Delete spurious file

This commit is contained in:
Egor Duda
2022-05-19 08:50:47 +03:00
parent 1277b97018
commit 5aac730f93

View File

@@ -1,693 +0,0 @@
// Copyright 2021 Google LLC
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
#[cfg(feature = "ed25519")]
use crate::ctap::data_formats::EDDSA_ALGORITHM;
use crate::ctap::data_formats::{
extract_array, extract_byte_string, CoseKey, PublicKeyCredentialSource,
PublicKeyCredentialType, SignatureAlgorithm, ES256_ALGORITHM,
};
use crate::ctap::status_code::Ctap2StatusCode;
use crate::ctap::storage;
use crate::env::Env;
use alloc::string::String;
use alloc::vec;
use alloc::vec::Vec;
use core::convert::TryFrom;
use crypto::cbc::{cbc_decrypt, cbc_encrypt};
use crypto::ecdsa;
use crypto::hmac::{hmac_256, verify_hmac_256};
use crypto::sha256::Sha256;
use rng256::Rng256;
use sk_cbor as cbor;
use sk_cbor::{cbor_array, cbor_bytes, cbor_int};
// Legacy credential IDs consist of
// - 16 bytes: initialization vector for AES-256,
// - 32 bytes: ECDSA private key for the credential,
// - 32 bytes: relying party ID hashed with SHA256,
// - 32 bytes: HMAC-SHA256 over everything else.
pub const LEGACY_CREDENTIAL_ID_SIZE: usize = 112;
#[cfg(test)]
pub const ECDSA_CREDENTIAL_ID_SIZE: usize = 113;
// See encrypt_key_handle v1 documentation.
pub const MAX_CREDENTIAL_ID_SIZE: usize = 113;
const ECDSA_CREDENTIAL_ID_VERSION: u8 = 0x01;
#[allow(dead_code)]
const ED25519_CREDENTIAL_ID_VERSION: u8 = 0x02;
#[cfg(test)]
const UNSUPPORTED_CREDENTIAL_ID_VERSION: u8 = 0x80;
/// Wraps the AES256-CBC encryption to match what we need in CTAP.
pub fn aes256_cbc_encrypt(
rng: &mut dyn Rng256,
aes_enc_key: &crypto::aes256::EncryptionKey,
plaintext: &[u8],
embeds_iv: bool,
) -> Result<Vec<u8>, Ctap2StatusCode> {
if plaintext.len() % 16 != 0 {
return Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP1_ERR_INVALID_PARAMETER);
}
// The extra 1 capacity is because encrypt_key_handle adds a version number.
let mut ciphertext = Vec::with_capacity(plaintext.len() + 16 * embeds_iv as usize + 1);
let iv = if embeds_iv {
let random_bytes = rng.gen_uniform_u8x32();
ciphertext.extend_from_slice(&random_bytes[..16]);
*array_ref!(ciphertext, 0, 16)
} else {
[0u8; 16]
};
let start = ciphertext.len();
ciphertext.extend_from_slice(plaintext);
cbc_encrypt(aes_enc_key, iv, &mut ciphertext[start..]);
Ok(ciphertext)
}
/// Wraps the AES256-CBC decryption to match what we need in CTAP.
pub fn aes256_cbc_decrypt(
aes_enc_key: &crypto::aes256::EncryptionKey,
ciphertext: &[u8],
embeds_iv: bool,
) -> Result<Vec<u8>, Ctap2StatusCode> {
if ciphertext.len() % 16 != 0 || (embeds_iv && ciphertext.is_empty()) {
return Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP1_ERR_INVALID_PARAMETER);
}
let (iv, ciphertext) = if embeds_iv {
let (iv, ciphertext) = ciphertext.split_at(16);
(*array_ref!(iv, 0, 16), ciphertext)
} else {
([0u8; 16], ciphertext)
};
let mut plaintext = ciphertext.to_vec();
let aes_dec_key = crypto::aes256::DecryptionKey::new(aes_enc_key);
cbc_decrypt(&aes_dec_key, iv, &mut plaintext);
Ok(plaintext)
}
/// An asymmetric private key that can sign messages.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum PrivateKey {
Ecdsa(ecdsa::SecKey),
#[cfg(feature = "ed25519")]
Ed25519(ed25519_compact::SecretKey),
}
impl PrivateKey {
/// Creates a new private key for the given algorithm.
