LIST must be non-empty.
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///
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/// This list is only considered if the enterprise attestation mode is
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/// VendorFacilitated.
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pub const ENTERPRISE_RP_ID_LIST: &[&str] = &[];
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/// Sets the number of consecutive failed PINs before blocking interaction.
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///
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/// # Invariant
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///
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/// - CTAP2.0: Maximum PIN retries must be 8.
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/// - CTAP2.1: Maximum PIN retries must be 8 at most.
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///
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/// The fail retry counter is reset after entering the correct PIN.
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pub const MAX_PIN_RETRIES: u8 = 8;
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/// Enables or disables basic attestation for FIDO2.
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///
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/// # Invariant
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///
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/// - Enterprise and batch attestation can not both be active (see above).
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///
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/// The basic attestation uses the signing key configured with a vendor command
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/// as a batch key. If you turn batch attestation on, be aware that it is your
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/// responsibility to safely generate and store the key material. Also, the
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/// batches must have size of at least 100k authenticators before using new key
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/// material.
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/// U2F is unaffected by this setting.
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///
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/// https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn/#attestation
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pub const USE_BATCH_ATTESTATION: bool = false;
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/// Enables or disables signature counters.
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///
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/// The signature counter is currently implemented as a global counter.
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/// The specification strongly suggests to have per-credential counters.
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/// Implementing those means you can't have an infinite amount of server-side
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/// credentials anymore. Also, since counters need frequent writes on the
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/// persistent storage, we might need a flash friendly implementation. This
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/// solution is a compromise to be compatible with U2F and not wasting storage.
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///
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/// https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn/#signature-counter
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pub const USE_SIGNATURE_COUNTER: bool = true;
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// ###########################################################################
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// Constants for performance optimization or adapting to different hardware.
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//
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// Those constants may be modified before compilation to tune the behavior of
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// the key.
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// ###########################################################################
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/// Sets the maximum blob size stored with the credBlob extension.
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///
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/// # Invariant
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///
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/// - The length must be at least 32.
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pub const MAX_CRED_BLOB_LENGTH: usize = 32;
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/// Limits the number of considered entries in credential lists.
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///
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/// # Invariant
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///
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/// - This value, if present, must be at least 1 (more is preferred).
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///
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/// Depending on your memory, you can use Some(n) to limit request sizes in
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/// MakeCredential and GetAssertion. This affects allowList and excludeList.
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pub const MAX_CREDENTIAL_COUNT_IN_LIST: Option<usize> = None;
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/// Limits the size of largeBlobs the authenticator stores.
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///
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/// # Invariant
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///
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/// - The allowed size must be at least 1024.
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/// - The array must fit into the shards reserved in storage/key.rs.
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pub const MAX_LARGE_BLOB_ARRAY_SIZE: usize = 2048;
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/// Limits the number of RP IDs that can change the minimum PIN length.
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///
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/// # Invariant
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///
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/// - If this value is 0, DEFAULT_MIN_PIN_LENGTH_RP_IDS must be non-empty.
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///
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/// You can use this constant to have an upper limit in storage requirements.
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/// This might be useful if you want to more reliably predict the remaining
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/// storage. Stored string can still be of arbitrary length though, until RP ID
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/// truncation is implemented.
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/// Outside of memory considerations, you can set this value to 0 if only RP IDs
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/// in DEFAULT_MIN_PIN_LENGTH_RP_IDS should be allowed to change the minimum PIN
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/// length.
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pub const MAX_RP_IDS_LENGTH: usize = 8;
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/// Sets the number of resident keys you can store.
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///
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/// # Invariant
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///
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/// - The storage key CREDENTIALS must fit at least this number of credentials.
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///
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/// This value has implications on the flash lifetime, please see the
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/// documentation for NUM_PAGES below.
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pub const MAX_SUPPORTED_RESIDENT_KEYS: usize = 150;
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/// Sets the number of pages used for persistent storage.
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///
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/// The number of pages should be at least 3 and at most what the flash can
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/// hold. There should be no reason to put a small number here, except that the
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/// latency of flash operations is linear in the number of pages. This may
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/// improve in the future. Currently, using 20 pages gives between 20ms and
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/// 240ms per operation. The rule of thumb is between 1ms and 12ms per
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/// additional page.
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///
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/// Limiting the number of resident keys permits to ensure a minimum number of
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/// counter increments.
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/// Let:
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/// - P the number of pages (NUM_PAGES)
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/// - K the maximum number of resident keys (MAX_SUPPORTED_RESIDENT_KEYS)
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/// - S the maximum size of a resident key (about 500)
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/// - C the number of erase cycles (10000)
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/// - I the minimum number of counter increments
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///
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/// We have: I = (P * 4084 - 5107 - K * S) / 8 * C
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///
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/// With P=20 and K=150, we have I=2M which is enough for 500 increments per day
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/// for 10 years.
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pub const NUM_PAGES: usize = 20;
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod test {
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use super::*;
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#[test]
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#[allow(clippy::assertions_on_constants)]
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fn test_invariants() {
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// Two invariants are currently tested in different files:
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// - storage.rs: if MAX_LARGE_BLOB_ARRAY_SIZE fits the shards
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// - storage/key.rs: if MAX_SUPPORTED_RESIDENT_KEYS fits CREDENTIALS
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assert!(DEFAULT_MIN_PIN_LENGTH >= 4);
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assert!(DEFAULT_MIN_PIN_LENGTH <= 63);
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assert!(!USE_BATCH_ATTESTATION || ENTERPRISE_ATTESTATION_MODE.is_none());
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if let Some(EnterpriseAttestationMode::VendorFacilitated) = ENTERPRISE_ATTESTATION_MODE {
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assert!(!ENTERPRISE_RP_ID_LIST.is_empty());
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} else {
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assert!(ENTERPRISE_RP_ID_LIST.is_empty());
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}
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assert!(MAX_PIN_RETRIES <= 8);
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assert!(MAX_CRED_BLOB_LENGTH >= 32);
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if let Some(count) = MAX_CREDENTIAL_COUNT_IN_LIST {
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assert!(count >= 1);
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}
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assert!(MAX_LARGE_BLOB_ARRAY_SIZE >= 1024);
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if MAX_RP_IDS_LENGTH == 0 {
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assert!(!DEFAULT_MIN_PIN_LENGTH_RP_IDS.is_empty());
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}
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}
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}
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