///
/// # Panics
///
/// Panics if the algorithm is [`SignatureAlgorithm::Unknown`].
pub fn new(rng: &mut impl Rng256, alg: SignatureAlgorithm) -> Self {
match alg {
SignatureAlgorithm::ES256 => PrivateKey::Ecdsa(crypto::ecdsa::SecKey::gensk(rng)),
#[cfg(feature = "ed25519")]
SignatureAlgorithm::EDDSA => {
let bytes = rng.gen_uniform_u8x32();
Self::new_ed25519_from_bytes(&bytes).unwrap()
}
SignatureAlgorithm::Unknown => unreachable!(),
}
}
/// Helper function that creates a private key of type ECDSA.
///
/// This function is public for legacy credential source parsing only.
pub fn new_ecdsa_from_bytes(bytes: &[u8]) -> Option<Self> {
if bytes.len() != 32 {
return None;
}
ecdsa::SecKey::from_bytes(array_ref!(bytes, 0, 32)).map(PrivateKey::from)
}
#[cfg(feature = "ed25519")]
pub fn new_ed25519_from_bytes(bytes: &[u8]) -> Option<Self> {
if bytes.len() != 32 {
return None;
}
let seed = ed25519_compact::Seed::from_slice(bytes).unwrap();
Some(Self::Ed25519(ed25519_compact::KeyPair::from_seed(seed).sk))
}
/// Returns the corresponding public key.
pub fn get_pub_key(&self) -> CoseKey {
match self {
PrivateKey::Ecdsa(ecdsa_key) => CoseKey::from(ecdsa_key.genpk()),
#[cfg(feature = "ed25519")]
PrivateKey::Ed25519(ed25519_key) => CoseKey::from(ed25519_key.public_key()),
}
}
/// Returns the encoded signature for a given message.
pub fn sign_and_encode(&self, message: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
match self {
PrivateKey::Ecdsa(ecdsa_key) => ecdsa_key.sign_rfc6979::<Sha256>(message).to_asn1_der(),
#[cfg(feature = "ed25519")]
PrivateKey::Ed25519(ed25519_key) => ed25519_key.sign(message, None).to_vec(),
}
}
/// The associated COSE signature algorithm identifier.
pub fn signature_algorithm(&self) -> SignatureAlgorithm {
match self {
PrivateKey::Ecdsa(_) => SignatureAlgorithm::ES256,
#[cfg(feature = "ed25519")]
PrivateKey::Ed25519(_) => SignatureAlgorithm::EDDSA,
}
}
/// Writes the key bytes.
pub fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
match self {
PrivateKey::Ecdsa(ecdsa_key) => {
let mut key_bytes = vec![0u8; 32];
ecdsa_key.to_bytes(array_mut_ref!(key_bytes, 0, 32));
key_bytes
}
#[cfg(feature = "ed25519")]
PrivateKey::Ed25519(ed25519_key) => ed25519_key.seed().to_vec(),
}
}
}
impl From<PrivateKey> for cbor::Value {
fn from(private_key: PrivateKey) -> Self {
cbor_array![
cbor_int!(private_key.signature_algorithm() as i64),
cbor_bytes!(private_key.to_bytes()),
]
}
}
impl TryFrom<cbor::Value> for PrivateKey {
type Error = Ctap2StatusCode;
fn try_from(cbor_value: cbor::Value) -> Result<Self, Ctap2StatusCode> {
let mut array = extract_array(cbor_value)?;
if array.len() != 2 {
return Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_INVALID_CBOR);
}
let key_bytes = extract_byte_string(array.pop().unwrap())?;
match SignatureAlgorithm::try_from(array.pop().unwrap())? {
SignatureAlgorithm::ES256 => PrivateKey::new_ecdsa_from_bytes(&key_bytes)
.ok_or(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_INVALID_CBOR),
#[cfg(feature = "ed25519")]
SignatureAlgorithm::EDDSA => PrivateKey::new_ed25519_from_bytes(&key_bytes)
.ok_or(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_INVALID_CBOR),
_ => Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_INVALID_CBOR),
}
}
}
impl From<ecdsa::SecKey> for PrivateKey {
fn from(ecdsa_key: ecdsa::SecKey) -> Self {
PrivateKey::Ecdsa(ecdsa_key)
}
}
/// Encrypts the given private key and relying party ID hash into a credential ID.
///
/// Other information, such as a user name, are not stored. Since encrypted credential IDs are
/// stored server-side, this information is already available (unencrypted).
///
/// Also, by limiting ourselves to private key and RP ID hash, we are compatible with U2F for
/// ECDSA private keys.
///
/// For v1 we write the following data for ECDSA (algorithm -7):
/// - 1 byte : version number
/// - 16 bytes: initialization vector for AES-256,
/// - 32 bytes: ECDSA private key for the credential,
/// - 32 bytes: relying party ID hashed with SHA256,
/// - 32 bytes: HMAC-SHA256 over everything else.
///
/// For v2 we write the following data for EdDSA over curve Ed25519 (algorithm -8, curve 6):
/// - 1 byte : version number
/// - 16 bytes: initialization vector for AES-256,
/// - 32 bytes: Ed25519 private key for the credential,
/// - 32 bytes: relying party ID hashed with SHA256,
/// - 32 bytes: HMAC-SHA256 over everything else.
pub fn encrypt_key_handle(
env: &mut impl Env,
private_key: &PrivateKey,
application: &[u8; 32],
) -> Result<Vec<u8>, Ctap2StatusCode> {
let master_keys = storage::master_keys(env)?;
let aes_enc_key = crypto::aes256::EncryptionKey::new(&master_keys.encryption);
let mut plaintext = [0; 64];
let version = match private_key {
PrivateKey::Ecdsa(ecdsa_key) => {
ecdsa_key.to_bytes(array_mut_ref!(plaintext, 0, 32));
ECDSA_CREDENTIAL_ID_VERSION
}
#[cfg(feature = "ed25519")]
PrivateKey::Ed25519(ed25519_key) => {
let sk_bytes = *ed25519_key.seed();
plaintext[0..32].copy_from_slice(&sk_bytes);
ED25519_CREDENTIAL_ID_VERSION
}
};
plaintext[32..64].copy_from_slice(application);
let mut encrypted_id = aes256_cbc_encrypt(env.rng(), &aes_enc_key, &plaintext, true)?;
encrypted_id.insert(0, version);
let id_hmac = hmac_256::<Sha256>(&master_keys.hmac, &encrypted_id[..]);
encrypted_id.extend(&id_hmac);
Ok(encrypted_id)
}
/// Decrypts a credential ID and writes the private key into a PublicKeyCredentialSource.
///
/// Returns None if
/// - the format does not match any known versions,
/// - the HMAC test fails or
/// - the relying party does not match the decrypted relying party ID hash.
///
/// This functions reads:
/// - legacy credentials (no version number),
/// - v1 (ECDSA)
/// - v2 (EdDSA over curve Ed25519)
pub fn decrypt_credential_source(
env: &mut impl Env,
credential_id: Vec<u8>,
rp_id_hash: &[u8],
) -> Result<Option<PublicKeyCredentialSource>, Ctap2StatusCode> {
if credential_id.len() < LEGACY_CREDENTIAL_ID_SIZE {
return Ok(None);
}
let master_keys = storage::master_keys(env)?;
let hmac_message_size = credential_id.len() - 32;
if !verify_hmac_256::<Sha256>(
&master_keys.hmac,
&credential_id[..hmac_message_size],
array_ref![credential_id, hmac_message_size, 32],
) {
return Ok(None);
}
let (payload, algorithm) = if credential_id.len() == LEGACY_CREDENTIAL_ID_SIZE {
(&credential_id[..hmac_message_size], ES256_ALGORITHM)
} else {
// Version number check
let algorithm = match credential_id[0] {
ECDSA_CREDENTIAL_ID_VERSION => ES256_ALGORITHM,
#[cfg(feature = "ed25519")]
ED25519_CREDENTIAL_ID_VERSION => EDDSA_ALGORITHM,
_ => return Ok(None),
};
(&credential_id[1..hmac_message_size], algorithm)
};
if payload.len() != 80 {
// We shouldn't have HMAC'ed anything of different length. The check is cheap though.
return Ok(None);
}
let aes_enc_key = crypto::aes256::EncryptionKey::new(&master_keys.encryption);
let decrypted_id = aes256_cbc_decrypt(&aes_enc_key, payload, true)?;
if rp_id_hash != &decrypted_id[32..] {
return Ok(None);
}
let sk_option = match algorithm {
ES256_ALGORITHM => PrivateKey::new_ecdsa_from_bytes(&decrypted_id[..32]),
#[cfg(feature = "ed25519")]
EDDSA_ALGORITHM => PrivateKey::new_ed25519_from_bytes(&decrypted_id[..32]),
_ => return Ok(None),
};
Ok(sk_option.map(|sk| PublicKeyCredentialSource {
key_type: PublicKeyCredentialType::PublicKey,
credential_id,
private_key: sk,
rp_id: String::from(""),
user_handle: vec![],
user_display_name: None,
cred_protect_policy: None,
creation_order: 0,
user_name: None,
user_icon: None,
cred_blob: None,
large_blob_key: None,
}))
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod test {
use super::*;
use crate::env::test::TestEnv;
#[test]
fn test_encrypt_decrypt_with_iv() {
let mut env = TestEnv::new();
let aes_enc_key = crypto::aes256::EncryptionKey::new(&[0xC2; 32]);
let plaintext = vec![0xAA; 64];
let ciphertext = aes256_cbc_encrypt(env.rng(), &aes_enc_key, &plaintext, true).unwrap();
let decrypted = aes256_cbc_decrypt(&aes_enc_key, &ciphertext, true).unwrap();
assert_eq!(decrypted, plaintext);
}
#[test]
fn test_encrypt_decrypt_without_iv() {
let mut env = TestEnv::new();
let aes_enc_key = crypto::aes256::EncryptionKey::new(&[0xC2; 32]);
let plaintext = vec![0xAA; 64];
let ciphertext = aes256_cbc_encrypt(env.rng(), &aes_enc_key, &plaintext, false).unwrap();
let decrypted = aes256_cbc_decrypt(&aes_enc_key, &ciphertext, false).unwrap();
assert_eq!(decrypted, plaintext);
}
#[test]
fn test_correct_iv_usage() {
let mut env = TestEnv::new();
let aes_enc_key = crypto::aes256::EncryptionKey::new(&[0xC2; 32]);
let plaintext = vec![0xAA; 64];
let mut ciphertext_no_iv =
aes256_cbc_encrypt(env.rng(), &aes_enc_key, &plaintext, false).unwrap();
let mut ciphertext_with_iv = vec![0u8; 16];
ciphertext_with_iv.append(&mut ciphertext_no_iv);
let decrypted = aes256_cbc_decrypt(&aes_enc_key, &ciphertext_with_iv, true).unwrap();
assert_eq!(decrypted, plaintext);
}
#[test]
fn test_iv_manipulation_property() {
let mut env = TestEnv::new();
let aes_enc_key = crypto::aes256::EncryptionKey::new(&[0xC2; 32]);
let plaintext = vec![0xAA; 64];
let mut ciphertext = aes256_cbc_encrypt(env.rng(), &aes_enc_key, &plaintext, true).unwrap();
let mut expected_plaintext = plaintext;
for i in 0..16 {
ciphertext[i] ^= 0xBB;
expected_plaintext[i] ^= 0xBB;
}
let decrypted = aes256_cbc_decrypt(&aes_enc_key, &ciphertext, true).unwrap();
assert_eq!(decrypted, expected_plaintext);
}
#[test]
fn test_chaining() {
let mut env = TestEnv::new();
let aes_enc_key = crypto::aes256::EncryptionKey::new(&[0xC2; 32]);
let plaintext = vec![0xAA; 64];
let ciphertext1 = aes256_cbc_encrypt(env.rng(), &aes_enc_key, &plaintext, true).unwrap();
let ciphertext2 = aes256_cbc_encrypt(env.rng(), &aes_enc_key, &plaintext, true).unwrap();
assert_eq!(ciphertext1.len(), 80);
assert_eq!(ciphertext2.len(), 80);
// The ciphertext should mutate in all blocks with a different IV.
let block_iter1 = ciphertext1.chunks_exact(16);
let block_iter2 = ciphertext2.chunks_exact(16);
for (block1, block2) in block_iter1.zip(block_iter2) {
assert_ne!(block1, block2);
}
}
#[test]
fn test_new_ecdsa_from_bytes() {
let mut env = TestEnv::new();
let private_key = PrivateKey::new(env.rng(), SignatureAlgorithm::ES256);
let key_bytes = private_key.to_bytes();
assert_eq!(
PrivateKey::new_ecdsa_from_bytes(&key_bytes),
Some(private_key)
);
}
#[test]
#[cfg(feature = "ed25519")]
fn test_new_ed25519_from_bytes() {
let mut env = TestEnv::new();
let private_key = PrivateKey::new(env.rng(), SignatureAlgorithm::EDDSA);
let key_bytes = private_key.to_bytes();
assert_eq!(
PrivateKey::new_ed25519_from_bytes(&key_bytes),
Some(private_key)
);
}
#[test]
fn test_new_ecdsa_from_bytes_wrong_length() {
assert_eq!(PrivateKey::new_ecdsa_from_bytes(&[0x55; 16]), None);
assert_eq!(PrivateKey::new_ecdsa_from_bytes(&[0x55; 31]), None);
assert_eq!(PrivateKey::new_ecdsa_from_bytes(&[0x55; 33]), None);
assert_eq!(PrivateKey::new_ecdsa_from_bytes(&[0x55; 64]), None);
}
#[test]
#[cfg(feature = "ed25519")]
fn test_new_ed25519_from_bytes_wrong_length() {
assert_eq!(PrivateKey::new_ed25519_from_bytes(&[0x55; 16]), None);
assert_eq!(PrivateKey::new_ed25519_from_bytes(&[0x55; 31]), None);
assert_eq!(PrivateKey::new_ed25519_from_bytes(&[0x55; 33]), None);
assert_eq!(PrivateKey::new_ed25519_from_bytes(&[0x55; 64]), None);
}
#[test]
fn test_private_key_get_pub_key() {
let mut env = TestEnv::new();
let ecdsa_key = crypto::ecdsa::SecKey::gensk(env.rng());
let public_key = ecdsa_key.genpk();
let private_key = PrivateKey::from(ecdsa_key);
assert_eq!(private_key.get_pub_key(), CoseKey::from(public_key));
}
#[test]
fn test_private_key_sign_and_encode() {
let mut env = TestEnv::new();
let message = [0x5A; 32];
let ecdsa_key = crypto::ecdsa::SecKey::gensk(env.rng());
let signature = ecdsa_key.sign_rfc6979::<Sha256>(&message).to_asn1_der();
let private_key = PrivateKey::from(ecdsa_key);
assert_eq!(private_key.sign_and_encode(&message), signature);
}
fn test_private_key_signature_algorithm(signature_algorithm: SignatureAlgorithm) {
let mut env = TestEnv::new();
let private_key = PrivateKey::new(env.rng(), signature_algorithm);
assert_eq!(private_key.signature_algorithm(), signature_algorithm);
}
#[test]
fn test_ecdsa_private_key_signature_algorithm() {
test_private_key_signature_algorithm(SignatureAlgorithm::ES256);
}
#[test]
#[cfg(feature = "ed25519")]
fn test_ed25519_private_key_signature_algorithm() {
test_private_key_signature_algorithm(SignatureAlgorithm::EDDSA);
}
fn test_private_key_from_to_cbor(signature_algorithm: SignatureAlgorithm) {
let mut env = TestEnv::new();
let private_key = PrivateKey::new(env.rng(), signature_algorithm);
let cbor = cbor::Value::from(private_key.clone());
assert_eq!(PrivateKey::try_from(cbor), Ok(private_key),);
}
#[test]
fn test_ecdsa_private_key_from_to_cbor() {
test_private_key_from_to_cbor(SignatureAlgorithm::ES256);
}
#[test]
#[cfg(feature = "ed25519")]
fn test_ed25519_private_key_from_to_cbor() {
test_private_key_from_to_cbor(SignatureAlgorithm::EDDSA);
}
fn test_private_key_from_bad_cbor(signature_algorithm: SignatureAlgorithm) {
let cbor = cbor_array![
cbor_int!(signature_algorithm as i64),
cbor_bytes!(vec![0x88; 32]),
// The array is too long.
cbor_int!(0),
];
assert_eq!(
PrivateKey::try_from(cbor),
Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_INVALID_CBOR),
);
}
#[test]
fn test_ecdsa_private_key_from_bad_cbor() {
test_private_key_from_bad_cbor(SignatureAlgorithm::ES256);
}
#[test]
#[cfg(feature = "ed25519")]
fn test_ed25519_private_key_from_bad_cbor() {
test_private_key_from_bad_cbor(SignatureAlgorithm::EDDSA);
}
#[test]
fn test_private_key_from_bad_cbor_unsupported_algo() {
let cbor = cbor_array![
// This algorithms doesn't exist.
cbor_int!(-1),
cbor_bytes!(vec![0x88; 32]),
];
assert_eq!(
PrivateKey::try_from(cbor),
Err(Ctap2StatusCode::CTAP2_ERR_INVALID_CBOR),
);
}
fn test_encrypt_decrypt_credential(signature_algorithm: SignatureAlgorithm) {
let mut env = TestEnv::new();
storage::init(&mut env).ok().unwrap();
let private_key = PrivateKey::new(env.rng(), signature_algorithm);
let rp_id_hash = [0x55; 32];
let encrypted_id = encrypt_key_handle(&mut env, &private_key, &rp_id_hash).unwrap();
let decrypted_source = decrypt_credential_source(&mut env, encrypted_id, &rp_id_hash)
.unwrap()
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(private_key, decrypted_source.private_key);
}
#[test]
fn test_encrypt_decrypt_ecdsa_credential() {
test_encrypt_decrypt_credential(SignatureAlgorithm::ES256);
}
#[test]
#[cfg(feature = "ed25519")]
fn test_encrypt_decrypt_ed25519_credential() {
test_encrypt_decrypt_credential(SignatureAlgorithm::EDDSA);
}
#[test]
fn test_encrypt_decrypt_bad_version() {
let mut env = TestEnv::new();
storage::init(&mut env).ok().unwrap();
let private_key = PrivateKey::new(env.rng(), SignatureAlgorithm::ES256);
let rp_id_hash = [0x55; 32];
let mut encrypted_id = encrypt_key_handle(&mut env, &private_key, &rp_id_hash).unwrap();
// Version 2 does not exist yet.
encrypted_id[0] = UNSUPPORTED_CREDENTIAL_ID_VERSION;
// Override the HMAC to pass the check.
encrypted_id.truncate(&encrypted_id.len() - 32);
let master_keys = storage::master_keys(&mut env).unwrap();
let id_hmac = hmac_256::<Sha256>(&master_keys.hmac, &encrypted_id[..]);
encrypted_id.extend(&id_hmac);
assert_eq!(
decrypt_credential_source(&mut env, encrypted_id, &rp_id_hash),
Ok(None)
);
}
fn test_encrypt_decrypt_bad_hmac(signature_algorithm: SignatureAlgorithm) {
let mut env = TestEnv::new();
storage::init(&mut env).ok().unwrap();
let private_key = PrivateKey::new(env.rng(), signature_algorithm);
let rp_id_hash = [0x55; 32];
let encrypted_id = encrypt_key_handle(&mut env, &private_key, &rp_id_hash).unwrap();
for i in 0..encrypted_id.len() {
let mut modified_id = encrypted_id.clone();
modified_id[i] ^= 0x01;
assert_eq!(
decrypt_credential_source(&mut env, modified_id, &rp_id_hash),
Ok(None)
);
}
}
#[test]
fn test_ecdsa_encrypt_decrypt_bad_hmac() {
test_encrypt_decrypt_bad_hmac(SignatureAlgorithm::ES256);
}
#[test]
#[cfg(feature = "ed25519")]
fn test_ed25519_encrypt_decrypt_bad_hmac() {
test_encrypt_decrypt_bad_hmac(SignatureAlgorithm::EDDSA);
}
fn test_decrypt_credential_missing_blocks(signature_algorithm: SignatureAlgorithm) {
let mut env = TestEnv::new();
storage::init(&mut env).ok().unwrap();
let private_key = PrivateKey::new(env.rng(), signature_algorithm);
let rp_id_hash = [0x55; 32];
let encrypted_id = encrypt_key_handle(&mut env, &private_key, &rp_id_hash).unwrap();
for length in (1..ECDSA_CREDENTIAL_ID_SIZE).step_by(16) {
assert_eq!(
decrypt_credential_source(&mut env, encrypted_id[..length].to_vec(), &rp_id_hash),
Ok(None)
);
}
}
#[test]
fn test_ecdsa_decrypt_credential_missing_blocks() {
test_decrypt_credential_missing_blocks(SignatureAlgorithm::ES256);
}
#[test]
#[cfg(feature = "ed25519")]
fn test_ed25519_decrypt_credential_missing_blocks() {
test_decrypt_credential_missing_blocks(SignatureAlgorithm::EDDSA);
}
/// This is a copy of the function that genereated deprecated key handles.
fn legacy_encrypt_key_handle(
env: &mut impl Env,
private_key: crypto::ecdsa::SecKey,
application: &[u8; 32],
) -> Result<Vec<u8>, Ctap2StatusCode> {
let master_keys = storage::master_keys(env)?;
let aes_enc_key = crypto::aes256::EncryptionKey::new(&master_keys.encryption);
let mut plaintext = [0; 64];
private_key.to_bytes(array_mut_ref!(plaintext, 0, 32));
plaintext[32..64].copy_from_slice(application);
let mut encrypted_id = aes256_cbc_encrypt(env.rng(), &aes_enc_key, &plaintext, true)?;
let id_hmac = hmac_256::<Sha256>(&master_keys.hmac, &encrypted_id[..]);
encrypted_id.extend(&id_hmac);
Ok(encrypted_id)
}
#[test]
fn test_encrypt_decrypt_credential_legacy() {
let mut env = TestEnv::new();
storage::init(&mut env).ok().unwrap();
let ecdsa_key = crypto::ecdsa::SecKey::gensk(env.rng());
let private_key = PrivateKey::from(ecdsa_key.clone());
let rp_id_hash = [0x55; 32];
let encrypted_id = legacy_encrypt_key_handle(&mut env, ecdsa_key, &rp_id_hash).unwrap();
let decrypted_source = decrypt_credential_source(&mut env, encrypted_id, &rp_id_hash)
.unwrap()
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(private_key, decrypted_source.private_key);
}
#[test]
fn test_encrypt_credential_size() {
let mut env = TestEnv::new();
storage::init(&mut env).ok().unwrap();
let private_key = PrivateKey::new(env.rng(), SignatureAlgorithm::ES256);
let rp_id_hash = [0x55; 32];
let encrypted_id = encrypt_key_handle(&mut env, &private_key, &rp_id_hash).unwrap();
assert_eq!(encrypted_id.len(), ECDSA_CREDENTIAL_ID_SIZE);
}
}